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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research question 
National governments usually delegate exclusive powers to bolster the credibility 
of policy commitments. Since credibility is related with the stability of policy 
preferences, national governments can make policies more credible by delegating 
competences to agencies that are independent from political pressures. This is 
argued in Majone (1996:40-42; 1997:145; 2001), who follows the seminal 
contribution of Kydland and Prescott (1977), and finds confirmation in several 
articles (e.g Elgie and McMenamin 2005; Gilardi 2002; 2007), which show that, in 
Western European countries, the need for credibility is at the core of the formal 
independence that governments grant both to regulatory agencies and central banks. 
The core of the argument is that elected politicians can hardly ensure credibility of 
policies commitments because they have an incentive to adjust policies to new 
circumstances than to follow fixed rules. Politicians may change policies to seek re-
election. In addition, the preferences of policy-makers may vary owing to the 
changes of the government coalition. Therefore, policies from national 
governments are likely to be time-inconsistent, that is, “a policy that appears 
optimal at time t0 no longer seems optimal at a later time tn” (Majone 1996:41). 
Following Majone (1996; 2001), national governments may overcome the problem 
of time-inconsistency through the delegation to agencies that do not have 
electorally induced preferences.  
On the basis of the above arguments, the credibility of policy commitments relies 
on the independence of agencies from political preferences. Hence, the changes in 
agency independence are expected to have repercussions on the credibility of policy 
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commitments. This point is evident in the contributions that focus on central banks 
(e.g Lohmann 1998; Franzese 1999; Keefer and Stasavage 2002; 2003). In 
particular, scholars stress how institutional arrangements affect both the autonomy 
of central banks and, as a result, the credibility of monetary policy. Lohmann 
(1998) shows that monetary policy outcomes may depend on the presence of veto 
players in the government. Keefer and Stasavage (2002; 2003), who refer directly 
to the contributions of Tsebelis (1995; 2002), highlight that delegation to central 
banks enhances credibility in the presence of multiple checks and balances.  
Since European countries have increasingly delegated regulatory competences to 
supranational institutions (see e.g. Egan 1998; 2001; Majone 1996; Moravcsik 
1998), it is important to investigate the independence of the European institutions 
especially when the logic of delegation is credibility. In other words, if credibility is 
at the heart of delegating exclusive competences, to what extent are EU institutions 
actually independent from member states’ preferences? How and under which 
circumstances can member states affect supranational decisions?  
The present study focuses on the policy of state aid control. According to Majone 
(2001:104), member states delegated treaty-based independence to the Commission 
in regulating state aid policy, as well as all the other competition policies, with the 
purpose of enhancing credibility of policy commitments. But, the formal 
independence does not necessarily mean the real independence. As shown in the 
contributions on central banks, the formal independence means more how these 
institutions should be rather than if they really are independent. Besides, as 
Franchino (2002) shows, member states partially limit the discretionary power of 
the Commission even when the delegation is credibility-based. At this point, the 
research questions of this work are: to what extent does Commission regulate state 
aid policy independently from national preferences? In which cases and to what 
extent are member states able to influence the Commission’s decisions?  
The present analysis shows that Commission is not fully independent from national 
pressures. I argue that member states may affect the decisions on state aid in two 
ways. First, they may influence the decisions when they can credibly threaten the 
Commission not to comply with European rules. Second, member states may 
influence the decision-making when they nominate the commissioners that are 
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more influential on state aid decisions. The results highlight that member states 
significantly affect the decisions on state aid as well as other factors, such as the 
Commission’s policy preferences, the procedural constraints in the rules, the 
amount of workload and the effects of financial crisis 
 
The politics of state aid control: a literature review 
Before proceeding, we need to define what a state aid is. Although the definition of 
aid is a matter of debate (Plender 2003), basically state aid is a government measure 
supporting a company that thereby obtains an advantage over its competitors. The 
notion of state aid is broader than that of subsidy (Schwartz and Clements 1999; 
Rubini 2009). In addition to subsidy, it includes also direct grants, soft loans, 
guarantees and tax subsidies. General measures in favour of all enterprises, such as 
general taxation, do not confer an advantage to a selective company, so they do not 
constitute aid. 
The control of state aid is a distinctive supranational policy since 1957, when 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands signed the Treaty 
of Rome. According to the Treaty, the European Commission is delegated powers 
in competition policy, which comprises the control of cartels, monopoly, mergers 
and state aid. State aid constitutes “the most original of EU’s competition policies” 
(Cini and McGowan 1998:135-136), because, unlike the other competition policies, 
it regulates national governments rather than firms. In particular, the Commission is 
delegated powers to restrict the opportunities for member states to support selective 
undertakings in order to prevent that national intervention in the economy distorts 
the competition within the common market. According to the EU law, member 
states have to notify any aid to the Commission, which evaluates the compatibility 
of such measures with the common market. If the Commission considers the aid 
compatible, the member state can grant the aid. Otherwise, if the Commission does 
not approve the aid, the member state is not allowed to intervene in the domestic 
economy.  
At least until the end of eighties the Commission could hardly control state aid 
policy (Cownie 1986; Wilks 2005) and national governments were free to act as 
they wished. In 1983 the Commission was empowered to recover unlawful aid 
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(Cini and McGowan 2008:175), but state aid control became more effective only in 
the first half of Nineties, in the wake of the institutionalization of the European 
Single Market (Smith 1998). Over the past decades, state aid control has improved 
so much that some scholars argue that non-compliance is too costly to be an option 
(Smith 1998:60-62; Blauberger 2009:721). In short, currently member states appear 
to be constrained by EU regulation, that is, they are unlikely to opt systematically 
not to comply with supranational rules. 
Notwithstanding the increasing attention on state aid policy (e.g. Lavdas and 
Mendrinou 1999; Quigley and Collins 2002; Nicolaides, Kekelekis and Buyskes 
2005; Cini and McGowan 2008; Szyszczak 2011) and the relevant consequences of 
supranational regulation on related policy areas, such as privatization (Bovis 2005) 
and public procurement (Chari and Cavatorta 2002), scholars have paid scant 
attention to the political factors that may underpin the Commission’s decisions on 
state aid. In particular, as shown in some recent contributions on the determinants 
of state aid decisions (Brouwer and Ozbugday 2011; Buts, Jegers and Joris 2011), 
scholars seem to take the autonomy of Commission for granted. However, the 
literature provides contrasting evidences about the independence of Commission’s 
decisions from national pressures.  
On the one hand, the literature stresses that the Commission enjoys great autonomy 
from member states in state aid as well as in other competition policies, such as 
cartels (McGowan 2000) and mergers (McGowan and Cini 1999; Doleys 2009). In 
effect, the Commission has been delegated considerable discretionary authority and, 
therefore, acts as a supranational entrepreneur developing its own vision of state aid 
regulation (Blauberger 2009) and contributing to consolidate the enforcement of 
state aid policy (Cini 2001; Smith 2001). As a proof of its independence, the 
Commission does not merely assess the economic impact of the aid on the common 
market, but it seems to ground the final decisions on its own priorities. The 
economic analysis is not so central in the evaluation of national measures (Cini and 
McGowan 2008:36-37) and the decisions seem to reflect the Commission’s positive 
attitude towards certain categories of aid. Blauberger (2009:726-729) points out 
that the Commission prefers horizontal aid (that are not sector specific) than 
sectoral aid because it considers the former less distortive to competition and closer 
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to its own market-correcting objectives. Buts, Jegers and Joris (2011) highlight that 
the decisions in 2007 are in line with the State Aid Action plan, which the 
Commission implemented in order to orient national interventions towards a “less 
but better targeted aid”. In addition, scholars offer evidence of the autonomy of 
Commission from member states, stressing the different criteria that Commission 
and national actors follow to evaluate and plan an aid respectively. In particular, 
this occurs in several contributions that examine the conflict between the European 
regulation and the national authorities on air transport (Lawton 1999), the co-
operative federalism in Germany (Thielemann 2000), the German banking system 
(Grossman 2006), the political economy in Poland (Gwiazda 2007) and the national 
law concerning film industries (Bellucci 2010). 
On the other hand, the outcome of supranational regulation seems to reflect the 
interests of national governments. Many contributions highlight that the state aid 
implemented by member states are related both to the policy orientations and the 
electoral concerns of incumbent governments. These contributions seem to offer 
corroborating evidence in favour of the member states’ influence on state aid policy. 
In particular, these studies seem to suggest that state aid is still time-inconsistent. 
According to the partisan theory of macro-economic policy (Hibbs 1977; 1992), 
Zahariadis (1997) finds a significant relation between the ideological position of 
government parties and the subsidies to industry in 1981-1986 period. In particular, 
Zahariadis finds that left-wing governments are more likely to subsidize industrial 
activity1. Then, in a more recent work the same author shows that state aid are 
related with the position of incumbent parties, but are granted especially by right-
wing governments (Zahariadis 2010)2.  
Other contributions emphasize the relation between state aid and elections. In fact, 
in light of several analyses, state aid represents a redistributive tool that incumbent 
governments use in order to increase their chances of re-election. Aydin (2007)                                                         
1 This result seem in line with other contributions of comparative political economy stressing that 
left-wing governments are more likely to intervene in the domestic economy (see e.g. Cameron 
1978; Swank 1988; Roubini and Sachs 1989a; 1989b; Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991; Garrett 
1998a; 1998b; Boix 2000; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Clark 2002).   
2 Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) reach a similar result. They find that right-wing governments present 
higher level of public expenditure. However, these authors show also that government position is 
less important than the size of government coalition (to examine the impact of coalition 
governments on expenditure, see also Bawn 1999, Pech 2004 and Persson, Roland and Tabellini 
2007).  
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shows that government subsidized industries to respond to the demands from social 
groups for employment3. Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2007) emphasize the 
electoral interests at the root of the Greek intervention for the Olympic Airways. In 
addition, even if the focus is not specifically on state aid, Cadot, Röller and Stephan 
(2006) emphasize the relation between electoral concerns and infrastructure 
investments in the transport in France, while Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find 
that national governments in Sweden grant programs to transfer resources in favour 
of regions where there are more swing voters.  
The literature looks also at the institutions structuring the incentives for distributive 
policies. McGillivray (2004) shows that, depending on the electoral rules, 
governments protect industries to distribute benefits to their supporters or 
alternatively to swing voters4. Franchino and Mainenti (2011), who follow the 
arguments of Persson and Tabellini (2003; 2004) and the contribution of Carey and 
Shugart (1995), illustrate the impact of the district magnitude on the amount and 
the frequency of state aid between 1999 and 2009.  
In some cases, scholars stress that national governments grant state aid as the 
election time approaches. As predicted by the models on political business cycle 
(Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; for a review, see Franzese and Jusko 
2006), Aydin (2007) finds that the amount of subsidies increases in proximity of 
elections, while Zahariadis (2005) points out the effects of electoral competition 
both on the intensity and the scope of subsidies to industry5. Furthermore, although 
this contribution is only partially related to state aid, John and Ward (2001) show 
that central government in United Kingdom grant greater resources to local 
authorities near national elections.  
                                                        
3 Aydin (2007) finds a positive relation between the unemployment rates and the level of subsidies 
to industry. However, the impact of unemployment on industrial subsidies in contradictory: Blais, 
Desranleau and Vanier (1996) find a positive relation, whereas Zahariadis (1997) does not find any 
significant relationship.  
4 Following the contribution of McGillivray (2004), Golden and Picci (2008) show the political 
determinants of infrastructure expenditure in Italy.  
5 Generally, apart from recent contributions (Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Franzese 2002) and some 
case studies (Kohno and Nishizawa 1990; Blais and Nadeau 1992; Schultz 1995), political-business 
cycle models have often performed poorly in empirical tests (Alesina, Mirrless and Neuman 1989; 
Alesina, Roubini and Coen 1997; Drazen 2000). Focusing on state aid, Zahariadis (2010) and 
Franchino and Mainenti (2011) find no significant correlation between election time and state aid.  
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In the present analysis I investigate if the Commission, according to the first group 
of contributions, is autonomy from member states, or, as the results of many studies 
suggest is affected by them. Unlike other analysis on the determinants of state aid 
decisions, I do not take the independence of Commission for granted, but I examine 
the mechanisms that may influence the supranational decision-making.   
 
Regulatory independence and mechanisms of control 
The present study analyses the independence of the Commission on the basis of the 
mechanisms that member states can employ to affect supranational decisions. In 
other words, the independence can be understood as a failure of the control 
mechanisms at disposal of member states.  
The analysis refers directly to the literature concerning the mechanisms of control 
that principals may use to constrain the behaviour of agents. Following the agency 
theory6, politicians delegate some competencies to agents and may need to control 
them in order to avoid that agents pursue outputs that diverge from politicians’ 
preferences. Therefore, politicians are expected to control the behaviour of the 
agents preventing the cases of adverse selection, that is, the appointment of 
unreliable agents, and constraining the agent’s discretion in order to restrict the 
likelihood of moral hazard.  
Generally, political actors may control bureaucratic discretion and output through 
different means of controls, such as appointing or firing agency heads, providing 
budgetary incentives and sanctions, reorganizing a department, having recourse to 
oversight7. In line with the seminal works of McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987; 
1989), Epstein and O’Halloran (1994) distinguish between ex-ante and ongoing (or 
ex-post) controls8.  
The ex-ante controls concern the design of statutes. In short, politicians may 
include some statutory constraints in the formal procedure that the agency has to 
follow when it carries out its duties. Although the design of statutes do not operate 
necessarily just as instrument of political control (e.g. Balla 1998), as Bawn (1995)                                                         
6 The implications of the agency theory for the study of bureaucracy are analysed by Moe (1984).  
7 Huber and Shipan (2002:27-37) provide a review of these instruments both in parliamentary and 
presidential systems. Volden (2002:209) lists the main mechanisms of control in the U.S.  
8 Bawn (1997) outlines that ex-ante and ex-post controls are related: effective ex-ante controls make 
ex-post control less indispensable and vice versa. 
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points out, depending on the level of uncertainty about agency behaviour, 
politicians may structure administrative procedures to affect the degree of 
responsiveness. Alternatively, Moe (1989; 1990) argues that the design of statutes 
aims to make difficult for other political groups to influence the agency in future, 
rather than making the agency responsive of political preferences now.  
The ongoing controls refer to institutions and procedures that check the agency on 
regular basis. For instance, they include mechanisms of police-patrol and fire-alarm 
(McCubbins ans Schwartz 1984; Lupia and McCubbins 1993; Hopenhayn and 
Lohmann 1996). Police-patrol implies a constant and direct oversight by politicians. 
On the contrary, fire-alarm regards a less direct and active intervention: it relies on 
the opportunities for constituents and interest groups to check the administrative 
output. Following Epstein and O’Halloran (1994:699), the term ongoing controls 
include also judicial oversight and appointment powers (see e.g Hammond and 
Knott 1996: 144-147; Snyder and Weingast 2000). 
The literature stresses that the presence and the impact of both these mechanisms 
vary considerably according to the different circumstances. In particular, several 
contributions, which focus on the control mechanisms exerted by the Congress in 
United States, emphasize the role of the institutions framing the political 
environment. For instance, some studies show that during divided governments 
Congress delegate less discretion to the executive, but it is more likely to delegate 
powers to independent agencies (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) and use statutory 
constraints more frequently (Huber, Shipan and Pfhaler 2001). In addition, Shipan 
(2004) highlights that the impact oversight by the Congress depends on the 
interactions among the policy preferences of different political actors at different 
times.  
On the whole, many contributions stress that political actors affect the behaviour of 
the regulatory agencies through the mechanisms of control. Most of the studies 
concerns the United States and stress the mechanisms employed by the Congress9. 
In agreement with the “congressional dominance approach” (e.g. Weingast and 
Moran 1983; Weingast 1984), scholars show the political influence on the                                                         
9 For a review of the limits of Congressional oversight, see Epstein and O’Halloran (1999:23-29). 
To examine under which circumstances the oversight introduces inefficiencies in agency regulation, 
see Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson (2007).  
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discretion and the behaviour of regulatory agencies, such as the Environment 
Protection Agency (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989; Wood and Waterman 
1993; Balla and Wright 2001), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
and the Federal and Trade Commission (Wood and Waterman 1991), the Food and 
Drug Administration (Olson 1995; 1996; 1999; Shipan 2004), the Medicaid 
program (Huber, Shipan and Pfhaler 2001), the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (Scholz, Twombly and Headrick 1991), the U.S. Trade Commission 
(Hansen 1990). In addition, several contributions emphasize the political control of 
bureaucracies in parliamentary systems: Thies (2001) highlights the impact of the 
distribution of junior ministers as a way to control the ministries held by coalition 
partners in Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Japan, Huber and Shipan (2002) shows 
the statutory constraints in the labor legislation of nineteen countries, and Jensen 
(2004) looks at the control mechanisms on labor inspectorates in fifteen 
democracies.  
 
Mechanisms of control and the autonomy of European institutions 
Scholars have started to focus on the control mechanisms in European Union 
especially since the contribution of Pollack (1997), who underlines that 
supranational autonomy is a function of the control mechanisms established by 
member states. Pollack (1997:113- 121) points out especially five mechanisms that 
member states may credibly employ to control the Commission. First, they can 
oversight the Commission through the comitology system. Second, they can rely on 
the monitoring activities of other European institutions, such as the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Third, member states can threaten 
the Commission with credible sanctions, such as non-complying with a 
Commission decision. Fourth, member states may threaten to amend the Treaty or 
the Council regulations that defines the Commission’s competences. In addition to 
comitology and the power to amend the mandate, Doleys (2000:542-543) consider 
other two control mechanisms that member states can use to affect the Commission. 
First, they can question the legality of Commission’s act, demonstrating to the 
Court that the Commission has acted beyond its mandate. Second, member states 
may affect the decision-making through the appointment of the individuals that 
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serve on the Commission. In particular, Doleys argues that member states may use 
the power to nominate the commissioners in order to control their behaviour.  
Overall, many contributions have examined the impact of committee system in the 
policy-making (e.g Steunenberg, Koboldt and Schmidtchen 1996; Dogan 1997; 
Franchino 2000; 2004; Ballmann, Epstein and O’Halloran 2002; Rhinard 2002; 
Pollack 2003; Häge 2007). On the contrary, there are no relevant works about the 
political pressures on the exclusive regulatory competences that the Commission 
derives directly from the Treaty. Nevertheless, the literature stress that member 
states may affect the Commission behaviour through commissioners. Scholars 
argue that commissioners both maintain a strong link with the respective domestic 
system (Egeberg 1996; Christiansen 1997) and have often a strong government’s 
party affiliation (Döring 2007; Wonka 2007). Furthermore, although 
commissioners should not act according to member states’ orientations (Cini 
1996:111; Donnelly and Ritchie 1994:35) and in spite of the evidences in favour of 
the overall autonomy of cabinets (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010) and temporary 
officials (Trondal 2008) scholars stress the impact of national preferences in the 
Commission decision-making (Hooghe 1999; 2001; 2005; Hug 2003; Thomson 
2008; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2006; Wonka 2008). In addition, some contributions 
stress the impact of member states on the European Court of Justice, that is, another 
supranational institution that, as provided for by the Treaty, should be independent 
from national pressures. Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz (1998) and Kelemen (2001) 
highlight how the institutional context may influence the ECJ decisions, while 
Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla (2008) show that member states are able to affect ECJ 
by means of threats of non-compliance and override.  
 
The argument of the thesis 
The present analysis argues that member states may affect the Commission’s 
decisions on state aid. They can influence the Commission through two 
mechanisms. First, member states affect the decisions if they can credibly threaten 
the Commission not to comply with supranational regulation and its decisions. 
Since the Commission can control and regulate state aid only if member states 
correctly notify and implement the aid, if the threat of non-compliance is credible, 
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the Commission is forced to approve the aid in order to keep the measure under its 
own supervision. The impact of these threats varies according the circumstances: 
member states credibly threaten the Commission when the monitoring by third 
interested parties, such as other member states or firms, is weak and affect 
especially the decisions when the Commission strongly sides against national 
intervention in the domestic economy. Second, as the Commission policy 
preferences play a relevant role in decision-making, member states can influence 
the decision-making when they nominate the most influential commissioners on 
state aid policy, such as the commissioner on competition and regional policy. 
These manage most of the applications and are able to influence the coalition 
formation within the College of commissioners in the evaluation of the most 
controversial cases. Therefore, member states that nominate the commissioners on 
competition and regional policy may benefit from an agent that defends their 
interests within the Commission.  
In addition, my analysis will highlight that supranational decisions are affected by 
the statutory constraints that member states included in the Council regulation and 
the Commission has to follow to evaluate each aid. Nevertheless, according to the 
formal rules, the results show that these constraints reduce the Commission’s 
discretionary power, but do not lead the Commission towards the approval.  
In short this study shows that, although member states delegated the Commission 
great discretionary power, they may have some opportunities to influence 
supranational decisions. In particular, the independence of Commission depends on 
the interactions among the level of monitoring by third interested parties, the policy 
preferences of the Commission and the policy orientations of national governments. 
 
The debate between theories of EU integration 
Even though the purpose of the present study is only to investigate the extent of 
Commission’s independence, the analysis is central to the theories of European 
integration. The present work follows the institutional approach to the study of 
European integration (e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001; 
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Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007), but it produces some evidences that may contribute 
to the debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism10. 
Neo-functionalism, or rather supranationalism, emphasizes the importance of 
international organizations in policy-making (Haas 1958; 1964; Schmitter 1996; 
2004; Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet 1998; Stone-Sweet, Fligestein and Sandholtz 
2001; Rosamund 2005). Basically, neo-functional scholarship considers European 
institutions, such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice, 
independent actors that are able to shape the policy outcomes in the European 
Union. On the contrary, intergovernmentalism put emphasis on the impact of 
member states’ preferences on the development of supranational institutions 
(Hoffmann 1966; 1982; Taylor 1983; Moravcsik 1993; 1995; 1998; Milward 1992). 
As member states play a central role in the European Union, supranational 
institutions are understood as a means to lower the costs of intergovernmental 
decisions. 
Recently, some contributions emphasize the usefulness of neo-functionalism to 
understand the development of the European regulation on competition policy 
(McGowan 2007; Cini and McGowan 2008:199-213). The scholars emphasize the 
role of the Commission as policy entrepreneur and the process of spill-over that 
foster and consolidate European integration.  
The present study, which stresses the conditional independence of the Commission, 
contributes to illustrate especially the circumstances under which state aid control is 
affected by national governments. The results show the significant impact of key 
member states and highlight that the Commission can still consolidate its autonomy 
from national pressures.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
The analysis includes five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the features of the 
European regulation on state aid. It includes three sections and analyse the 
development of the regulation over the decades, the formal procedure that member 
states and the Commission have to follow, and the organization within the 
                                                        
10 For a complete review of the European integration theories, see Wiener and Diez (2004), 
Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) and Pollack (2010).  
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Commission. The first section highlights the consolidation of state aid control and 
the changes of supranational policy priorities. The second section examines in 
depth all the provisions regulating state aid policy and put emphasis on the statutory 
constraints in the standard procedure. The third section looks at the conflict within 
the Commission and the structure of the DG Competition.  
Chapter 2 introduces a formal model on state aid policy that focuses on the strategic 
interactions between member states applying for an aid and the Commission. 
Chapter 2 is divided in two parts: the first section presents the basic assumption, the 
game and the equilibria; the second section presents the testable hypotheses on the 
impact of threats of non-compliance and the appointment of commissioners. The 
former derives directly from the model’s predictions, while the latter is related to 
the importance of Commission policy preferences. 
Chapter 3 describes the data on state aid to industry and services that I use to test 
the hypotheses. Chapter 3 shows how I measure both the dependent and 
independent variables and illustrates the cross-country and cross-temporal 
heterogeneity in state aid policy from 1999 to 2009.  
Chapter 4 tests the hypotheses deriving from the formal model in the Chapter 2. In 
this chapter I test the impact of member states on the aid in favour of industry and 
services that the Commission has evaluated from 1999 to 2009, providing also 
different analysis for regional and horizontal aid. In addition I show how the impact 
of member states has changed over the time and which member states have more 
influenced the Commission.  
Chapter 5 investigates the effects of national pressures on the decisions concerning 
the government measures in favour of a very sensitive and contested sector, such as 
car manufacturing. In particular, this chapter examines the extent to which member 
states’ influence on supranational decisions may have repercussions on the national 
spending for car industry.  
Finally, the conclusion presents the main findings of the analysis and proposes the 
possible strategies for further researches.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
State aid control in the European Union: 
development, rules and organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The present chapter analyses the features of the European regulation on state aid 
policy. It emphasizes the nature of the current procedures of notification and 
evaluation. The first section focuses on the development of the supranational rules 
and the simultaneous evolution of supranational priorities. In particular, this section 
highlights both the consolidation of state aid control over the decades and the 
present objectives of the Commission. The second section examines in depth the 
rules that regulate state aid policy and define the procedure that member states and 
the Commission have to follow. In this section I look also at the statutory 
constraints that member states may have included in the standard procedure to 
restrict the Commission’s discretionary power. Finally, the third section underlines 
the organization within the Commission, stressing both the structure of the DG 
Competition, the most influential directorate on state aid, and the conflicts among 
DGs. 
 
 
1.1 The development of the EU control on state aid  
Nowadays the European regulation on state aid is characterized by the extensive 
powers of the Commission, but this is just the result of a troubled historic process. 
Overall, the development of state aid policy is related to the enforcement of the EU 
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competition policy. In particular, since state aid control strengthened only in the 
mid of the eighties, this section first focuses more on the development of 
competition regulation, and then on state aid policy. 
 
1.1.1 The development of state aid control 
From the very beginning, competition has constituted a very important issue at 
supranational level: it was exactly the first supranational policy in the European 
Union (McGowan and Wilks 1995). Member states and Commission established 
and consolidated the foundations of competition regulation through three steps.  
The first step was the approval of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community in 1951. At that time competition policy was a very recent field 
and only a few member states had already adopted a domestic regulation: Belgium 
and Luxembourg had no legislation, Italy regulated monopolies through the 
provisions of the Civil Code, France relied on a weak regulation of restrictive 
business practises, Germany would enact competition rules only in 1957, while 
Netherlands would draft an act in 1956 (Cini and McGowan 2008:18). Given the 
considerable differences among the respective regulations and experiences, member 
states, also under the influence of transatlantic networks (Leucht 2009), agreed just 
on general provisions regarding particularly anti-trust. 
The second step was the signing of the EEC Treaty in 1957. The negotiations 
preceding the agreement were affected by the conflicting positions of Germany and 
France. Germany was for rules preserving fair competition in the common market, 
whereas the French position was not so cohesive: it was for a market economy in 
principle, but it appreciated state intervention as well (Seidel 2009:130-131). 
Because of this conflict, member states included in the Treaty only some basic and 
broad provisions. These provisions are still so general that the literature provides 
opposite interpretations: some scholars consider that the EEC Treaty presents 
similarities with the German competition law (Cini and McGowan 2008:13-16), 
while someone else consider that the same provisions refer to the French law of 
1953 (Siedel 2009:131-132).  
The third step was the agreement on the final version of the Regulation 17 in 1961. 
Regulation 17 was at the heart of DG Competition and therefore also of the 
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enforcement of competition regulation (Siedel 2009:139-141). In particular, the 
Commission asked member states to follow some basic elements, such as the 
prohibition of restrictive practises and the obligatory notification. In spite of the 
preliminary protests of the French government and the industrialists in Belgium, 
France and Germany, Regulation 17 was approved in December 1961 (Siedel 
2009:139). Member states reached an agreement also because the first 
commissioner on competition, Hans von der Groeben, held a leading role during 
the negotiations. The leadership of the commissioner was likely to affect also the 
content of Regulation 17, which, at least partially, reflected the German model of 
notification, evaluation and exemption (Seidel 2009).  
Once member states reached an agreement on the basics of the supranational 
regulation on competition, the Commission proceeded to develop a consistent set of 
policy priorities. In the early sixties, competition policy meant especially restrictive 
practise policy, therefore state aid and monopoly were marginalized (Cini and 
McGowan 2008:21-22). A substantial change occurred at the end of the sixties with 
the establishment of the Common External Tariff and the removal of intra-EC 
tariffs: in this period the DG Competition extended the attention on all the non-
tariffs barriers to trade, government subsidies to national industries included (Cini 
and McGowan 2008:24). In spite of the increasing attention by the DG Competition, 
competition and state aid regulation were still weak. The weakness was represented 
by the enforcement and, in particular, the obligatory notification was the most 
important issue that the DG Competition had to face. The solution to the 
notification of state aid was the exemption for certain types of government 
interventions that were considered compatible with the common market. The 
exemption aimed to strengthen the supranational authority incentivizing companies 
and member states to follow the European rules on competition (Goyder 1988). In 
addition, the exemption reduced the workload of Commission. Council approved 
the exemption policy in 1965, only after the Commission had gained experience in 
the fields of exclusive distribution and purchasing (Cini and McGowan 2008:20-
21). Despite this reform, the enforcement procedures would soon reveal still 
inadequate.  
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The recession deriving from the oil crisis of 1973 emphasized the limits of state aid 
control to cope with a drastic change in the economic environment. Given the 
economic recession, although the Commission relaxed its position towards state aid 
(Merkin and Williams 1984:327), member states usually did not comply with 
supranational rules to take some immediate countermeasures to unemployment and 
failing industries (Cownie 1986). Since the Commission had no relevant tool to 
regulate national interventions in sensitive areas such as the management of 
industries and sectors in decline, state aid control was totally ineffective (Cini and 
McGowan 2008:26).  
In addition, the economic downturn affected the capacity of supranational 
institutions to find a solution. In particular, the recession influenced the 
negotiations concerning the establishment of a common industrial policy. In 1973, 
according to a project proposed for the first time at the end of the sixties, the 
Commission proposed the Council to adopt a programme on a future European 
industrial policy. Given the economic circumstances, as member states focused 
more on national than common problems, negotiations were substantially 
inconclusive (Cini and McGowan 2008:26). In short, the economic crisis 
emphasized “the general anti-supranational ethos of the time and the desire of key 
member states to retain absolute control over their national industrial policy” (Cini 
and McGowan 2008:27).  
Competition and state aid policy were significantly consolidated only in the mid of 
the eighties. More generally, the failures of state aid control in the seventies lead to 
a substantial change over the course of the following decades. This change was due 
to four factors. First, since competition officials had accumulated more experience, 
the DG Competition moved from a reactive towards a proactive, more managerially 
aware and innovatory mode of administration (Wilks and McGowan 1996:247).  
Second, the European Court of Justice supported the Commission’s authority on 
state aid control. In particular, the sentences of the European Court of Justice 
between the end of seventies and the first half of eighties allowed the Commission 
to recover the illegal aid11 (Cownie 1986:250; Cini and McGowan 2008:30-31). 
                                                        
11 A landmark was represented by the judgment of 17 September 1980 concerning Philipp Morris 
Holland . 
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The Commission first recovered an unlawful aid in 1983 and since that moment the 
recovery has become an essential tool for state aid control (Cini and McGowan 
2008:175).  
Third, according to the growing commitment to neo-liberal economic approach in 
western countries, competition was placed at the top of Commission agenda (Cini 
and McGowan 2008:31). The change of policy approach on competition policy 
started in 1981 with the appointment of Frans Andriessen as competition 
commissioner. Then, the neo-liberal approach continued through Peter Sutherland 
and Sir Leon Brittan, appointed in 1985 and 1989 respectively (Cini and McGowan 
2008:31-32).  
Fourth, the project of the Single European Market fostered the strengthening of the 
state aid control. The Commission increased the attention on state aid regulation to 
avoid cases of protectionism conferring an advantage for domestic firms at the 
expense of European competitors (Cini and McGowan 2008:32). For this purpose, 
the DG Competition proceeded to scrutinize all the aid that had already been 
approved between 1981 and 1986 (Cini and McGowan 2008:34). This examination 
allowed the commissioners Sutherland and Brittan to identify both the weak points 
and the future basic priorities, such as the transparency of national interventions 
(Cini and McGowan 2008:177-178).   
The changes occurred in the eighties had a significant impact during the nineties. 
Once the Commission’s authority and the single market project consolidated, the 
growing level of transparency made state aid control more robust12. National 
governments and private competitors increasingly notified the Commission cases of 
distortive aid, therefore boosting the likelihood of detection and punishment (Smith 
1998:62-63). However, the involvement of third interested parties represented also 
a critical change in the policy-making. As government and private actors monitored 
the respective competitors, they usually asked the European Court of Justice to 
annul a previous Commission decision: although in many cases the Court ruled for 
the Commission, sometimes it overruled a Commission’s decision (Smith 
2001:221-229). In short, private actors were able both to strengthen state aid                                                         
12 In the Nineties, the Commission provided a first relevant contribution on transparency of the 
financial relations between member states and undertakings (Commission 1993). Then, in 2006, the 
Commission intervened again to improve the overall level of transparency (Commission 2006c).  
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control and constrain the Commission’s discretionary power. It followed that the 
Commission intervened to avoid this last consequence.  
Given the growing demand of business associations on a new regulatory regime, 
the Commission invited the Council to change the conditions of both state aid 
control and state aid policy (Smith 2001). In 1998 the Commission and the Council 
adopted the Regulation 994/1998 exempting member states to notify certain 
measures to the Commission. In 1999 the Council approved the Regulation 
659/1999 concerning the procedure member states and the Commission have to 
follow to notify and evaluate and aid respectively. Although the Commission 
needed for the approval of member states represented in the Council, it safeguarded 
its own autonomy from national pressures. Undoubtedly the new regulations 
reflected the conflict between the national governments and Commission, but, since 
member states followed different industrial traditions, they were not able to share 
some common positions against the Commission. In fact, the resulting agreements 
enhanced the supranational powers to enforce state aid decisions and Commission’s 
preferences (Smith 2001:232). Regulation 994/1998 both reduced the 
Commission’s workload and lead member states towards Commission’ policy 
objectives (Blauberger 2009:732-734). Regulation 659/1999, according to the 
demand of national governments, made the procedure more clear. As a result, since 
member states agree on stricter rules, the Commission consolidated further its 
authority in state aid policy.  
In the last decade, the Commission has improved the state aid regulation especially 
through soft laws, such as framework, guidelines and communication, responding 
to the changes occurring in the common market. The most significant reform 
occurred in 2005: the commissioner Neelie Kroes introduced the State Aid Action 
Plan to create a better fit between state aid policy and the strategies provided for by 
the Treaty of Lisbon (Cini and McGowan 2008:180). The State Aid Action Plan 
pointed out a roadmap for the reform of state aid policy in 2005-2009 in order to 
achieve two main objectives: consolidating the economic analysis of the aid; 
guiding national intervention towards competitiveness, innovation and employment, 
instead of the support to failing industries. In other words the State Aid Action Plan 
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aimed to orient member states towards “a less but better targeted aid” (Cini and 
McGowan 2008:180:181).  
An additional change occurred in 2008, when the Commission established a 
temporary framework in response to the financial crisis. In particular, the 
Commission simplified further the procedure of notification for aid concerning the 
financial and banking sectors (Commission 2009b).  
So far I have focused mainly on the consolidation of state aid control over the years.  
However, the improvements of state aid control are strictly connected to the 
development of the supranational policy objectives. As state aid control has 
consolidated, the Commission has changed its primary objectives. The next part 
examines the recent changes of the Commission’s attitude towards state aid policy. 
 
 1.1.2 The evolution of Commission’s policy objectives 
As the Commission has strengthened its authority, it has changed also its policy 
objectives. The Commission has clearly changed its attitude towards the three main 
categories of aid: sectoral aid, regional aid and horizontal aid. Each category 
represents a macro primary objective: the development of a specific economic 
sector, the development of a specific geographic area, the limitations of negative 
market externalities.  
The term sectoral aid refers to the national measures that are targeted at the 
problems of specific economic sectors. The measures in favour of specific sectors 
rely on frameworks or guidelines indicating the type and the scope of national 
intervention that the Commission is likely to approve (Cini and McGowan 
2008:184). The economic sectors involved in these frameworks have been, for 
instance, motor vehicle industry, air transport, synthetic fibres, shipbuilding, coal 
and steel, electricity, postal service, banking, audio-visual production and 
broadcasting (Cini and McGowan 2008:184-189).  
Regional aid refers to the development of specific geographic areas. According to 
the guidelines on regional aid, the Commission is likely to approve the measures in 
favour of the areas that are disadvantaged in relation to the national average, and, 
more generally, any measure promoting the economic, social and territorial 
cohesion of member states and the European Union (Commission 2010a).  
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Horizontal aid may be considered a residual category. It regards the national 
intervention towards sectors that do not rely on specific supranational guidelines 
and frameworks (Cini and McGowan 2008:189).  For instance, the term horizontal 
aid refers to measures in favour of disabled workers, environment protection, 
rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty, research and development, risk capital, 
small and medium enterprises, training.  
Since the failure of state aid policy in the seventies the Commission has been 
promoting especially regional and horizontal aid and opposing sectoral aid. As the 
Commission highlighted the need for member states to adapt to the changes in the 
economic environment, it has sided against any measure that aims to preserve the 
status quo (Cownie 1986:253). In particular, in the eighties the Commission 
restricted the national intervention towards sectoral aid, that is any measure aiming 
at remedying the structural difficulties of a specific economic sector. On the 
contrary, the Commission has appeared more tolerant towards regional and 
horizontal aid. 
Regional development has continued to be a primary objective of the Commission. 
Since the Treaty provisions establish that regional aid is likely not to be distortive, 
the Commission seems to consider the development of poor regions a prominent 
supranational objective. This is likely to be still true for two reasons: first, the 
enlargement process occurred in the 2004 and 2007 has widened the economic and 
social differences within the European Union; second, according to the Lisbon 
strategy, the Commission aims at reaching a greater social cohesion.  
As regards the horizontal aid, the Commission has increasingly been for this type of 
measure over the last years. As Buts, Jegers and Joris (2011) point out, horizontal 
aid has become more important since the approval of State Aid Action Plan in 2005. 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has shifted its approach on state 
aid, directing national interventions especially towards research, innovation and the 
optimisation of human capital (Commission 2005).  
The positive attitude of the Commission for regional and horizontal aid has also 
affected the formal rules on state aid policy. In particular, the “Block Exemption” 
and the “De minimis” regulations of 2006 and 2008 simplified the procedures of 
notification and approval for both these categories of aid. The next chapter 
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examines in depth all the features of the rules that member states and the 
Commission have to follow.  
 
 
1.2 State aid rules 
The basics of state aid control are included in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. Then, according to the Treaty, the Council has approved specific rules 
to improve the procedures of notification and evaluation concerning member states 
and the Commission respectively. This section focuses the attention on the main 
features of the rules that actually regulate state aid policy.  
 
1.2.1 Treaty Provisions 
The state aid regulation takes shape from Articles 107, 108 and 109 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)13. Article 107 states which aid 
are compatible with the common market, while Article 108 and 109 specify the 
institutions deciding on the compatibility of each aid with the common market and 
the institutions in charge of developing relevant regulations.  
According to the Article 107, any aid granted by a member state or through State 
resources that distort or threatens to distort competition is incompatible with the 
internal market. Article 107 then lists the types of aid that are, or may be considered 
to be, compatible with the EU law. It is compatible with the common market any 
measure a) having a social character, granted to individual consumers (provided 
that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products 
concerned); b) aiming at making good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences; c) granted to the economy of certain areas of Germany in 
order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by the previous 
division of the country. In addition, state aid may be considered to be compatible 
with the internal market if: a) promotes the economic development of areas where 
the standard of living is abnormally low or there is serious underemployment; b) 
promotes the execution of an important project of common European interest or                                                         
13 This is the new name given to the Treaty establishing the European Community since the Treaty 
of Lisbon entered into force on the first of December 2009. 
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remedies a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state; c) facilitates the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas; d) 
promotes culture and heritage conservation; e) it belongs to a category of aid 
specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.  
In accordance to the Article 108 any plan to grant new aid must be notified to the 
Commission, which, therefore, starts an investigation to evaluate the compatibility 
of the proposed aid with the common market. When the Commission finds that the 
aid granted is not compatible with the internal market, it decides that the member 
state concerned shall abolish or alter such aid. If the member state concerned does 
not comply with this decision, the Commission or any other interested member 
state may refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Article 
108 also establishes that, in exceptional cases and in derogation with Article 107 
and 109, a state can apply directly to the Council, which must approve the measure 
unanimously14. If initiated, the Commission’s investigation into this proposed 
measure is suspended. If the Council does not decide within three months, the 
Commission provides its decision on the aid.  
According to the Article 109, the European Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, approves any 
appropriate regulation for the application of Article 107 and 108. The 
implementation of TFEU Articles is further detailed in the Council Regulation 
659/1999 of 22 March 1999, establishing the procedure that the Commission has to 
follow to take a decision. In addition, the Council Regulation 994/98 of 7 May 
1998 enables the Commission to adopt the so called “Block exemption” and “De 
minimis” regulations. These regulations state which categories of aid are exempted 
from Commission’s investigation. The former is used by the Commission to specify 
the categories of state aid that are compatible with Article 107, exempting them for 
the requirement of notification and approval of Commission. With the latter, the                                                         
14 As a proof of the fact that Council decides only in exceptional circumstances, from 2006 to 2009 
the Official Journal includes only seven decisions on state aid taken directly by the Council. The 
decisions concerned: several grants by Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian authorities for the purchase of 
agricultural land (see Council 2010; Council 2009a; Council 2009b); an aid by Cyprus and Romania 
governments to mitigate the consequences of drought in agricultural sector (Council 2008; Council 
2007b); an aid granted by Finland for seeds and cereal seed (Council 2007a); and a measure by 
Cyprus to farmers in order to repay part of the agricultural debts created before the accession to the 
European Union (Council 2006).  
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Commission sets the thresholds under which the aid measure does not fall under the 
obligation of notification.     
 
1.2.2 The Standard procedure of state aid policy  
Council Regulation 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 establishes that the standard 
procedure of state aid regulation starts when a member state notifies a given aid to 
the Commission. Once the Commission receives the complete notification15, it 
proceeds to a “preliminary investigation” of the measure. If the Commission does 
not need additional information, it decides within two months whether the measure 
constitutes an aid and, especially, if it is compatible with the common market16. In 
particular, when the Commission raises no doubt about the compatibility of the aid 
at the end of the preliminary investigation, it takes “a decision not to raise 
objections”. 
Otherwise, if the Commission considers that the information provided by the 
member state is insufficient to take a decision, it opens a procedure of “formal 
investigation”. Every time the Commission opens the formal investigation, the 
member state concerned and any other interested parties can submit comments 
within a prescribed period (normally about a month). However, once the formal 
investigation is opened, the Commission has to take a negative, positive or 
conditionally positive decision17 within eighteen months. When the period of 
eighteen months is expired, the Commission has to decide within two months on 
the basis of the information available. If at the end of this period the Commission is 
still not able to assess the impact of the aid on the common market, the 
Commission has to reject the measure.  
The member state concerned can withdraw the notification of an aid before the 
Commission has taken a decision. If the Commission has already opened the formal 
investigation procedure, it closes the procedure that the member state intends to                                                         
15 The notification is considered complete when the Commission does not request any additional 
information within two months from its receipt. According to the Article 5 of TFEU, member states 
are obliged to cooperate with the Commission providing all the information required (Council 1999). 
16 If the Commission has not taken a decision within two months, the Member State concerned can 
implement the aid after giving the Commission notice, unless the Commission takes a decision 
within a period of 15 working days following the receipt of the notice (Council 1999:4). 
17 In case of conditional positive decision, the Commission establishes some conditions so that the 
aid may be considered compatible with the common market. 
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withdraw. Besides, the Commission can revoke any decision that has been already 
taken following the Council Regulation 659/1999. 
The procedure summarized above concerns the notification and the evaluation of 
“new aid”, that is any notified aid that member states have not implemented yet and 
the Commission evaluates for the first time. The procedure concerning the “new” 
aid is outlined in Figure 1.1. However, the Commission takes into consideration 
also other types of aid: “existing aid”, “unlawful aid” and cases of “misuse of aid”. 
The term “existing aid” refers to the following situations: a) any measure existed 
before the entry in force of the Treaty; b) any measure has been already authorized 
by the Commission or the Council; c) any measure that member states implemented 
as the Commission has not taken any decision within the preliminary investigation; 
d) any unlawful aid that member states implemented at least ten years before 
(without that the Commission or the member states have taken action with regard to 
such aid); e) any measure became an aid subsequently to a change in the common 
market18. If the Commission raises some doubts about the compatibility of an 
existing aid with the common market, it can send a recommendation to the member 
state involved. The Commission may suggest to: a) amend the aid, b) introduce 
some procedural requirements or c) abolish the existing measure. If the member 
state concerned does not follow the recommendation, the Commission opens a 
formal investigation procedure.  
“Unlawful aid” and “Misuse of aid” regard measures put into effect in 
contravention of the Treaty provisions. In particular, an aid is considered unlawful 
if it is put into effect without notifying the Commission, whereas the cases of 
misuse of aid concern any aid that is incorrectly implemented. Unlike the regulation 
for new aid, the procedure starts when the Commission evaluates the information in 
its possession (usually coming from a third interested party). Then the Commission 
requests information from the Member State concerned.  
 
                                                        
18 For instance, a measure may be considered an aid after the liberalization of an economic sector. 
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If it does not provide any information or provide incomplete information, the 
Commission can decide to send an “information injunction” specifying the 
information required and the period within which it is to be supplied. Usually, the 
Commission may need of investigating for many months in order to take a final 
decision on a case of unlawful aid. For instance, in 2000 the Commission founded 
that the aid of Spanish government in favour of the synthetic fibres producer 
SNIACE was not compatible with the common market, two years after the 
investigation had been going on19. 
Overall, in order to improve the application of the Council Regulation 659/1999, 
the Commission has introduced more detailed rules to simplify the notification 
process (Commission 2004b; Commission 2009d) and best practises codes to 
promote the cooperation with member states (Commission 2009c). In addition, the 
Commission has taken specific measures to assess unlawful state aid (Commission 
2002a; Commission 2007). 
 
1.2.3 “Block Exemption” and “De Minimis” regulations 
Council Regulation 994/98 of 7 May 1998 allows the Commission to exempt from 
the notification some categories of aid that, according to the Treaty, are considered 
compatible with the common market. As provided for by this Council Regulation, 
the Commission can adopt the “Block Exemption” and the “De Minimis” 
regulations: the former specifies which categories of aid are not subject to the 
notification requirements; the latter fixes the amount under which the aid does not 
fall under the obligation of notification. Both regulations set detailed rules to ensure 
transparency and to enable the Commission to monitor the aid exempted from 
notification20.  
The Commission Regulation 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 establishes the current 
provisions of the “Block Exemption” regulation. It states that, under certain 
conditions, aid to small and medium enterprises (SME), aid in favour of research                                                         
19 In that specific instance, as in 2004 the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission decision, 
the rejection of the aid was confirmed only in 2007, when the European Court of Justice overrode 
the previous judgement (Commission 2009a). 
20 Both regulations apply only to transparent aid, that is, aid for which it is possible to calculate 
precisely the gross grant equivalent ex-ante. In actual terms, an aid is considered transparent if it is 
comprised in grants, interest rate subsidies, loans and fiscal measures (Council 1998). 
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and development, aid in favour of environmental protection, employment, training 
and regional aid21 are compatible with common market. In detail, the regulation 
applies to the following measures: a) regional aid; b) SME investment and 
employment aid; c) aid for the creation of enterprises by female entrepreneurs; d) 
aid for environmental protection; e) aid for consultancy in favour of SME and SME 
participation in fairs; f) aid in the form of risk capital; g) aid for research, 
development and innovation; h) training aid; i) aid for disadvantaged or disabled 
workers.  
On the contrary, the regulation does not apply to aid to export-related activities22, 
aid related to the use of domestic over imported goods, regional aid favouring 
activities in the steel sector, regional aid favouring activities in the shipbuilding 
sector and regional aid favouring activities in the synthetic fibres sector. In addition, 
the Block Exemption regulation does not take into consideration any regional aid 
scheme that is targeted at specific sectors of economic activity within 
manufacturing or services23, while it applies in the coal sector only in case of 
training aid, aid for research, development and innovation, and environmental aid. 
In order not to alter the trading conditions, the Commission excludes from the 
exemption the undertakings in difficulty and the enterprises that benefited from 
illegal aid.  
In view of other rules on primary production, Commission imposes restrictions to 
the exemption in some sectors. As concerns the fishery and aquaculture sector, the 
Block Exemption regulation applies only in case of training aid, aid in form of risk 
of capital, aid for research, development and innovation, and aid for disadvantaged 
and disabled workers. In addition to the above-mentioned cases, the regulation 
applies to the agricultural production even for environmental aid. Aid favouring 
activities in the processing and marketing of agricultural products are not subject to 
the notification only if the amount of the aid is fixed on the basis of the price (or 
                                                        
21 Any regional aid complies with the map approved by the Commission for each member state 
(Commission 2008b) 
22 In this case, national intervention is directly linked to the quantities exported, to the establishment 
and operation of a distribution network or to other current costs deriving from export activities. 
23 Aid schemes in favour of tourism activities are not considered targeted at a specific economic 
sector. 
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alternatively on the quantity of the product purchased from primary producers) or if 
the aid is partially or entirely passed on to primary producers.  
Alternatively to the “Block Exemption” regulation, member states and the 
Commission may follow the “De Minims regulation”. This is established by the 
Commission Regulation 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006, which replaces the 
previous Commission Regulation 69/2001 of 12 January 2001. The Commission 
sets out a threshold under which aid are not subject to notification. Currently, the 
total amount of a “de minimis” aid has not to exceed 200.000 Euros over any 
period of three fiscal years, with the exception of the measures in the road transport 
sector that has not to be over 100.000 Euros. 
As the “Block Exemption” regulation, the “De minimis” regulation does not apply 
to export-related activities, aid related to the use of domestic over imported goods, 
and undertakings in difficulty. In addition, the “De minimis” regulation does not 
apply to aid for the coal sector and aid granted to undertakings performing road 
freight transport for hire and reward in order to purchase road freight transport 
vehicles. Besides, in view of other rules on primary production, the “De minimis” 
regulation does not apply to undertakings that operate in fishery, aquaculture, 
production, processing and marketing of agricultural products24.  
As a result of the financial crisis that emerged internationally in 2008, the 
Commission has modified considerably state aid rules, especially the “De Minimis” 
regulations. Next section examines in depth the changes occurred because of the 
financial crisis.  
 
1.2.4 Rules in response to the Financial Crisis (2008-2010) 
In the light of the financial crisis related to the U.S. mortgage market, on 26 
November 2008 the Commission adopted a “European Economic Recovery Plan”. 
(Commission 2008c). This Plan aims to reinforce the common market through two 
types of intervention. Firstly, it incentives short-term measures to boost demand, 
                                                        
24 As in the “Block Exemption” regulation, Commission applies any “de minimis” aid in favour of 
activities in processing and marketing of agricultural products only if the amount of the aid is fixed 
on the basis of the price (or alternatively on the quantity of the product purchased from primary 
producers) or if the aid is partially or entirely passed on to primary producers (Commission 2006e). 
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save jobs and help restore confidence. Secondly, it provides for investments to 
yield higher growth and sustainable prosperity in the long-term.  
The Recovery Plan lays the basis of a Temporary Framework for state aid measures 
(Commission 2009b). Given the hard impact of the financial crisis especially on the 
banking sector, the Commission, on a proposal of the Council, decided to add 
temporary rules on state aid policy in order to improve the coordination among 
member states, therefore preserving the common market. Since member states 
could be tempted to support their companies, the Commission introduced new 
common principles to avoid serious damage to the internal competition. In 
particular, the Commission approved the Temporary Framework on state aid in 
order to reach two objectives: first, unblocking bank lending to companies in order 
to guarantee continuity in their access to finance; second, according to the Lisbon 
Strategy, encouraging companies to invest in a sustainable growth economy. 
Although member states could achieve such objectives through general instruments 
at their disposal25, the Commission considered that the impact of the economic 
crisis requires exceptional responses at supranational level. In practice, it has 
allowed member states to grant certain categories of aid for a limited period (from 
the 17 December 2008 to the 31 December 2010) on condition that they show, 
according to the Article 107 of TFEU, that the aid to implement are necessary, 
appropriate and proportionate to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy.  
Under the Temporary Framework, the Commission introduces some relevant 
changes to the previous rules on state aid. First, as far as the “De minimis” 
regulation is concerned, the threshold passes from 200.000 to 500.000 Euros. In 
addition, according to the amendments of the Temporary Framework currently the 
“De minimis” regulation applies even to undertakings active in the primary 
production of agricultural products, provided that the total amount of the measure 
does not exceed 15.000 Euros. Second, in comparison with the previous provisions, 
the Commission allows to use loan guarantees in order to give simpler access to 
                                                        
25 For instance, member states could change the payment deadline for social security charges, extend 
taxation or grant financial support directly to consumers. If such measures are open to all 
undertakings without discrimination, they do not constitute state aid.   
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finance in specific cases. Third, the Commission consents to member states 
granting aid through an interest-rate reduction.   
 
1.2.5 The statutory constraints in standard procedure 
To sum up, the Commission regulates state aid following the Treaty provisions and 
the Council regulations. As the latter require the approval of the Council, it follows 
that member states have the opportunity to introduce some statutory constraints in 
standard procedure that the Commission has to follow in order to evaluate the aid. 
The possible statutory constraints used to delimit the execution of common policies 
are listed in Franchino (2007: 91-96). He applies the analysis of Epstein and 
O’Halloran (1999:101) to the European Union and finds eight types of means to 
constrain the Commission’s discretionary power: time limits, spending limits, 
reporting requirements, consultation requirements, public hearings, rule-making 
requirements, appeals procedures, exemptions, legislative action required, 
executive action required.  
The standard procedure on state aid includes only time limits. The Commission has 
to take a preliminary decision within two months from the receipt of the aid 
notification and eighteen months from the opening of the formal investigation. 
When the time for the preliminary investigation is over, the member state 
concerned, after having given Commission notice, can proceed to implement the 
aid.  On the contrary, at the end of the formal investigation the Commission has to 
reject the aid if it has still no information enough to evaluate the compatibility with 
the common market.  
As state aid regulation does not concern European funds but national public 
spending, the presence of spending limits on the Commission’s budget is not 
applicable. In addition, since the Commission derives its exclusive competences on 
competition directly from the Treaty, both Council and Parliament are excluded 
from the ordinary management of state aid policy. Therefore, the formal procedure 
on the evaluation of state aid does not include reports to other supranational 
institutions (reporting requirements), consultations before taking a specific decision 
(consultation requirements) and the legislative approval prior the Commission 
decision becomes effective (legislative action required). The Commission needs for 
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the consultation and the approval of other supranational institutions to apply a new 
regulation, but it takes the decisions on state aid independently of the preferences of 
Council and Parliament26. Besides, the Commission is independent of the approval 
by national authorities (executive action required): although the implementation of 
state aid relies on member states, the Commission’s decisions do not need the 
approval of member states’ representatives.  
Although member states approve detailed rules about the standard procedure on 
state aid, they often include any details on the Commission’s proposal. As a result, 
rule-making requirements seem to consolidate rather than constrain the 
Commission’s authority. Also exempting regulations do not seem to represent a 
constraint: in fact, the exemptions are proposed by the Commission to simplify the 
procedure and therefore to reduce the workload and orient member states towards 
behaviour that are compliant with supranational rules. Besides, the Commission has 
to publish any decision on the official journal, but is not obliged to hold public 
hearings before taking a relevant decision. Finally, appeal procedures may override 
a previous decision, but currently they do not seem to influence the Commission 
during the preliminary and the formal investigation.  
In conclusion, the supranational rules include just a relevant constraint, which 
contribute to establish the utmost duration of the decision-making. Member states 
define the time limits but they do not introduce any statutory constraints in order to 
increase their chances of approval. In other words, they influence the Commission’s 
discretion, but cannot benefit from the constraints in order to shift the decision-
making towards a positive decision. On the whole, the Commission seems to 
benefit of considerable discretionary power. Given the leading role played by the 
Commission, the next section focuses the attention on how the internal structure of 
this supranational institution may affect the decision-making.  
 
 
                                                         
26 The Commission rarely consult an advisory committee on state aid before adopting implementing 
provisions and publishing any draft regulation (Hofmann 2006:187). The meetings of the 
Commission with the advisory committee, which are called by the Commission, aim to facilitate the 
agreement and the co-operation on certain aspects of state aid rules. However, the Commission do 
not consult the advisory committee to take a decision on a specific case under evaluation.  
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1.3 Commission organization  
The decision-making relies on the commissioners and their Directorates General. 
Four DGs have relevant responsibilities on state aid policy: DG Agriculture, DG 
Competition, DG Energy and Transport, and DG Fisheries. Most of the aid is 
managed directly by the DG Competition. In the most controversial cases, the 
relevant commissioners evaluate the compatibility of the aid with the common 
market and the College of the commissioners take the final decision. In this latter 
case, the impact of the relevant commissioner depends on its ability to create 
coalitions within the College of commissioners (Cini and McGowan 2008: 45).  
Since the commissioners are nominated by member states, the decisions on state aid 
may bring about disputes within the College of the commissioners along national 
differences. In particular, given the different industrial traditions and orientations, 
member states usually conflict along the liberal-interventionist dimension (Cini and 
McGowan 2008: 47).  
In addition, commissioners conflict because their DGs pursuit different policies. 
Usually the disputes regard the DG Competition and the DG Regional Policy. Both 
have interest in managing state aid policy according to their respective policy 
objectives on cohesion and competition. The conflict concerns the implementation 
of regional aid (Frazer 1995; Wishlade 1993; 1998). This issue became particularly 
relevant after the reform of Structural Funds in 1988. Over the years, the DG 
Competition and the DG Regional Policy have solved some practical problems 
through a revision of the map on regional development. In this way, DG 
Competition has assessed the compatibility of state aid regulation with the 
programs concerning the Structural Funds (Cini and McGowan 2008:183). Then, 
despite these improvements, the enlargement process has increased the difficulties 
to coordinate competition and cohesive objectives both in old and new member 
states. Although the DG Competition has simplified the notification and the 
evaluation of regional aid, the conflict with the DG Regional Policy is still mostly 
unresolved (Gualini 2003; Wishlade 2008). 
Each commissioner is assisted by personal staff and cabinets: the former brief the 
Commissioner and link the Commission with national authorities, the latter assist 
the relevant commissioners to deal with the ordinary administration of the DG (Cini 
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and McGowan 2008:47). Focusing the attention on the DG Competition, which 
regulates most of aid, at the head of the DG there are: the Director General and 
three Deputies on Operations, Mergers and Antitrust, and State Aid. The Director 
General is the top senior officer and links the Commission’s priorities with the DG 
structure.  
The DG Competition consists of eight directorates: Directorate A on Policy and 
Strategy concerns the overall problems on competition policy; Directorate B 
focuses on energy and environment; Directorate C is responsible for information 
and communications; Directorate D regards financial services; Directorate E refers 
to basic industries, manufacturing and agriculture; Directorate F deals with 
transport, post and other services; Directorate G focuses only on cartels; Directorate 
H is about state aid, research and development policy, innovation, enforcement and 
procedural reform; Directorate R constitutes the Registry and is responsible for 
document management, strategic planning, information technology.  
A substantial change in the structure occurred in 2008, because of the financial 
crisis. From the end of 2008 to the end of 2010, Directorate D has included also a 
task force to find remedies to the consequences deriving from the impact of the 
crisis in the European Union. Apart from this change, The DG Competition has 
presented the same structure since the reform of 2003. In 2003 the directorate that 
previously focuses only on state aid was abolished. Therefore, state aid has been 
integrated in the other directorates in order to consolidate state aid policy along the 
sectoral and functional dimensions of the supranational regulation on competition 
(Cini and McGowan 2008:163).  
Although there is no specific directorate on state aid, more than a quarter of the 
officers are employed for state aid control. In 2006 the staff of the DG Competition 
included 750 officers: 188 were employed only to assess the aid notified and 
implemented by member states. Over the last decades, owing to the enlargement 
process and the need to make the enforcement more effective, the staff has doubled: 
from about 400 officers in the first half of the nineties to around 750 in 2006 (Cini 
and McGowan 2008:49). The staff is constituted especially by lawyers: they 
represent about the half of the officers within the DG. Although the DG deals with 
the economic impact of national intervention, state aid regulation relies especially 
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on the legal ethos and the judicial interpretations at the expense of the economic 
analysis (Cini and McGowan 2008:54) 
 
According to the features of supranational rules and the organization within the 
Commission, I produce a formal model stressing to which extent member states 
may affect the Commission during the decision-making. The next chapter presents 
a straightforward game of state aid regulation and six hypotheses on the strategies 
that member states can adopt to influence the decisions on state aid.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A formal model of state aid control in the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents a straightforward model of state aid control in the European 
Union. According to the formal rules analysed in the previous chapter, the model 
highlights how member states strategically interact with the Commission and 
stresses under which circumstances member states affect the supranational 
decisions on state aid. In particular, the impact of member states on the 
Commission’s behaviour depends on two factors: the policy preferences both of 
member states and the Commission and the level of control by third interested 
parties. On the basis of model’s predictions, the final section produces six testable 
hypotheses about how member states affect the decision-making through threats of 
non-compliance and the commissioners on competition and regional policy.   
 
 
2.1 A game of state aid policy: players, assumptions and outcomes 
The policy of state aid control is composed of two stages. The first stage, 
concerning state aid planning, involves national actors only: the domestic interested 
groups and the national government. The former lobby national governments for 
intervening in the domestic economy. The latter plans the aid and then it has to 
notify it to the Commission. The second stage regards the evaluation of the aid and 
involves supranational actors too. The Commission approves or rejects the aid on 
the basis of its compatibility with the common market. If the Commission has not 
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taken a decision yet, national governments may apply to the Council, which can 
replace the Commission in exceptional circumstances. Figure 2.1 summarizes the 
actors involved in state aid planning and decision-making. Since state aid 
regulation concerns national governments rather than firms, individual firms or 
interested groups are assumed not to interact directly with the Commission during 
decision-making. Although business associations and other groups play a relevant 
role at supranational level, they are assumed to lobby the Commission and the 
Council only to change sectoral frameworks. On the contrary, when the 
Commission evaluate a single case, interested groups are assumed to act just at 
national level. In other words, they may affect the Commission only through 
national governments. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Actors involved in state aid planning and decision-making 
 
Even though Figure 2.1 mentions four actors, this chapter presents a game of state 
aid regulation including only two players: a Member State and the Commission. 
The model looks at member states as the interaction among national governments, 
interested groups and other domestic institutions. In other words, member states 
reflect the policy output of state aid planning: they mean the policy preferences of 
national governments given certain domestic institutions and interested groups 
pressures. In addition, the game excludes the Council because the present 
investigation focuses only on the aid evaluated through the standard procedure.  
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Member State and the Commission are both motivated by policy considerations. 
For instance, Member State is motivated by the distributive or the economic impact 
of the aid, whereas the Commission aims to orient national governments towards 
specific supranational priorities. As in several models about congressional 
influence on regulatory agencies (e.g. Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Huber and Shipan 
2002; Shipan 2004), the policy preferences of Member State and the Commission 
are aligned along a single policy dimension. In the present analysis they are 
assumed to conflict along the liberal-interventionist dimension. Given a change in 
the domestic economy, Member State is interventionist if it is in favour of 
intervening for private companies. On the contrary, Member State is liberal if it 
prefers not to interfere with the market27. At the same time the Commission is 
interventionist when it considers that the state aid under investigation contributes to 
consolidate competition in the common market. Otherwise, the Commission is 
liberal, that is, it strongly sides against the national intervention in the economy 
because of its distortive effects. The Commission is assumed to be always more 
liberal than Member State.  
The game assumes that Member State and Commission have perfect knowledge of 
state aid policy. This means that both players are assumed to know state aid rules, 
the respective strategies, payoffs and moves. In particular, this implies that Member 
State and the Commission have the same knowledge of the extent to which third 
interested parties are likely to monitor the implementation of the aid.    
Member State moves first: it chooses whether to notify the aid to the Commission, 
to grant the aid without notifying the Commission or not to grant the aid at all. If 
the Member State is indifferent between notifying and not granting an aid, it does 
not grant the aid.  
When Member State chooses to notify, the Commission starts the investigation. At 
the end of the investigation, the Commission can approve or reject the aid. If the 
Commission rejects the aid, Member State chooses between two options: it has to 
decide whether comply or alternatively not to comply with the Commission’s 
                                                        
27 The term liberal does not refer to a specific party, but just to a policy orientation that objects to 
government interferences with the market.  
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decision. The game has five possible outcomes. Figure 2.2 shows the sequence of 
the moves and the payoffs.  
 
Figure 2.2 – The game on state aid control in extensive form 
 
SM = value of the aid for the Member State 
SC = value of the aid for the Commission 
c = costs of non-compliance  
pc = probability to pay the costs of non-compliance 
t = saving of time 
v = electoral cost  
 
The model fits well especially with the procedure that the Commission follows to 
evaluate the “new aid”, that is, the aid that Member State notifies and implements 
for the first time. However, sometimes the Commission evaluates aid that Member 
State has already put in effect without following the supranational rules. In this case 
the procedure starts when third interested parties notify an unlawful aid. Once the 
Commission examines the information provided by third parties, it proceeds to 
request information to the Member State concerned. On the basis of the information 
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available the Commission decides on the compatibility of the aid with the common 
market. In particular, if the aid is not considered compatible, the Commission may 
ask the Member State to recover the aid. Looking at the game in Figure 2.2 the 
procedure that the Commission follows to evaluate the unlawful aid can be 
interpreted as a situation in which Member State plays the game twice. First, 
Member State opts for granting the aid without notifying the Commission. Second, 
in case a third interested party should detect the aid, Member State notifies the aid.  
 
Member State’s payoffs 
The payoffs of Member State vary according to the value of the aid. This value is 
equal to 0 when Member State does not implement the aid. This occurs in two 
cases: when it prefers not to intervene in the domestic economy (O1) or when it 
complies with a Commission’s rejection (O4). When Member State implements the 
aid, the value of the aid (SM) depends on the policy preferences of the Member 
State. If Member State is liberal, the value of the aid is lower than 0 (SM  < 0); if 
Member State is interventionist, the value of the aid is greater than 0 (SM  > 0).  
When Member State does not notify the aid or not comply with the Commission’s 
decision, it may pay a cost (c). The cost is constituted, for instance, by a loss of 
credibility or the reversal of the aid. The cost (c) is assumed to be always greater or 
equal than the value of the aid, while the probability to pay the costs (pc) depends 
on the monitoring executed by third interested parties. If third parties, such as other 
member states and firms, pay attention to the execution of the aid, Member State is 
likely to pay the costs of non-compliance. In this case the expected costs are 
assumed to exceed the value of the aid (c * pc >SM) and, as a result, Member 
State is expected to notify and comply with supranational decision. On the contrary, 
if third interested parties are likely not to monitor the implementation of the aid, the 
expected costs are lower than the value of state aid (c * pc< SM). Therefore, 
Member State has the incentive not to comply with the Commission’s decisions. 
Member State is expected to grant the aid without notifying the Commission only 
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when third interested parties do not monitor state aid at all, or rather, the expected 
costs are exactly equal to zero (c * pc= 0)28.  
If Member State grants the aid without notifying the Commission, it avoids the 
supranational investigation and can immediately implement the aid. In other words, 
when Member State does not notify the aid, it can intervene straightaway in 
response to the changes occurring in the domestic economy without wasting time in 
waiting for the Commission’s decision. Hence, the game assumes that Member 
State saves time (t) when it grants the aid without notifying the Commission. The 
value of this saving of time is always positive.   
In addition, since state aid planning is rooted in domestic politics Member State is 
assumed to pay an electoral cost (v) if national government does not plan to 
intervene, but voters expected a government measure. The electoral cost (v) 
depends on Member State’s policy preferences: if Member State is liberal, voters 
are likely not to expect any aid, therefore the value of v is assumed to be equal to 
zero (v = 0); if Member State is interventionist, as the voters are likely to expect 
that Member State plans the aid, the value of v is greater than 0 (v > 0). Member 
State may pay the electoral cost only if it does not plan any aid. On the contrary, 
Member State does not pay any electoral cost (v) when it complies with a negative 
decision. In this case it may lay the blame on the European rules and the 
Commission.  
 
Commission’s payoffs 
The payoffs of the Commission depend on the extent to which it safeguards the 
common market from national and particular interests. The Commission can reach 
this goal on two conditions: first of all, it has to control each state aid implemented 
by Member State; then, it has to prevent that such state aid distort competition in 
the common market.  
First, the Commission can effectively control state aid policy only if Member State 
correctly notifies the aid and complies with negative decisions. Otherwise, the                                                         
28 I remind that the Commission evaluates the compatibility of an unlawful aid with the common 
market only when third interested parties detect the measure. According to the game, that occurs 
only if the level of control executed by third parties has increased over the time (and, simultaneously, 
the expected costs of non-compliance have moved form 0 to a positive value).  
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Commission is not capable to assess the impact of national intervention, unless 
third interested parties notify the unlawful aid. Aside from the control executed by 
third interested parties, in case Member State should not follow supranational rules, 
the Commission does not systematically control state aid before their 
implementation. In other words, if Member State does not comply with 
supranational rules, the Commission does not exercise its authority as provided for 
by the Treaty. For this reason the Commission is assumed to pay a reputation cost 
equal to -1 in two cases: when Member State does not comply with the notification 
procedure (O2) or a negative decision (O5).  
 
Table 2.1 – Payoffs for Member State and the Commission in each outcome 
Outcome Description Member State Commission 
O1 Member State does not grant aid 0 - v 1 
O2 Member State grants the aid without 
notifying 
SM + t – (𝑐 ∗ 𝑝c) 
 
-1 
O3 Member State notifies, Commission 
accepts 
SM  SC 
O4 Member State notifies, Commission 
rejects, Member State complies 
0 1 
O5 Member State notifies, Commission 
rejects, Member State does not complies 
SM  – (𝑐 ∗ 𝑝c) 
 
-1 
 
Second, the Commission has to rejects any aid that distort competition. Basically, 
competition is preserved when Member State does not plan any aid (O1), or 
complies with a negative decision (O4). In both these cases, the Commission 
receives a payoff that is equal to 1. Otherwise, if Member State notifies the aid and 
the Commission approves such aid, the payoff, which is equal to the value of the 
aid (SC), varies according to the Commission’s policy orientations. If the 
Commission is liberal, it is likely to raise several doubts about the compatibility of 
state aid with the common market. In this case, since the Commission is likely to 
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consider the aid distortive, the payoff is lower than 1 ( -1 < SC < 1 ). In other words, 
a liberal Commission prefers Member State not to intervene at all than to notify an 
aid. If the Commission is interventionist, it is likely to consider the impact of the 
aid on competition more positively. In this case, as the Commission considers that 
the aid consolidates more than distorts competition, the payoff is greater than 1 (SC 
> 1). Table 2.1 summarizes the payoffs of Member State and the Commission in 
each outcome. 
 
Equilibria 
Solving the game by backward induction, we find the sub perfect Nash equilibria of 
the game. The equilibria rely on three elements: the value of the aid for the Member 
State (SM); the value of the aid for the Commission (SC); the expected costs of non-
compliance for the Member State (c * pc). Table 2.2 outlines the sub perfect Nash 
equilibria in the game.  
When Member State is liberal29, it always decides not to intervene in the domestic 
economy. A liberal Member State prefers not to grant the aid at all, regardless of 
Commission’s orientations and the expected costs of non-compliance. Therefore, if 
the Member State is liberal the equilibrium is outcome O1.  
When Member State is interventionist, the equilibrium depends both on the 
expected costs of non-compliance and Commission’s policy preferences. If the 
expected costs of non-compliance are high, that are, greater than the value of the 
aid, Member State decides to comply. At this point, the equilibrium depends on the 
Commission’s policy orientations. If the Commission is interventionist, the 
Commission approves and Member State notifies. If the Commission is liberal, it 
rejects the aid. Then, Member State has to choose among three alternatives: 
notifying the aid to the Commission; granting the aid without notifying; not 
granting the aid at all. If Member State grants the aid without notifying, it is likely 
to pay the costs. Once Member State discards this option, two alternatives are left. 
Since Member State is interventionist, if it does not intervene in the domestic 
economy, it has to cope with the complaints of the voters expecting a government                                                         
29 Since the Commission is assumed to be always more liberal than Member State, when Member 
State is liberal, the value of the aid ranges from -1 to 0 (-1 < SM  < 0). 
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measure. Moving from the assumption that national governments do not want to 
disappoint voters’ expectations, Member State chooses to notify the aid to the 
Commission.  
To sum up, if Member State is interventionist and the expected costs of non-
compliance are high, there are two possible outcomes. When both Member State 
and the Commission are interventionist the equilibrium is constituted by outcome 
O3: Member States applies the Commission that approves the aid. On the contrary, 
if the Commission is liberal, the equilibrium is the outcome O4: Member State 
notifies the aid, the Commission rejects the aid and the Member State complies 
with such rejection.  
 
Table 2.2 – The sub perfect Nash equilibria in the game 
Member State Expected costs of  
non-compliance 
Commission 
Liberal 
 ( -1 < SC < 1) 
Interventionist 
 ( SC > 1) 
Liberal          
(-1 <  SM  < 0 ) 
Low, high or no 
expected  costs 
O1                                      
(No aid, Comply; 
Reject)                       
O1                                      
(No aid, Comply; 
Approve)                       
Interventionist 
(SM > 0) 
No expected costs         
(𝑐 ∗ 𝑝c = 0) O2 (No Notification, No 
Compliance; Approve)                       
O2 
(No Notification, No 
Compliance; Approve) 
Interventionist 
(SM > 0) 
Low                            
(𝑐 ∗ 𝑝c < | SM ) O3 (Notify, No 
Compliance; Approve) 
O3 
(Notify, No 
Compliance; Approve) 
Interventionist 
(SM > 0) 
High                           
(𝑐 ∗ 𝑝c >SM) O4 (Notify, Comply; 
Reject) 
O3 
(Notify, No 
Compliance; Approve) 
 
If the expected costs of noncompliance are lower than the value of the aid, Member 
State chooses not to comply with the Commission’s decision. As the threat of non-
compliance is credible, Member State puts the Commission in a dilemma. In 
particular, the Commission has to decide whether to approve the aid even if such 
aid may distort the competition or alternatively to rejects the aid running the risk 
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that Member State does not comply with the negative decision and implements the 
measure anyway. If the Commission approves the aid, on the one hand it allows 
Member State to implement a distortive aid, but on the other hand it takes the aid 
under its supervision and, therefore, it can adjust or abolish the existing aid later. If 
the Commission rejects the aid, it preserves the competition in the immediate future, 
but it is likely not to control the aid later if Member State decides to implements 
that measure without following the Commission’s decision. Since state aid control 
is a necessary condition to regulate state aid policy over the years, the Commission 
is assumed to pay attention first to control state aid and, then, to prevent that 
national measures distort the common market. Therefore, the Commission, 
independently of its own policy orientations, approves the aid. Since the 
Commission approves the aid, Member State chooses to notify. 
In short, when Member State is interventionist and the expected costs of non-
compliance are lower than the value of the aid, the game equilibrium is always 
represented by the outcome O3: once Member State notifies the aid, the 
Commission allows to implement the measure.  
If the expected costs are exactly equal to zero, Member State is likely to intervene 
without notifying the aid to the Commission. As in the previous case, Member State 
chooses not to comply with the supranational decision and the Commission 
approves in order to control the aid. As Member State is interventionist, it has to 
decide between two options: notifying the aid and granting the aid without 
notifying the Commission. Since Member State expects to pay no costs, it chooses 
not to notify the aid. In this way it can remedy a serious disturbance in the domestic 
economy at once. Therefore, aside from the Commission’ preferences, when 
Member State is interventionist and no third interested parties is expected to 
monitor, the equilibrium is represented by the outcome O2.  
 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
According to the predictions of the game, we can produce testable hypotheses about 
the impact of member state on the Commission’s decisions. In particular, the game 
contributes to focus the attention on two types of means that member states may 
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use to affect decision-making. First of all, the game stresses under which 
circumstances member states are likely to influence the Commission’s behaviour 
through threats of non-compliance. Second, as the game highlights the role of 
Commission’s policy preferences, member states may affect the decision-making 
through the commissioners that are more influential on state aid policy.  
 
Threats of Non-Compliance 
Following the game, once Member State decides to intervene and notify, if the 
expected costs of non-compliance are lower than the value of the aid, the 
Commission is forced to approve the aid. In this way the Commission may control 
the aid and review the measure later. Otherwise it would run the risk that Member 
State implements the aid illegally causing a serious damage both to common 
market and state aid regulation. In short, once member state notifies the aid, the 
Commission may be affected by the threats of non-compliance. Since the 
credibility of these threats depend on the monitoring by third interested parties, the 
first hypothesis links the likelihood that other member states or firms oversee the 
aid under evaluation and the likelihood that the Commission approves the aid. The 
less third parties are likely to be aware of the aid, the more member states will 
threaten the Commission not to comply with its decision, implementing the 
measure illegally. Hence, the Commission is expected to approve the aid in order to 
keep the aid under its authority. On the contrary, if third parties are likely to 
monitor the implementation, member states are not expected to use threats of non-
compliance and, therefore, the Commission is not forced to approve the aid.  
 
Hypothesis 1: the less third interested parties are expected to monitor the aid under 
investigation, the more the Commission is likely to approve the aid  
 
According to the game equilibria, the impact of the threats of non-compliance 
should depend not only on the oversight by third interested parties but also on the 
Commission’s policy preferences. In particular, member states are expected to 
affect the Commission especially when it is liberal, that is, against the 
implementation of the state aid under investigation. As an interventionist 
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Commission approves the aid in any case, even if the costs of noncompliance are 
greater then the value of the aid, the threats of non-compliance should influence 
especially a Commission that sides against government intervention. According to 
the game equilibria, when third interested parties are expected not to monitor the 
aid, the liberal Commission is likely to approve the aid. On the contrary, if third 
parties are expected to oversee the aid, the liberal Commission is expected to reject 
the national intervention. In short, the second hypothesis limits the impact of threats 
of non-compliance to the liberal Commission.  
 
Hypothesis 2: the less third interested parties are expected to monitor the aid under 
investigation, the more a liberal Commission is likely to approve the aid  
 
The appointment of commissioners 
The game and hypothesis 2 emphasize the role played by Commission’s policy 
preferences in the decision-making. So far, the Commission is considered to 
manage its own preferences independently of member states’ orientations. In real 
facts, since commissioners are nominated by national governments30, they may be 
considered member states’ agents. In other words, member states may use the 
commissioners as their representatives to influence the level of tolerance towards 
national intervention within the Commission.  
Although commissioners should not decide according to member states’ positions, 
scholars provide several evidences corroborating the principal-agent relationship 
between member states and commissioners. Hug (2003) shows that commissioners’ 
preferences may be related to those of the actors who nominate them. Thomson 
(2008) finds high agreement between the positions of the Commission and the 
member state of the commissioner primarily responsible for drafting a legislative 
proposal. Wonka (2007) stresses that commissioners follow their national parties’ 
positions. In addition, Christiansen (1997:82-85) argues that commissioners can be                                                         
30 Each member state puts forward a list of candidates to the President of the Commission. Once the 
president chooses the commissioners from the lists, the proposed College of commissioners has to 
be approved by the Council of Ministers through qualified majority. Then, the proposed College is 
submitted to the Parliament for its approval. Once Parliament approves the list of commissioners, 
the new Commission is officially appointed by the Council, which votes again by qualified majority.  
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considered member states’ representatives within the Commission, while Egeberg 
(2006) underlines that they are attentive of their country of origin and their political 
party.  
In accordance with the Commission’s organization, member states may affect the 
Commission’s decisions on state aid through the most influential commissioners on 
this policy area. Focusing on national interventions for industry and services, the 
commissioner on competition and the commissioner on regional policy are the most 
relevant within the College of the Commissioners. The former is at the head of the 
DG Competition, which has the greatest experience on evaluating the compatibility 
of national measures with the common market. The latter leads the DG Regional 
Policy, which involves the most relevant experts on the impact of state aid for 
regional development. Given their expertise on state aid, both commissioners are 
likely to have a significant impact both on the cases that fall under their 
competence and on the coalition formation within the College of Commissioners, 
when the Commission has to take a decision on a controversial case. As a result, 
member states may use the commissioners on competition and regional policy to 
influence the Commission’s preferences and increase their chances of approval.  
Member states may affect the decisions on state aid trough commissioners that 
defend national interests within the Commission. In particular, if member states 
propose a commissioner that strongly sides with his or her own country, we expect 
that the member state nominating the commissioner will take advantage of the 
nationality of the commissioner during the decision-making. If the member state 
picks out a commissioner that is strongly affiliated with the government coalition, it 
follows that member states will benefit from the commissioner only until the 
commissioner and the incumbent government concerned in the aid are affiliated. As 
soon as a different coalition replaces the government that nominated the 
commissioner, the commissioner is not expected to favour his or her member state 
when it is concerned in the aid under investigation. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 concern the commissioner on competition. In hypothesis 3, 
national governments are assumed to nominate a commissioner on competition that 
defends national interests within the Commission. In hypothesis 4, national 
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governments are assumed to nominate a commissioner on competition who has a 
strong affiliation with the government coalition.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The Commission is more likely to approve an aid proposed by the 
member state that nominated the commissioner on competition 
 
Hypothesis 4: The Commission is more likely to approve an aid proposed by the 
government coalition that nominated the commissioner on competition  
 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 regard the commissioner on regional policy. According to the 
competences of the DG Regional Policy, this commissioner is expected to affect 
only the decisions on regional aid. As above, member states are assumed to 
nominate a commissioner on regional policy that defends either national or 
government interests within the Commission. In hypotheses 5 and 6 member states 
take advantage of the nationality and the government affiliation of the 
commissioner respectively.  
 
Hypotheses 5: The Commission is more likely to approve the regional aid proposed 
by the member states that nominated the commissioner on regional policy 
 
Hypotheses 6: The Commission is more likely to approve the regional aid proposed 
by the government coalition that nominated the commissioner on regional policy 
 
The next chapter presents the data that I use to test these hypotheses. Chapter 3 
outlines the main features of the dataset that I produce and explains how I 
operationalize both the dependent and independent variables. In connection with 
this last point, chapter 3 describes the operationalization both of the key 
independent variables, concerning threats of non-compliance, the policy 
preferences of the Commission and the appointment of commissioners, and other 
control variables that may contribute to explain the decisions on state aid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Data and variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces the data and the variables I employ to test the determinants 
of the decisions that the Commission takes on state aid policy. The first section 
examines in detail the nature and features of the dataset on state aid policy I rely on 
to measure both the dependent and most of the independent variables. As the 
present analysis focuses on the aid in favour of industry and services, the dataset 
concerns all the state aid applications managed by the DG Competition between 
1999 and 2009.   
The second section highlights the procedure I follow to operationalize the 
dependent variable, which refers to the type of decisions that the Commission takes. 
The third section looks at the measurement of the factors expected to explain 
whether the Commission approves or rejects an aid. First of all, it describes the 
operationalization of the variables that, according to the hypotheses presented at the 
end of chapter 2, will be employed to test the impact of member states on 
supranational decision-making. These variables concern the threat of non-
compliance (hypotheses 1 and 2), the Commission’s policy preferences (hypothesis 
2) and the commissioners on competition and regional policy (hypotheses 3 to 6). 
Second, it describes the measurement of other factors that may affect the 
Commission’s decisions on state aid, such as the degree of selectivity of the aid 
under investigation, the statutory constraints in the procedure the Commission has 
to follow, the amount of workload, the effects of the financial crisis and the process 
of enlargement. Since the output of state aid policy has considerably differed 
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among member states and over the years, the present chapter stresses both the 
cross-country and cross-temporal dynamics concerning each variable. In this way, 
in addition to examine the main features of state aid policy from 1999 to 2009, I 
provide all the information we need to understand the results of the inferential 
analysis presented in chapter 4.   
 
 
3.1 State aid for industry and services in EU (1999-2009) 
The present analysis considers 324931 decisions on state aid that the Commission 
has taken from the 22nd of March 1999, when Council Regulation 659/1999 came 
into force, until 31st of December 200932. The dataset does not include 184 cases 
where the Commission has decided that the notified measure did not constitute aid, 
93 cases of notified aid with a pending decision and 56 investigations concerning 
existing aid. Data refer only to the measures that member states have notified under 
the procedure provided for by the Council Regulation 659/1999, excluding state aid 
implemented in accordance with the block exemption and the “de minimis” 
regulations.  
The dataset contains information on the dates of notification and decision, the 
member state concerned, the nature of Commission’s decision, the level of 
selectivity of the aid, the economic sector involved, the primary objectives of the 
aid, the policy instruments that member state will use to implement the aid, and the 
degree of compliance with the procedure of notification. Unfortunately, 
applications usually do not include precise information about the amount of aid 
expenditure. Although the data concerning the aid expenditure are available in 
aggregated form33, examining the aid case by case I have noticed that many 
applications do not show any precise information about the amount34. In addition, I 
can hardly estimate the aid expenditure when member states implement the aid by                                                         
31 I consider only the first application of a given state measure. Any subsequent procedure that is 
associated with the same measure is considered just a prosecution of the first application.  
32 Data are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm. I collected the data on 
state aid from the end of September 2009 to the end of January 2010. 
33 The aggregated data (per year and per member state) on the amount of expenditure are available 
in the EU Scoreboard (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html). 
34 In some cases the information is not available yet in the website. In other cases the information is 
not specified in the notification (see e.g state aid C64/2002 and C75/2002). 
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means of some policy instruments, such as guarantees or debt write-off. However, 
the amount of aid is likely to be a relevant determinant of supranational decisions 
only if the specific economic sector is equal.  
The dataset includes all the state aid applications processed by the DG Competition. 
Since the present analysis focuses on the measures in favour of industry and 
services, the dataset excludes the aid managed by the other DGs, such as the DG 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs and the 
DG Energy and Transport, which evaluate state aid in their respective policy areas. 
Although data refer just to the cases under the responsibility of the DG Competition, 
the present analysis concerns most of state aid that the Commission has evaluated 
from 1999 to 2009.  On the whole, the DG Competition has been the most involved 
into state aid policy. As Figure 3.1 shows, it has managed about the half of all the 
aid that member states have sent to the Commission from the March 1999 to the 
end of 2009.  
 
Figure 3.1 – State aid applications per DG Responsible 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
In particular, the present analysis concerns the majority of state aid proposed by 
each member state. As shown in Figure 3.2, the DG Competition has managed most 
of state aid planned by each member states, except five countries. Cyprus, Czech 
!!"#
$%$#
%%%&#
!%$'#
(# "(((# %(((# !(((# $(((#
)*#+,-./0,/-#123#410,56/#781,0-#
)*#92/0:;#123#<012-=>0?#
)*#7:0,@AB?A0/#123#CA01B#)/D/B>=6/2?#
)*#E>6=/55>2#
  58 
Republic, France, Italy and Lithuania have applied less than the half of all the 
measures to industry and services. Italy and Lithuania are the only ones that have 
applied more aid for agriculture and fisheries than industry and services. In 
particular, the DG Competition has processed about thirty and forty per cent of all 
the aid planned by the Italian and Lithuanian governments respectively.  
 
Figure 3.2 – Share of aid processed by the DG Competition, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
In addition, the dataset concerns the DG that after 2004 has been increasingly more 
involved in state aid policy. As shown in Figure 3.3, undoubtedly the DG 
Competition has recently processed most of state aid. Since 2005 the DG 
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Competition has evaluated a growing share of aid and in 2009 it processed more 
than seventy per cent of all the notifications.  
 
Figure 3.3 – Share of aid processed by the DG Competition, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
Figure 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the ratio between the data concerning the aid on 
industry and services, which I use in the present analysis, and all the aid evaluated 
by the Commission. Focusing just on the measures processed by the DG 
Competition, they concern especially some member states. As highlighted in Figure 
3.4, about a fifth of the aid originates in Germany and about two thirds of the 
observations originate just in six member states (Germany, Spain, Italy, France, 
United Kingdom, Netherlands). This is due to the fact that some countries have 
intervened more frequently in the domestic economy. If we divide the number of 
the measures that a member state has applied to the Commission by the number of 
years that the member state has joined the European Union since 1999, we find that 
Germany has notified on average about sixty aid per year, whereas Bulgaria has 
intervened on average just one time in a year.  
On the whole, the data refer especially to the government measures planned in the 
largest economies. As shown in Figure 3.4, more than the half of the state aid 
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originates in the five largest economies in Europe. In addition, the dataset seem to 
reflect the different traditions and models of political economy: the average number 
of aid in a market oriented system, such as United Kingdom, is less than the 
number of interventions in a managed-economy, such as Germany or Italy35. The 
processes of enlargement in 2004 and 2007 have not contributed to increase the 
number of applications. This is evident in Figure 3.5 that shows the trend of state 
aid application in favour of industry and services. 
 
Figure 3.4 – Number of aid for industry and services, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission                                                         
35 This means that data may reflect different industrial traditions (see e.g. Buigues and Sekkat 2009; 
2010), models of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 2007), 
government choices (Gourevitch 1986; Hall 1986) and regulatory regimes (Crouch and Streeck 
1997; Schmidt 2002; Thatcher 2002). 
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Figure 3.5 – Number of aid for industry and services, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
Inter-country heterogeneity is more important than cross-temporal differences. 
Apart from two peaks in 2000 and 2006, the number of state aid in the European 
Union has been fairly constant. Aside from 1999, for which I included nine months 
only, there appears to be only a one-step increase after 2004. Although in 2004 the 
number of member states passed from fifteen to twenty-five, on average the number 
of applications was up by about fifty applications per year. In real facts, this 
moderate growth may depend both on the frequency of government intervention in 
the new member states and on the decrease of the number of applications occurred 
in some of the largest economies especially after 2007. However, data for 2008 and 
2009 could be downwardly biased for two reasons: first, there are formal 
investigations are still pending; second, the cases of unlawful aid are normally 
discovered some years later.  
This introductory section highlights that the dataset reflects both cross-country and 
cross-temporal dynamics. As these differences among countries and periods may 
play a relevant role to explain whether the Commission approves or rejects an aid, 
the next sections both introduce the operationalization of the variables and describe 
how such variables are distributed among member states and over the years. Let’s 
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start with the analysis of the dependent variable. Then we proceed to examine the 
independent variables.  
 
 
3.2 Dependent variable: the type of Commission’s decision  
The dependent variable concerns the nature of Commission’s decisions. Since the 
Commission either approves or rejects an aid, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous: it takes value 1 when the Commission approves an aid, while it takes 
value 0 when the aid is rejected. An aid is considered to be approved if the 
Commission takes one of the following decisions: a) it has no objections about the 
compatibility of the aid after the preliminary investigation; b) it approves the aid 
after the formal investigation; c) it conditionally approves the aid after the formal 
investigation. On the contrary, an aid is considered rejected in the following three 
cases: a) the Commission provides a negative decision after the formal 
investigation; b) the Commission revokes a previous positive decision; c) a member 
state withdraws the application while the Commission is carrying out the 
investigation36.  
Table 3.1 shows that the Commission approves the vast majority of state aid. In 
almost ninety per cent of the cases, the Commission raises no objections about the 
compatibility of the aid with the common market. Therefore, it allows member 
states to implement most of aid by the end of the preliminary investigation. Besides, 
the Commission approves a further 4.5 per cent of state aid after a formal 
investigation that removes remaining doubts. Where the formal investigation ends 
with a conditional decision, the Commission approves, but the aid is subject to 
conditions that make the measure compatible with the common market.  
The Commission rejects 7.6 per cent of state aid applications. Only 5.8 per cent of 
the applications are eventually not implemented because of a negative decision. In 
addition, about two per cent of all the measures are not implemented because either 
member states withdraw or the Commission revokes a previous positive decision. 
                                                        
36 Negative decisions include the cases of withdrawals because member state may withdraw to 
anticipate a likely negative decision.  
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The majority of negative decisions, almost 95 per cent, are related to applications 
from member states that have joined the European Union before 2004. 
 
Table 3.1 –Supranational decisions on state aid 
Commission’s final decision Number of aid % 
 
Approval 
No Objections 2854 87.84 
Positive Decision 116 0.95 
Conditional Decision 31 3.57 
 
Rejection 
Negative Decision 190 5.85 
Withdrawal 54 1.66 
Revocation 4 0.13 
     Total 3249 100.00 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
The Commission has approved most of the aid concerning each member state. As 
Figure 3.6 shows, it has approved at least eighty per cent of the applications 
concerning each country. Rejections have been more frequent in older member 
states. The share of negative decisions is about ten per cent in Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Portugal. Besides, the ratio of rejections is above the average also 
in Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands and Romania. In particular, older 
member states are more likely to withdraw a measure: Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Poland and United Kingdom withdraw at least two per cent of their aid 
applications. On the contrary, for seven new members (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia) the rejection rate is equal to zero. Among theses 
countries, in six cases out of seven, the Commission has always decided “not to 
raise objections”, approving all the aid without opening a formal investigation 
procedure. The case of Slovenia is particularly interesting: it has not received any 
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negative decision although the Commission has usually opened formal 
investigation against.  
 
Figure 3.6 – Share of Commission’s approvals, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
Despite the slight increase of the total number of aid after 2004, the number of 
rejections has significantly decreased over the years. As shown in Figure 3.7, in 
1999 the Commission rejected more than 15 per cent of state aid. The figure 
decreased in less than 1 per cent in 2008. This trend could be interpreted as 
evidence of the fact that member states have learnt the common rules on state aid, 
but, since there are formal investigations that are still pending, data are likely to be 
downwardly biased in the more recent years.  
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Figure 3.7 – Share of Commission’s approvals, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
 
3.3 Independent variables: the determinants of supranational decisions 
This section concerns the independent variables, that is, the determinants of the 
Commission’s decisions. First, the section focuses on the three factors, threats of 
non-compliance, Commission’s policy preferences, and appointment of 
commissioners, which are expected to affect the supranational decisions according 
to the model and the hypotheses presented in chapter 2. Then, the section moves to 
examine some control variables, which refer to other factors that may affect 
decision-making.  
 
3.3.1 Threats of Non-Compliance 
According to the formal game in chapter 2, member states affect the Commission 
by means of threats of non-compliance when the expected costs of non-compliance 
are lower than the benefits of the aid. As the expected costs rely on the oversight 
executed by third interested parties, member states are likely to use threats of non-
compliance when other member states or firms do not monitor the aid under 
investigation. Alternatively, member states comply with the supranational decision 
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when third interested parties pay attention to the aid. Third interested parties are 
assumed to monitor the aid under investigation in three cases.   
First, third parties monitor the aid when they compete with the firms concerned in 
the application. In other words, once a member state notifies an aid in favour of a 
specific economic sector, the other firms involved in that same sector oversee the 
decision-making in order to check both the compatibility of the aid with the 
common market and the advantages for a direct competitor. Moving from the 
assumption that at least another firm compete in the same sector concerned in the 
aid under investigation, third parties are expected to monitor any aid targeted to a 
specific economic sector. 
Second, third interested parties are likely to monitor the aid when they are able to 
check easily the impact of the aid on the common market. Member states and firms 
are interested in examining to which extent the aid affects the competition. 
Nevertheless, they are likely to pay attention to the impact of the aid according to 
the opportunities to oversee the decision-making and the aid implementation. In 
particular, the monitoring by third interested parties relies on the degree of 
transparency during the implementation. According to the formal procedure, the 
level of transparency depends especially on the policy instrument that member 
states use to implement the aid37. The more the instrument, which is chosen by 
national government according to the institutional arrangement of the domestic 
economy, is transparent, the more the Commission and other interested parties are 
able to evaluate the impact of the aid, calculating easily and precisely the gross 
grant equivalent before the implementation.  
Third, interested parties are likely to pay attention to the aid if they have reason not 
to trust the member state concerned in the application. In particular, member states 
and firms are likely to oversee the execution of the measure when the member state 
concerned has already implemented the aid in contravention either of the 
supranational rules or the Commission’s decision, producing distortive effects on 
the common market. In other words, third parties strictly follow the notification and 
the subsequent implementation of all the unlawful aid.  
                                                        
37 I use the term policy instrument, as in the state aid applications, instead of policy tools as, for 
instance in Salamon (2002).  
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In short, we expect that third interested parties are more likely to monitor state aid 
especially when they compete in the same economic sector involved in the 
notification, when the policy instrument is transparent, and when the aid has been 
already implemented unlawfully. In these three cases member states are expected to 
comply with the supranational rules. On the contrary, if third parties are not 
interested in the economic sector involved, if the procedure does not allow to check 
easily the impact of the aid and if the aid has been correctly notified for the first 
time, third parties are less likely to monitor the aid applications. The above-
mentioned instances about the monitoring by third interested parties correspond to 
three different variables.  
The first variable, labelled Sectoral aid, concerns the economic sector involved in 
the aid. The variable is dichotomous: it takes value 0 when the application does not 
make reference to a specific economic sector, that is, the application does not mean 
the economic sector at all; on the contrary, it takes value 1 either when the aid is in 
favour of a specific economic sector or its primary objective is sectoral 
development38.  
The second variable, Transparent aid, measures the level of transparency of the 
policy instrument that member states notify in the application. Following the 
Council regulation on the “Block Exemption” and “De Minimis” regulation, an aid 
is considered transparent if it is comprised in grants, interest rate subsidies, loans 
and fiscal measures (Council 1998). The variable is dichotomous: it takes value 1 
when the implementation relies on at least one of the following instruments: direct 
grants, soft loans, interest subsidies, fiscal measure, tax allowance, tax base 
reduction, tax rate reduction and tax deferment; on the contrary, it takes value 0 
either when the aid involves other instruments (such as guarantees and debt write-
off) or the member state does not specify the policy instrument in the notification. 
The third variable is Unlawful aid. It measures if the aid was previously 
implemented without following the supranational rules. In particular, the variable 
means that the aid is either unlawful or correctly notified. In the former case, the                                                         
38 According to this operationalization, the economic sector does not refer just to the primary 
objective of the aid. In some cases the aid may be targeted at a specific sector even though the 
primary objective concern regional development or horizontal purposes. Therefore, in chapter 5 I 
will use this variable also to test the determinants of state aid decisions on regional and horizontal 
aid.  
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procedure starts with the notification by third interested parties. In the latter, 
member state notifies the aid according to the standard procedure. The variable is 
dichotomous: it takes value 0 when the member state notifies an aid for the first 
time and in accordance to the supranational rules, while it take value 1 when the aid 
is notified to the Commission by third parties.  
According to hypothesis 1, each variable is expected to be negatively correlated 
with the likelihood that the Commission approves the aid. The increase of each 
variable corresponds to the increase of monitoring by third interested parties. 
Therefore, if these variables increase, member states are less likely to use threats of 
non-compliance and the Commission is not forced to approve the aid in order to 
control the aid.  
The three variables, Sectoral aid, Transparent aid and Unlawful aid are differently 
distributed and are only partially correlated39. Member states direct the aid to a 
specific economic sector in 42.4 per cent of applications and implement the aid 
through a transparent instrument in 64.4 per cent of cases. Only the 12.7 per cent of 
observations concern unlawful aid.  
As shown in Figure 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 each variable presents significant cross-
country differences. Following the results in Figure 3.8, the measures in favour of a 
specific sector are frequent especially in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal and Slovakia: in these member states more than the half of all the aid 
regards a particular economic sector. On the contrary, in Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain and United Kingdom less 
than the forty per cent of applications concerns a specific sector.  
As shown in Figure 3.9, each member state implements most of cases by means of 
transparent instruments, excepting Finland and Ireland, which use transparent 
instruments in less than the half of aid. Besides, also Hungary, Italy, Sweden and 
United Kingdom present a share of transparent aid significantly below the average. 
On the other hand, Czech Republic, Malta and Slovakia implement at least eight 
measures out of ten by means of transparent policy instruments.  
                                                         
39 The Pearson’s coefficient in a two-tailed correlation between Sectoral aid and Transparent aid is 
equal to -0.095. The coefficient is 0.15 when we correlate Sectoral aid and Unlawful aid. Finally, 
the coefficient is -0.036 if we correlate the variables Transparent aid and Unlawful aid. 
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Figure 3.8 – Share of sectoral aid, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
 
Figure 3.9 – Share of transparent aid, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
The cases of unlawful aid are more frequent in older member states. As Figure 3.10 
shows, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg do not follow the notification 
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requirements in about one aid out of five, while in Germany, Greece, Portugal, 
Sweden and United Kingdom third interested parties notify about one aid out of 
seven. Among the old member states, only Austria and Ireland show high rates of 
compliance with the notification rules.  
New members are clearly more compliant: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia and Malta 
have correctly notified all the aid: Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia have correctly notified more than ninety per cent of measures. 
 
Figure 3.10 – Share of unlawful aid, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
In addition, as shown in Figure 3.11, the three variables are differently distributed 
over the years. Member states have targeted the aid to a specific sector especially 
from 2006 and 2009. In the previous period the share of sectoral aid was below 
forty per cent. Then this share has significantly increased: in 2006 sectoral aid were 
more than the half of aid while in the recent years they have represented about the 
sixty per cent of applications.  
The level of transparency follows a different trend. Member states have always 
implemented more than the half of aid by means of transparent instruments, 
excepting in 1999 and 2009. Apart these two years, the share of transparent 
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measures has been below sixty per cent of applications only in 2000, 2003 and 
2004. 
 
Figure 3.11 – Share of sectoral, transparent and unlawful aid, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
Finally, the cases of notification failure have significantly decreased over the years. 
Since unlawful measures are normally discovered some years later, the number of 
notification failures in 2008 and 2009 could be downwardly biased. However, the 
decrease of unlawful aid appears robust because it constitutes a long-term trend. In 
1999 third interested parties notified about thirty per cent of all the measures while 
between 2000 and 2004 they notified less than twenty per cent of the cases in the 
dataset. Then, since 2005, the share of unlawful aid has always been below ten per 
cent and in 2009 it is about five per cent.   
 
3.3.2 Commission’s policy preferences  
As shown in the game in chapter 2, the impact of the threats of non-compliance 
depends also on the Commission’s policy orientations. In particular, member states 
are expected to affect supranational decisions by means of these threats especially 
when the Commission is liberal, that is, it sides against the national intervention in 
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the domestic economy. On the contrary, when the Commission is interventionist, it 
considers that the aid consolidates the competition, and approves the aid anyway.   
Commonly scholars use two ways to infer the preferences of Commission. First, 
they interview experts and key actors to examine the preferences of European 
institutions. For instance, Thomson, Boerefijn and Stokman (2004) collect 
information on the preferences of the Commission, member states and the 
European Parliament across 174 issues between 1996 and 2000. Besides, Thomson 
(2009) produces a dataset consisting of 263 interviews and providing comparable 
information on the decision-making before and after the enlargement process 
occurred in 2004. Second, scholars infer the Commission’s preferences on the basis 
of the commissioners’ party affiliation. In this case the preferences of 
commissioners are assumed to be related to the positions of national governments 
that nominate the commissioners. Crombez (1996; 1997) estimates the 
Commission’s preferences from the alignment of national governments along the 
left-right axis. Franchino (2007) measures the positions of commissioners on 
integration, policy and left-right dimensions on the basis on their partisan 
affiliation: he examines the biographies of commissioners and the information on 
the distribution of portfolio responsibilities to derive their political position. When 
the party affiliation is mentioned explicitly, the position of commissioners is that of 
their party at the time of the appointment. Alternatively, when party affiliation 
cannot be inferred, for instance when commissioners are academics or career 
diplomats, the preferences of commissioners are considered those of their national 
governments at the time of the appointment.  
Both methods do not seem to be suitable to measure the Commission’s preferences 
on state aid policy. In particular, they do not allow us to examine the Commission’s 
position on each single case, that is, if the Commission is lenient of against the 
government measure under investigation. Therefore, in the present analysis I use a 
different method to estimate the Commission’s policy orientations.  
In the present work, I infer the policy preferences from the Commission’s primary 
objectives on state aid policy. As shown in chapter 1.1, the Commission has 
changed its priorities over the years, but in the last decade it has tried to orient 
member states to grant regional aid and, especially from 2005, horizontal measures. 
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I assume that the Commission is more tolerant towards the implementation of these 
two categories of aid, while it sides against sectoral aid and, before 2005, horizontal 
aid. In short, the estimation of Commission’s policy preferences is derived from the 
primary objective of the aid. The Commission is interventionist when the aid 
pursues a supranational priority. On the contrary, the Commission is liberal when 
the aid under investigation either does not pursue a supranational objective or 
specify the primary objective in the notification. 
Since the primary objective of the aid is planned by member states, the 
Commission is interventionist when national and supranational objectives converge, 
while it is liberal when policy priorities diverge. However, member states and the 
Commission choose their objectives independently. National governments notify 
the primary objective of the aid according their domestic institutions and industrial 
traditions. They may be incentivized by European rules to pursue especially certain 
categories of aid, such as those are exempted from notification, but they intervene 
according to the features of the domestic institutions. The Commission sets its 
priorities according to the Treaty provisions to consolidate state aid control and 
competition in the common market. In particular, the Commission aims to direct 
member states towards the measures it considers less distortive. Therefore, in any 
case the formation of Commission’s preferences do not rely on the features of 
member states’ plan, but they are established before the procedure of evaluation.  
The variable Commission measures the Commission’s policy preferences: it is a 
dichotomous variable taking value 0 when the Commission is interventionist 
whereas it takes value 1 when the Commission is liberal. The Commission is 
interventionist when the aid under investigation pursues a supranational priority, 
that is, in two cases: when it is a regional aid or when it is a horizontal aid that has 
been notified after 2005 (see chapter 1.1). The Commission is liberal in the 
remaining three cases; when the measure is a sectoral aid, when it is a horizontal 
aid notified between 1999 and 2004, or when the application does not indicate the 
primary objective of national intervention.  
As shown in Table 3.2, according to this operationalization, the Commission has 
been interventionist, that is, supranational and national objective match, in 54,1 per 
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cent of cases, while has resulted liberal, that is supranational and national priorities 
disagree, in the remaining 45,9 per cent40.  
 
Table 3.2 – Distribution of Commission’s policy orientations  
Commission’s 
policy orientation 
Aid primary objective  Number of aid % 
Interventionist 
Regional development 657 20.2 
Horizontal aid (2005-2009) 1100 33.9 
 
Liberal 
Sectoral development 139 4.3 
Horizontal aid (1999-2004) 1006 31.0 
No primary objective 347 10.6 
     Total 3249 100.00 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
On the whole, the Commission’s objectives match especially with primary 
objectives of new member states. These countries have invested more in the 
development of poor regions and on the whole they have applied about the ninety-
five per cent of measures for regional or horizontal aid. On the contrary, 
Commission usually pursue different priorities from old member states. As Figure 
3.12 shows, supranational and national primary objective diverge in more than half 
of procedures concerning Spain, Belgium, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Netherlands.    
As the Commission has been more tolerant with horizontal aid since 2005, 
supranational and national objectives diverge especially from 1999 to 2004. On 
average, in this period member states do not match supranational priorities in eighty 
per cent of cases. This share suddenly fell in 2005, while after 2005 the primary                                                         
40 About a fifth of the aid promotes regional development, while more than sixty per cent regards 
horizontal objectives. In more than half of cases, horizontal objectives involve research development 
and environment protection. 
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objectives of Commission and member states agree in about ninety per cent of 
cases. 
 
Figure 3.12 – Distribution of Commission’s policy orientations, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
Figure 3.13 – Distribution of Commission’s policy orientations, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
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3.3.3 The appointment of commissioners 
Finally, member states may affect the Commission through the commissioners on 
competition and regional policy, who are the most influential commissioners during 
the decision-making. Since they manage most of the measures or are able to affect 
the coalition formation within the Commission, they have a decisive role to approve 
an aid. National governments influence the decisions on state aid selecting 
commissioners that defend their interests within the Commission. If the 
commissioners represent national interests, they are expected to approve or 
influence the decision-making towards the approval of the aid concerning their 
member states of origin. In addition, if commissioners act on the basis of their 
government affiliation, they are likely to approve the measures planned by the 
government coalition that nominated them. Two variables focus on the 
commissioner on competition, while two other variables concern the commissioner 
on regional policy.  
The variable Competition aims to test the influence of commissioners when they 
defend national interests. The variable is dichotomous: it takes value 1 when the 
member state that applies the aid is also the member state that nominated the 
commissioner on competition; otherwise it takes value 0. The variable presents the 
value 1 in three cases: a) when the aid concerns Belgium and the commissioner on 
competition is Karel Van Miert (in office from 06/01/1993 to 15/09/1999); b) when 
the aid concerns Italy and the commissioner on competition is Mario Monti (in 
office from 16/09/1999 to 21/11/2004); c) when the aid concerns Netherlands and 
the commissioner on competition is Neelie Kroes (in office 22/11/2004 to 
09/02/2010).    
The variable Competition (government affiliation) allows us to test the impact of 
commissioners if they have a strong affiliation with the government coalition. As 
the previous variable, also this variable is dichotomous: it takes value 1 when the 
government coalition that applies the aid is also the government that nominated the 
commissioner. The value of the variable is 1 in three cases: a) when the 
commissioner on competition is Karel Van Miert and the aid is notified by the 
Belgian coalition government led by the Dehaene (from 23/06/1995 to 12/07/1999); 
b) when the commissioner is Mario Monti and the aid is notified by the center-left 
  77 
Italian coalition government led by Massimo D’Alema (and then by Giuliano 
Amato, from 20/10/1998 to 10/06/2001); c) when the commissioner is Neelie Kroes 
and the aid is notified by Dutch government led by Jan Peter Balkenende (from 
22/07/2002 to 14/10/2010).  
According to hypotheses 3 and 4, we expect that member states that nominated the 
commissioner on competition are likely to receive a positive decision. Hence, 
variables Competition and Competition (government affiliation) should be 
positively correlated with the likelihood that the Commission approves the aid 
under investigation.  
From an empirical point of view, the Commission has evaluated an aid notified by a 
member state that nominated the commissioner on competition in 8.1 per cent of 
cases. More than half of these applications concern Italy, while about a third of aid 
involve Netherlands. Focusing the attention on the government affiliation, the 
Commission has evaluated an aid notified by a government coalition that 
nominated the commissioner on competition in 4.2 per cent of aid. In this case, 
most of aid concerns Netherlands, while the remaining aid, excepting one 
application, regard Italy. As stressed by the case of Netherlands, the variables 
Competition and Competition (government affiliation) may coincide41. In particular, 
this is due to the fact that these two variables present the same values between 2005 
and 2009. The values of the two variables vary especially from 2001 to 2004. 
Examining the distribution of Competition, from 2001 to 2004 the Commission has 
evaluated cases where the member state concerned in the investigation also 
nominated the commissioner on competition in 135 cases. On the contrary, 
focusing on the distribution Competition (government affiliation) in the same 
period, the Commission has evaluated only eleven measures where the national 
governments concerned in the aid nominated the commissioner on competition. 
The variable Regional policy refers to the commissioners on regional policy when 
they are assumed to defend national interests within the Commission. The variable 
is dichotomous: it takes value 1 when the member state concerned in the aid is also 
the member state that nominated the commissioner on regional policy. The variable 
                                                        
41 Variables Competition and Competition (government affiliation) are correlated at 70 per cent in a 
two-tailed Pearson correlation.  
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takes the value 1 in four cases: a) when the aid concerns Germany and the 
commissioner on Regional policy is Wulf-Mathies (in office from 06/01/1995 to 
15/09/1999); b) when the aid concerns France and the commissioner on regional 
policy is either Barnier (in office from 16/09/1999) or Barrot (in office from 
26/04/2004 to 30/04/2004); c) when the aid concerns Hungary and the 
commissioner on regional policy is Balàzs (in office from 01/05/2004 to 
21/11/2004); d) when the aid concerns Poland and the commissioner on regional 
policy is either Hübner (in office from 22/11/2004 to 03/07/2009) or Samecki (in 
office from 04/07/2009 to 09/02/2010).  
The variable Regional policy (government affiliation) concerns the commissioner 
on regional policy when it is expected to follow his or her affiliation with the 
parties in the government coalition. The variable is dichotomous and takes value 1 
in three cases42: a) the commissioner is either Barnier or Barrot and the aid is 
notified by the French government led by Jospin (from 04/06/1997 to 07/05/2002); 
b) the commissioner is Balàzs and the aid is notified by the Hungarian government 
led by Medgyessy and then by Gyurcsány (from 31/12/2003 to 08/06/2006); c) the 
commissioner is either Hübner or Samecki and the aid is notified by the Polish 
government led by Belka (from 02/05/2004 to 09/11/2005). 
As it is plausible that the commissioner on regional policy is influential only on the 
evaluation of the measures concerning regional development, the variables 
Regional policy and Regional policy (government affiliation) contribute to test 
hypotheses 5 and 6 by the interaction with the variable Regional development. This 
last variable is dichotomous and takes value 1 when the primary objective of the aid 
is precisely regional development. Since the commissioners on regional policy are 
expected to increase the chances of approval for their member states or 
governments, the interaction between Regional policy, or alternatively Regional 
policy (government affiliation), and Regional development should be positively 
correlated with the dependent variable.    
Looking at the distribution of these variables, about 4.3 per cent of the dataset 
regard cases where the aid concerns the member state that nominated the 
                                                        
42 Since the dataset include state aid from 22/03/1999, there is no measure applied by the German 
government that appointed the commissioner Wulf-Mathies.  
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commissioner on regional policy. Most of these cases concern Poland, while the 
remaining cases regard practically only France. Although Hungary nominated 
Balàzs as commissioner on regional policy, it applies no aid on regional 
development while this commissioner is in office. Focusing the attention on the 
cases where we assume a government affiliation, only in two per cent of cases the 
Commission has evaluated an aid notified by the national government that selected 
the commissioner on regional policy. Most of these cases regard France, while the 
remaining applications concern Poland. As the variables on the commissioner on 
competition, the two variables concerning the commissioner on regional policy are 
strongly correlated. In particular, the data coincides both in 2000 and 2001.  
 
3.3.4 Control variables 
In addition to the strategies executed by member states, other factors may affect 
decision-making on state aid applications. First of all, the Commission is likely to 
be influenced by the procedural constraints provided for by the formal rules. 
Second, as the Commission is interested in the impact of the aid on the common 
market, it is likely to examine also the degree of selectivity of the aid. Third, the 
Commission may suffer from the level of workload. Finally, the decision-making 
may be affected by the changes occurred after the enlargement process. Besides, 
the Commission may be influenced by the serious impact of the financial crisis 
started in 2008. Let’s examine each factor listed above. 
First, the Commission has to follow the procedure established in the Council 
regulation 659/1999. Such regulation includes some statutory constraints that the 
Commission must take into account during the decision-making. In particular, these 
constraints may affect both the decision-making and the nature of the final decision. 
As shown in chapter 1, the formal procedure includes time limits. Once the 
Commission opens a formal investigation, it has to take a decision within eighteen 
months. If at the end of this period the Commission is still not able to evaluate the 
compatibility with the common market and take a final decision within two months, 
it has to reject the measure. The impact of this procedural constraint is tested with 
the variable Time Limits. This is a dichotomous variable that takes value 0 when the 
Commission takes a decision on time and value 1 when the Commission takes a 
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decision beyond the end of the period prescribed for the formal investigation. 
Specifically, the variable takes value one when the Commission takes the final 
decision after twenty-two months from the date of notification. This period of time 
represents the time prescribed for the preliminary investigation (two months), the 
formal investigation (eighteen months) and the additional period within which the 
Commission has to take a decision once the time of formal investigation is expired 
(two months)43.  
The Commission has taken most of the decisions on time and only 5.5 per cent of 
the procedures have gone beyond the time prescribed for the formal investigation. 
As Figure 3.14 highlights, the cases of delay do not concern equally all the states. 
Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal are the countries more affected by the delays in 
decision-making: about one decision out of ten is taken beyond the time limits. 
Then, other nine countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom) have suffered a delay in at least one aid 
out of twenty. On the contrary, the Commission has taken on time all the decisions 
concerning many recent member states, such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia. 
Apart from a peak in 2004, the share of decisions that the Commission has taken 
beyond the time limits has gradually decreased over the years. As shown in Figure 
3.15, the Commission often decided beyond the time limits in 1999, when about 
one decision out of seven was took after the end of formal investigation, and in 
2004, when the delay concerned about one decision out of ten. According to the 
figure, the Commission has never gone beyond the time limits neither in 2008 nor 
in 2009. This result is likely to be biased because several formal investigations are 
still pending and, therefore, are not taken into account in the dataset.  
 
 
                                                         
43 The operationalization is slightly different if the Commission evaluates an unlawful aid. In this 
case the aid is not regularly notified by the member state concerned, but the Commission registers 
the aid subsequently to the notification by third interested parties. As the documents on unlawful aid 
do not mean the date of notification, but just the year of registration, the variable Time Limits takes 
value 1 only where we are sure that the Commission takes a decision beyond the time limits. It 
follows that in case of unlawful aid Time Limits takes value 1 when the Commission takes the final 
decision after three years from the year of registration. 
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Figure 3.14 – Share of decision delays, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
 
Figure 3.15 – Share of decision delays, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
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Second, the Commission is likely to pay attention to the degree of selectivity of 
each aid. In other words, the Commission examines if the aid is firm specific or 
sector-wide In particular, the Commission classifies aid applications into three 
categories, according to their degree of selectivity. Schemes are more abstract and 
general in character. They are targeted to a sector, a group of companies or a 
geographical area. If a specific aid awards to an individual company, under an 
approved scheme, it must also be notified to the Commission: this measure is 
classified as individual application of scheme. Finally, a measure that is not granted 
on the basis of an approved scheme is an ad hoc aid. 
The variable Ad hoc points out if the aid is firm-specific or sector-wide: it is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 0 when the aid is either a scheme or an 
individual application, while it takes the value of 1 when the aid is an ad hoc 
measure. Member states apply more sector-wide than firm-specific aid: although all 
the aid are targeted to selective groups, only seventeen per cent of the applications 
confers and advantage to specific firms. In other words, each member state plans 
especially schemes and individual applications related to approved schemes. 
However there is a significant variation among countries.  
Several member states do not target aid towards a specific firm without following 
an approved scheme. As shown in Figure 3.16, aside from Bulgaria, Cyprus and 
Malta, the share of ad hoc cases in Austria, Finland, Hungary and Sweden is 
significantly below the average. On the contrary, in Germany and Italy about one 
aid out of five is ad hoc, while in Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Poland and 
Slovakia more than one aid out of four is firm specific.  
On the whole, the distribution of ad hoc cases has been fairly constant. As shown in 
Figure 3.17, the ad hoc measures have always constituted at least ten per cent of 
applications, reaching a peak of about twenty-six per cent in 2003. On the contrary, 
the share of schemes has been always between sixty-five and eighty per cent of all 
the measures.  
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Figure 3.16 – Share of ad hoc measures, by country 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
 
 
Figure 3.17 – Share of ad hoc measures, by year 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
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Third, since the Commission has to decide within time limits, the degree of 
workload may influence the supranational regulation. As highlighted in chapter 1, 
the less the Commission suffers from excessive workload, the more it is able to 
evaluate the compatibility of each case with common market. The variable 
Workload is a continuous variable, measuring the number of applications the 
Commission has still to evaluate when a member state notifies a new aid. This 
measure takes into account only the applications that the Commission has evaluated 
according the Council regulation 659/1999, therefore excluding the procedures 
following the previous rules. The variable includes both procedures concerning the 
measures that the Commission has not considered state aid and procedures that are 
still pending.   
On the average, when a member state notifies an aid, the Commission has not taken 
a decision yet on about 240 measures. This value does not present significant 
differences among member states: on the average, the workload varies from 255 
measures when Bulgaria notifies a new aid to less than 230 when the new 
application concerns Netherlands, Romania, Austria, Lithuania and Luxembourg.  
 
Figure 3.18 – Average annual level of Commission’s workload 
 
Source: Personal computations on data available on the website of the European Commission 
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On the whole, as Figure 3.18 shows, the level of workload has significantly varied 
over the years. The value in 1999 and 2009 may be downwardly biased: the former 
involve nine months only and, in addition, does not include the pending procedure 
following previous rules; the latter may exclude several cases of unlawful aid that 
third interested parties have not detected yet. Overall, the average amount of 
workload has decreased until 2005 and then has steeply increased until 2008.   
Finally, the Commission may decide according to the serious changes concerning 
the European Union and the common market. First of all, as a result of the 
enlargement process in 2004 and 2007, the Commission may take into account the 
differences among old and new member states. Second, the Commission may 
consider the serious changes in the economic cycle.  
I control for both of these issues. The variable New Members controls if the 
Commission has a different attitude towards new member states, that are, states 
have joined the European Union since 2004 and 2007. This is a dichotomous 
variable that takes value 1 when the aid is notified by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. The variable Crisis controls for the impact on the decision-making of 
the recent financial crisis: it is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 when the aid 
is notified either in 2008 or 2009.  
 
3.4 Variables: a summary 
The present analysis emphasizes the determinants of supranational decisions on 
state aid policy. The dependent variable points out the nature of the decisions that 
the Commission takes on each state aid. The independent variables concern the 
factors that may affect the Commission’s decisions and, in particular, the likelihood 
that the Commission approves an aid. First of all, according to the predictions of 
the model presented in chapter 2, the independent variables concern the influence 
of member states on supranational decision-making by means of threats of non-
compliance and the commissioners on competition and regional policy. The impact 
of the threats of non-compliances will be tested through three different variables.  
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Table 3.3 – Variables and expected relation with Commission’s approval  
Variables Measurement Hp Sign 
    
Dependent variable    
Positive Decision 1 = the aid is approved   
    
Independent variables    
    
Threats of non-compliance    
Sectoral aid 1 = aid for a specific sector Hp.1 - 
Transparent aid 1 = the instrument is transparent Hp.1 - 
Unlawful aid  1 = aid notified by third parties Hp.1 - 
Sectoral aid*Commission Interaction Hp.2 - 
Transparent*Commission Interaction Hp.2 - 
Unlawful*Commission Interaction Hp.2 - 
    
Appointment of commissioners    
Competition  1= the aid concerns the member 
state that nominated the 
commissioner on competition 
Hp.3 + 
Competition (government affiliation) 1= the aid concerns the 
government that nominated the 
commissioner on competition 
Hp.4 + 
Regional policy  1= the aid concerns the member 
state that nominated the 
commissioner on regional policy 
 +/- 
Regional policy (government affiliation) 1= the aid concerns the 
government that nominated the 
commissioner on regional policy 
 +/- 
Regional policy   
* Regional development 
Interaction Hp.5 + 
Regional policy (government affiliation) 
* Regional development 
Interaction Hp.6 + 
    
Commission 1 = the Commission is liberal  - 
Regional development 1 = aid for regional development  +/- 
    
Control variables    
Time limits 1 = decision beyond the time 
limits 
 - 
Ad hoc 1 = the aid is an ad hoc measure  +/- 
Workload Number of procedure are open  +/- 
New members 1 = member states after 2004  +/- 
Crisis 1 = aid notified in 2008 or 2009  +/- 
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As the threats depend on the oversight by thirds interested parties, these variables 
refer to the likelihood that member states and firms monitor the implementation of 
the aid under investigation. The effect of the appointment of commissioners on the 
decision-making is tested by two couples of variables. These variables test the 
impact of the commissioners on competition and regional aid both in case they 
defend national within the Commission. In particular, I include also a variable to 
test the influence of commissioners if they have partisan affiliation.  
 
Table 3.4 - Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
Variables N Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent variable      
Positive Decision 3249 0.924 0.266 0 1 
      
Independent variables      
      
Threats of non-compliance      
Sectoral aid 3249 0.424 0.4942 0 1 
Transparent aid 3249 0.644 0.479 0 1 
Unlawful aid  3249 0.127 0.332 0 1 
      
Appointment of commissioners      
Competition  3249 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Competition (government affiliation) 3249 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Regional policy  3249 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Regional policy (government affiliation) 3249 0.045 0.208 0 1 
      
Commission 3249 0.459 0.498 0 1 
Regional development 3249 0.202 0.402 0 1 
      
Control variables      
Time limits 3249 0.055 0.228 0 1 
Ad hoc 3249 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Workload 3249 236.60 45.58 3 302 
New members 3249 0.133 0.340 0 1 
Crisis 3249 0.185 0.389 0 1 
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In addition, I take into account also other factors that may affect supranational 
decisions. I consider the time limits included in the formal procedure, the 
selectivity of the aid and the Commission’s workload. Besides, I control if the 
Commission follows different criteria either during the financial crisis that has 
begun in 2008 or for member states have joined European Union recently.  
Table 3.3 summarizes the features of all the variables and their expected relations 
with the likelihood that the Commission approves the aid under investigation. Table 
3.4 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable.  
The next chapter tests the impact of the above-mentioned independent variables on 
the supranational decisions on state aid. The results in chapter 4 show the extent to 
which member states have affected the Commission from 1999 to 2009. In addition 
to emphasize the overall impact of member states, I highlight both the evolution of 
such impact over the time and which member states have mainly affected 
supranational decision-making.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The determinants of Commission’s decisions on state aid: 
an empirical analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter shows the factors that affect the Commission’s decisions on state aid 
policy. In particular, it tests the hypotheses, which I presented at the end of chapter 
2, about the impact of member states on supranational decision-making. According 
to the operationalization introduced in chapter 3, I highlight the extent to which 
member states have influenced the Commission.  
The first section examines the determinants of all the decisions concerning state aid 
for industry and services that the Commission has taken from 1999 to 2009. I show 
the overall impact of member states on state aid policy both through threats of non-
compliance and the most influential commissioners. Besides, I stress which 
member states have most affected the supranational decision-making and how their 
influence has changed over the years. 
The second and the third sections focus on regional and horizontal aid respectively. 
Both these types of aid refer to the current primary objectives of supranational 
regulation, but, as they present specific features, I investigate them separately. The 
second section concerns the determinants of the state aid to industry and services 
that member states intend to implement in favour to the development of a specific 
area. The third section focuses on the determinants of the general measures that do 
not follow specific supranational rules.  
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Finally, a fourth section summarizes the main results of the whole chapter and 
presents the main evidences for the influence of member states on the supranational 
decisions on state aid policy. 
 
A note on methodology 
Before proceeding, I illustrate some points about the methodology used for the 
estimations in the next pages. As the dependent variable, that concerns the 
likelihood that the Commission approves a state aid, is dichotomous, I test the 
impact of the determinants on state aid decisions by means of a logit model with 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Besides, as shown in chapter 3, since 
the Commission rejects less than ten per cent of the aid, I use also a relogit, or 
rather, a logit regression for rare events (King and Zeng 2001). In this way, I can 
check the robustness of the results that I find with the logit model. Besides, given 
the large differences among countries and years, I perform a logit model with 
robust standard errors including fixed effects both for member states and years of 
notification. Inserting fixed effects I can control for the institutional peculiarities of 
each member state and the main changes in the global economy44.  
In addition to show the output of multiple regressions, I present also the predicted 
effects of each independent variable on the probability that the Commission 
approves an aid. I calculate the predicted values of the explanatory factors and their 
interactions by means of the command margins, which is included in the statistical 
package Stata 11.045.  
 
 
4.1 The determinants of state aid for industry and services 
Table 4.1 presents the results of logit and relogit models when the commissioners 
on competition and regional policy are nominated to represent national interests 
within the Commission. Table 4.2 shows the same models, but in case the                                                         
44 When I include the fixed effects for member states, I lose the observations concerning the 
countries have never experienced a Commission rejection from 1999 to 2009 (for instance, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia).  
45 Similar results may be obtained using the statistical package Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 
2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).  
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commissioners on competition and regional policy act according to their affiliation 
with the government coalition. Therefore, all the models in Table 4.1 test 
hypotheses 3 and 5, while each model included in Table 4.2 tests hypotheses 4 and 
6. Besides, models 1, 3, 5 in Table 4.1 and models 7, 9 and 11 in Table 4.2 test 
hypothesis 1. Models 2, 4 and 6 in Table 4.1 as well as models 8, 10 and 12 in 
Table 4.2 test hypothesis 2. As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the decisions on state 
aid depend on many factors. However, as shown in Table 4.3, just a few of these 
factors affect substantively the chances that the Commission approves an aid. Let’s 
examine the impact of each variable.  
The results show that member states affect the Commission by means both of the 
threats of non-compliance and the most influential commissioners. According to 
hypotheses 5 and 6, the decisions on state aid are affected by the nationality and the 
government affiliation of the commissioner on regional policy. The output in Table 
4.1 emphasizes that when the Commission evaluates a regional aid concerning the 
member state that nominated the commissioner on regional policy, such measure is 
more likely to be approved. This result is statistically significant at .005 level even 
if we include the fixed effects in the model. In particular, when the member state 
concerned in the regional aid under investigation may benefit from the nationality 
of the commissioner on regional policy, the probability that the Commission 
approves the aid increases on average by six percentage points. Table 4.2 shows 
that also the government affiliation matters according to the expectations: when the 
investigation concerns the applications made by the national government that 
nominated the commissioner on regional policy, the Commission is more likely to 
approve the measure. Contrary to the previous correlation, this result is not 
statistically significant. Substantively, if the member states involved in the regional 
aid under investigation may benefit from the government affiliation of the 
commissioner on regional policy, the chances of approval increases by one to five 
percentage points. In short, the results seem to corroborate that member states are 
able to influence the Commission through the commissioner on regional policy.  
Contrary to hypotheses 3 and 4, member states do not benefit from the appointment 
of the commissioner on competition.  
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Table 4.1 - Determinants of decisions on state aid (Part I) 
 (1)  
Logit 
(2)  
Logit 
(3) 
Relogit 
(4) 
Relogit 
(5)  
Logit 
(6)  
Logit 
Sectoral aid -0.905*** -0.940*** -0.894*** -0.918*** -0.812*** -0.908*** 
 (0.204) (0.298) (0.203) (0.296) (0.209) (0.311) 
Transparent aid -0.286 -0.093 -0.279 -0.079 -0.365* -0.170 
 (0.192) (0.313) (0.191) (0.311) (0.211) (0.355) 
Unlawful aid  -2.562*** -2.483*** -2.527*** -2.436*** -2.675*** -2.502*** 
 (0.193) (0.314) (0.193) (0.313) (0.200) (0.327) 
Sectoral aid*Commission - 0.048 - 0.037 - 0.136 
  (0.374)  (0.372)  (0.388) 
Transparent*Commission - -0.289 - -0.295 - -0.277 
  (0.394)  (0.392)  (0.420) 
Unlawful*Commission - -0.113 - -0.126 - -0.264 
  (0.384)  (0.382)  (0.408) 
Competition  
 
-0.905*** 
(0.243) 
-0.909*** 
(0.246) 
-0.903*** 
(0.242) 
-0.904*** 
(0.245) 
-0.473 
(0.352) 
-0.482 
(0.353) 
Regional policy 
 
-0.432 
(0.338) 
-0.428 
(0.340) 
-0.437 
(0.336) 
-0.432 
(0.338) 
-0.234 
(0.465) 
-0.235 
(0.470) 
Regional policy *  
Regional development 
2.630** 
(1.063) 
2.602** 
(1.037) 
2.411** 
(1.058) 
2.370** 
(1.032) 
2.840** 
(1.114) 
2.801** 
(1.081) 
Commission -0.566* -0.351 -0.553* -0.315 -0.516 -0.274 
 (0.313) (0.474) (0.312) (0.472) (0.411) (0.540) 
Regional development -1.237*** -1.243*** -1.218*** -1.218*** -1.121*** -1.115*** 
 (0.317) (0.316) (0.316) (0.314) (0.381) (0.377) 
Time limits -2.093*** -2.090*** -2.061*** -2.052*** -2.154*** -2.159*** 
 (0.279) (0.277) (0.277) (0.276) (0.278) (0.278) 
Ad hoc -0.307 -0.312 -0.305 -0.301 -0.283 -0.290 
 (0.231) (0.233) (0.230) (0.232) (0.239) (0.241) 
Workload 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
New members 0.158 0.151 0.133 0.126 - - 
 (0.377) (0.375) (0.376) (0.373)   
Crisis 1.265*** 1.286*** 1.197*** 1.214*** - - 
 (0.429) (0.438) (0.428) (0.435)   
Constant 4.139*** 4.008*** 4.086*** 3.926*** 2.569** 2.445** 
 (0.498) (0.546) (0.496) (0.543) (1.063) (1.067) 
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3249 3249 3249 3249 3127 3127 
Wald chi2 458.32 471.63   446.77 458.65 
Pseudo R2 0.4276 0.4279   0.4474 0.4479 
Loglikelihood -501.606 -501.307   -478.827 -478.392 
Dependent Variable: Commission approves the aid. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p <0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 4.2 – Determinants of decisions on state aid (Part II) 
 (7)  
Logit 
(8)  
Logit 
(9) 
Relogit 
(10) 
Relogit 
(11)  
Logit 
(12)  
Logit 
Sectoral aid -0.903*** -0.909*** -0.892*** -0.887*** -0.818*** -0.886*** 
 (0.201) (0.303) (0.200) (0.301) (0.207) (0.311) 
Transparent aid -0.259 -0.058 -0.253 -0.047 -0.353* -0.121 
 (0.190) (0.304) (0.189) (0.302) (0.208) (0.336) 
Unlawful aid  -2.552*** -2.513*** -2.521*** -2.469*** -2.665*** -2.482*** 
 (0.193) (0.317) (0.192) (0.315) (0.200) (0.329) 
Sectoral aid*Commission - -0.0004 - -0.009 - 0.088 
  (0.375)  (0.373)  (0.386) 
Transparent*Commission - -0.058 - -0.311 - -0.332 
  (0.3041)  (0.386)  (0.407) 
Unlawful*Commission - -0.049 - -0.059 - -0.280 
  (0.382)  (0.381)  (0.413) 
Competition  
(government affiliation) 
-0.673 
(0.413) 
-0.662 
(0.413) 
-0.691* 
(0.411) 
-0.678* 
(0.412) 
-0.187 
(0.466) 
-0.183 
(0.467) 
Regional policy 
(government affiliation) 
-0.566 
(0.422) 
-0.564 
(0.423) 
-0.588 
(0.420) 
-0.585 
(0.420) 
-0.818 
(0.631) 
-0.847 
(0.637) 
Regional policy *  
Regional development 
1.170 
(0.783) 
1.182 
(0.779) 
0.976 
(0.779) 
0.983 
(0.775) 
1.067 
(0.762) 
1.115 
(0.759) 
Commission -0.591* -0.363 -0.577* -0.329 -0.380 -0.055 
 (0.309) (0.475) (0.308) (0.472) (0.417) (0.543) 
Regional development -1.106*** -1.112*** -1.088*** -1.089*** -0.836** -0.8282** 
 (0.319) (0.319) (0.317) (0.317) (0.396) (0.392) 
Time limits -2.071*** -2.065*** -2.042*** -2.030*** -2.160*** -2.162*** 
 (0.284) (0.282) (0.283) (0.281) (0.282) (0.003) 
Ad hoc -0.311 -0.313 -0.309 -0.310 -0.278 -0.281 
 (0.227) (0.228) (0.226) (0.227) (0.237) (0.238) 
Workload 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
New members 0.485 0.472 0.458 0.445 - - 
 (0.376) (0.377) (0.375) (0.375)   
Crisis 1.307*** 1.331*** 1.239*** 1.258*** - - 
 (0.424) (0.434) (0.422) (0.431)   
Constant 3.915*** 3.771*** 3.862*** 3.692*** 2.207** 2.035* 
 (0.478) (0.525) (0.476) (0.523) (1.040) (1.041) 
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3249 3249 3249 3249 3127 3127 
Wald chi2 449.96 466.94   432.49 448.65 
Pseudo R2 0.4161 0.4165   0.4401 0.4407 
Loglikelihood -511.650 -511.325   -485.152 -484.614 
Dependent Variable: Commission approves the aid. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p <0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 4.3 – Predicted effects of the explanatory factors  
Variables Change in probability 
that the Commission 
approves the aida 
Change in probability 
that the Commission 
approves the aidb 
Sectoral aid -0.024 
(0.006) 
-0.025 
(0.006) 
Transparent aid -0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Unlawful aid -0.173 
(0.027) 
-0.181 
(0.028) 
Commission -0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.008) 
Competition  -0.032 
(0.012) 
--- 
Competition (government affiliation) --- -0.023 
(0.019) 
Regional policy  
(if the aid is for regional development) 
0.063 
(0.025) 
--- 
Regional policy (government affiliation) 
(if the aid is for regional development) 
--- 0.030 
(0.020) 
Ad hoc -0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Workload 0.0001 
(0.00004) 
0.0001 
(0.00004) 
Time limits -0.132 
(0.037) 
-0.136 
(0.039) 
New members 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Crisis 0.022 
(0.006) 
0.024 
(0.006) 
Note: change in the probability that the Commission approves an aid when a variables increases by 
one unity, all the other values being set at their means. Standard errors in the brackets.  
a The predicted values are estimated from model 1 in Table 4.1. 
b The predicted values are estimated from model 7 in Table 4.2. 
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The results of Table 4.1 highlight that when the aid concerns the member state that 
nominated the commissioner on competition, the Commission is likely to reject the 
aid. This correlation is statistically significant at .001 level, apart from the model 
including also the fixed effects. Focusing on the substantive effects, when the 
Commission evaluates the aid concerning the member state that nominated the 
commissioner on competition, the probability of approval decreases by about three 
percentage points. As shown in Table 4.2, also hypothesis 4 does not find any 
corroboration. When the Commission investigates an aid concerning the national 
government that nominated the commissioner on competition, the chances of 
approval decrease. This result is statistically significant only in the relogit model. 
Anyway, the sign of the correlation is always contrary to the expectations. In 
particular, when the Commission evaluates an aid concerning the national 
government that nominated the commissioner on competition, the chances of 
approval decreases by about two percentage points. This value is drastically lower 
if we take in consideration the coefficients of model 5 and 6 of Table 4.2, which 
include the fixed effects. Unlike the commissioner on regional policy, the 
commissioner on competition appears to manage state aid policy more 
independently from national pressures. Contrary to the appointment of the 
commissioner on regional policy, the appointment of the commissioner on 
competition does not give any advantage to member states.  
The results corroborate the impact of the threats of non-compliance on the 
Commission decisions. As expected, the more third interested parties monitor the 
aid under investigation, the less the Commission is likely to approve the aid. This 
means that when third parties do not monitor the decision-making, as member 
states are incentivized not to comply with the supranational rules, the Commission 
tends to approve the aid in order take the measures under its supervision over the 
years. The results of Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the Commission is less likely to 
allow member states to implement an aid when third parties are more likely to 
monitor decision-making.  
First, given the strong competition among firms, third parties are likely to pay 
attention to the supranational decisions regarding specific sectors. In line with 
hypothesis 1, the results show that the Commission is more likely to reject the aid 
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when measures concern a specific economic sector. This relation is particularly 
significant in each model. The probability that the Commission approves a sectoral 
aid is two percentage points lower than the probability to allow the implementation 
of a measure that is not targeted to a specific sector. 
Second, third parties can oversee the aid if the procedure of implementation is 
considered to be transparent. When member states use transparent policy 
instruments, third parties check more easily the compliance with supranational rules. 
Therefore, as the Commission can rely on the oversight of third parties, the threats 
of non-compliance by member states are less credible and the Commission is more 
likely to reject the aid. Despite this result corroborates hypothesis 1, it is 
statistically significant only in models 5 and 11, where fixed effects are included. 
However, the substantive impact of policy instrument of the final decision is 
limited: if a member state use a transparent policy instrument, the chances of 
approval decreases by about just one percentage point.   
Third, third interested parties are likely to monitor the aid if they do not trust the 
member state concerned in the implementation, that is, if this member states have 
already implemented the aid without following the supranational rules. The results 
show that the Commission is likely to reject the aid that member states previously 
implemented unlawfully. This result is very robust: the negative correlation 
between the variable Unlawful aid and likelihood of approval is statistically 
significant in each model. In addition, also the substantive impact of the variable is 
large: the probability that the Commission approves an aid that have been already 
implemented illegally is about eighteen percentage points lower than the 
probability that the Commission approves an aid correctly notified the first time.  
The interactions between the three above-mentioned indicators on the likelihood of 
non-compliance and the policy preferences of the Commission aim at testing 
hypothesis 2. According to this hypothesis, we expect that threats of non-
compliances affect the Commission especially when it is liberal. The interaction 
terms in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the average trend, but we need to consider further 
analysis to interpret the interaction models (see Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006; 
Kam and Franzese 2007). Therefore, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the predicted impact 
of the interactions among the variables concerning the level of monitoring by third 
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interested parties and the supranational preferences on the likelihood of approval. 
The results included in Table 4.4 refer to the estimation of model 1 in Table 4.1, 
whereas the values of Table 4.5 concern the model 7 in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.4 – The impact of the interaction between threats of non-compliance and 
Commission’s policy preferences on the likelihood of approval (Part I) 
 Commission 
Interventionist Liberal 
 
Sectoral aid 
0 0.989 
(0.003) 
0.977 
(0.004) 
1 0.970 
(0.007) 
0.894 
(0.016) 
  
 
Transparent aid 
 
 
0 0.984 
(0.005) 
0.970 
(0.005) 
1 0.982 
(0.004) 
0.947 
(0.008) 
  
 
Unlawful aid 
0 0.987 
(0.003) 
0.978 
(0.003) 
1 0.718 
(0.050) 
0.531 
(0.044) 
 
Note: The likelihood of approval is estimated from model 2 of Table 4.1. The values of all the 
other variables are set to their means. Standard errors in the brackets.  
 
According to hypothesis 2, both Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that the impact of threats 
of non-compliance on the final decisions depends on the Commission policy 
preferences. Since these threats rely on the level of monitoring by third parties, we 
expect that, as the level of monitoring decreases, the chances of approval increase 
especially if the Commission is liberal. If the Commission is interventionist, it 
approves the aid independently of the expected costs of non-compliance, that is, the 
oversight by third parties. On the contrary, a liberal Commission is expected to 
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reject the aid when the mechanisms of oversight are robust, while it is forced to 
approve the applications when monitoring is weak. In this case, despite the 
Commission would prefer to reject the aid, it has an incentive to approve it in order 
to take the measure under its supervision.  
 
Table 4.5 – The impact of the interaction between threats of non-compliance and 
Commission’s policy preferences on the likelihood of approval (Part II) 
 Commission 
Interventionist Liberal 
 
Sectoral aid 
0 0.989  
(0.003) 
0.975 
(0.004) 
1 0.970 
(0.007) 
0.890 
(0.016) 
  
 
Transparent aid 
0 0.984 
(0.005) 
0.968 
(0.006) 
1 0.982 
(0.004) 
0.945 
(0.008) 
  
 
Unlawful aid 
0 0.987 
(0.003) 
0.977 
(0.003) 
1 0.719 
(0.049) 
0.529 
(0.044) 
      
Note: The likelihood of approval is estimated from model 8 of Table 4.2. The values of all the 
other variables are set to their means. Standard errors in the brackets. 
 
First, if we assume that the level of monitoring by third parties depends on the 
competition in a specific economic sector, we notice that liberal and interventionist 
Commission behave differently. In both cases, according to hypothesis 1, the 
Commission is less likely to approve a sectoral aid than an aid that is not targeted to 
a specific sector. Nevertheless, when the Commission is interventionist, the 
likelihood of approval decreases by just one percentage point, while if the 
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Commission is liberal it decreases by more than eight percentage points. This result 
seems to confirm that liberal Commission are more affected by threats of non-
compliance.  
Second, moving from the assumption that the level of monitoring by third parties 
relies on the transparency of the policy instrument that member states use to 
implement the aid, we find a similar result. According to the expectations, the less 
the instrument is transparent, the more the Commission is likely to approve the aid. 
When the Commission is interventionist, such increase is negligible, whereas if the 
Commission is liberal the likelihood of approval increases by more than two 
percentage points.  
Finally, even when we consider that third parties pay attention to the decision-
making especially if the Commission evaluates an unlawful aid, we find that a 
liberal Commission is more affected than an interventionist one. Given the level of 
monitoring by third parties, the Commission is more likely to reject the unlawful 
aid than the measures that are correctly notified for the first time. For instance, an 
interventionist Commission approves an unlawful aid about seven times out of ten, 
while it approves a new aid about ten times out of ten. The likelihood of approval 
significantly changes when the Commission is liberal: as in the previous case it 
approves a new aid ten times out of ten, but, unlike the interventionist Commission, 
it approves an unlawful aid only five times out of ten. This result shows that, 
although the level of monitoring may significantly influence both an interventionist 
and a liberal Commission, the latter is more affected than the former. 
On the whole, the results corroborate that member states are likely to affect the 
Commission through the commissioner on regional policy (according to hypotheses 
5 and 6) and treats of non-compliances (according to hypotheses 1 and 2). Now I 
investigate if all the member states are able to influence the Commission equally or 
some members have benefited more from the appointment of commissioners and 
the strategic interactions during the decision-making.  
I proceed to examine the cross-country differences on the impact of the 
commissioner on regional policy. Most of the state aid in the dataset has been 
evaluated when the commissioners on regional policy in office were Barnier (and 
then Barrot) or Hübner (and then Samecki).  
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Table 4.6 – Likelihood of approval depending on the commissioners  
Commissioners Likelihood of approval for the 
member state that nominated 
the commissioner 
Likelihood of approval for 
other member states 
Regional Policy 
Barnier /Barrot 0.995 
(0.008) 
0.922 
(0.018) 
Hübner and Samecki 0.996 
(0.005) 
0.978 
(0.008) 
Competition   
Monti 0.920 
(0.005) 
0.966 
(0.019) 
Kroes 0.982 
(0.003) 
0.988 
(0.013) 
   
Commissioners Likelihood of approval for the 
government that nominated the 
commissioner 
Likelihood of approval for 
other governments 
Regional Policy 
Barnier /Barrot 0.986 
(0.012) 
0.923 
(0.017) 
Hübner and Samecki 0.976 
(0.017) 
0.983 
(0.006) 
Competition 
Monti 0.914 
(0.005) 
0.988 
(0.013) 
Kroes 0.982 
(0.003) 
0.987 
(0.013) 
 
Note: The likelihood of approval is estimated from model 1 of Table 4.1 and model 7 of Table 4.2. 
The values of all the other variables are set to their means. Standard errors in the brackets. 
 
French government nominated Barnier and Barrot, while the Polish government 
nominated Hübner and Samecki. Both France and Poland took advantage from such 
appointments, but the former seems to get greater benefits than the latter. When the 
commissioner were Barnier or Barrot, the probability that the Commission 
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approved a regional aid concerning France was about 99.5 per cent, while the 
probability of approval for another member state was about 92.2 per cent. When 
Hübner and Samecki were in office, the Commission approved the regional aid 
concerning Poland in 99.6 per cent of cases, while it allowed other states to 
implement a regional aid in 97.8 of cases. In short, the likelihood of approval in 
favour of France and Poland is similar, but France achieved a larger comparative 
advantage over the other countries.  
If we assume that, according to their affiliation with the government coalition, the 
commissioners favour just the national government that nominated them, the results 
present significant changes. During the terms of Barnier and Barrot, the French 
government that nominated them was allowed to implement a regional aid in 98.6 
per cent of cases, while any other national government implemented the same type 
of measure in 92.3 per cent of cases. On the contrary, when Hübner and Samecki 
become commissioners, the Polish government that nominated both did not receive 
any relevant advantage.  
Although no member state has benefited from the commissioners on competition, 
also this case presents interesting cross-country differences. I examine the changes 
in the probability that the Commission approved an aid when the commissioner on 
competition were Mario Monti and Neelie Kroes, nominated by Italian and Dutch 
government respectively. When Monti was in office, Italy was allowed to 
implement 92 per cent of its applications, whereas other member states 
implemented on average 96.6 per cent of their applications. Although even 
Netherlands did not take any advantage from the term of Kroes, unlike Italy, it was 
not penalized. While Kroes was in office, Netherlands was allowed to implement 
about 98.2 per cent of its applications, more or less the same ratio in favour of the 
other member states. This result does not change even if we assume that the 
commissioners favour only the government coalition that nominated them. Table 
4.6 resumes the predicted likelihood of approval depending on the commissioners 
of competition and regional policy. 
Let’s move to consider the cross-country differences about the impact of the threats 
of non-compliance. Some member states have taken more advantage from the 
scarce monitoring by third parties than others. Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show the 
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coefficients of the variables measuring the level of monitoring in country-by-
country regressions. The more the coefficient is negative, the more member states 
are able to benefit from the low probability to pay the costs of non-compliance. 
Assuming that the level of monitoring by third interested parties is higher when the 
aid under investigation is targeted to a specific economic sector, on the whole, both 
old and new members benefit from threating the Commission not to comply. In 
particular, as result of this operationalization, France, Spain and Germany have a 
significant impact on the Commission decisions.  
 
Figure 4.1 – Coefficient on Sectoral aid per country 
 
Note: the coefficients are estimated from a country by country logit model on all the factors 
included in the model 1 of Table 4.1.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.2, if we measure the level of monitoring through the 
transparency of the aid implementation, the results presents relevant changes. On 
average, old member states benefit from the lack of transparency. In real facts, 
focusing on the member states that are more representative in the dataset, Germany 
is the only country that significantly increases its likelihood of approval when the 
policy instrument is not transparent.   
Finally, as Figure 4.3 shows, in case the level of monitoring is measured by the 
attention of third interested parties to the cases of unlawful aid, we find that all the 
most representative member states significantly have influenced the Commission’s 
decision by means of threats of non-compliance. In case third parties are likely not 
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to control the aid under investigation, the member states that take the most 
advantages are France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Germany.  
 
Figure 4.2 – Coefficient on Transparent aid per country 
 
Note: the coefficients are estimated from a country by country logit model on all the factors 
included in the model 1 of Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Coefficient on Unlawful aid per country 
 
Note: the coefficients are estimated from a country by country logit model on all the factors 
included in the model 1 of Table 4.1.  
 
 
In addition to cross-country variations, the threats of non-compliance present 
significant cross-temporal differences. They have not affected supranational 
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decisions equally over the years. Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 highlight the trend of the 
coefficients measuring the likelihood of monitoring by third interested parties. As 
in 2008 and 2009 the Commission approved almost all the applications, the figures 
focus on the period from 1999 to 2007. The negative coefficients mean that 
member states took advantage of the threats in that specific year.  
 
Figure 4.4 – Coefficient on Sectoral aid per year 
 
Note: the coefficients are estimated from a year by year logit model on all the factors included in the 
model 1 of Table 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Coefficient on Transparent aid per year 
 
Note: the coefficients are estimated from a year by year logit model on all the factors included in the 
model 1 of Table 4.1.  
 
 
As Figure 4.4 shows, looking at the variation of the variable Sectoral aid, we find 
that member states significantly benefited from threats of non-compliance in 2002, 
2005 and 2007. On the contrary, Figure 4.5, which relies on the degree 
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transparency to measure the level of control, shows that member states significantly 
benefited from threats of non-compliances only in 1999. 
Then, Figure 4.6, which assumes that third parties monitor especially the cases of 
unlawful aid, highlights that, aside from 2004 and 2005, member states have always 
taken a significant advantage from threating the Commission not to comply with 
the European regulation.  
 
Figure 4.6 – Coefficient on Unlawful aid per year 
 
 
Note: the coefficients are estimated from a year by year logit model on all the factors included in the 
model 1 of Table 4.1.  
 
 
So far I have passed in review the impact of member states. Now I focus the 
attention on the control variables. The policy preferences of the Commission matter, 
even if they have a moderate effect on the probability that the aid is approved. 
According to the predictions of the game in chapter 2, the more the Commission is 
liberal, that is, it sides against the national intervention under investigation, the 
more the Commission is likely to reject an aid. In other words, taking into account 
the operationalization of the variable Commission, when member states apply 
measures that do not pursue supranational priorities, the Commission does not 
allow member states to implement the aid. The policy preferences of the 
Commission and the type of supranational decision are significantly correlated both 
in the logit and relogit models, whereas this correlation is not statistically 
significant when we include the fixed effects. Anyway, if we focus on the results of 
model 1 included in Table 4.1 and model 7 in Table 4.2, even where the variable 
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Commission is significantly correlated with the type of final decision, the 
supranational policy preferences slightly affect the probability of approval. For 
instance, if the Commission is liberal, the probability that the Commission decides 
to approve the aid is at the utmost two percentage points lower than if the 
Commission is interventionist.  
On the contrary, the final decisions are affected by the constraints included in the 
formal procedure. When the Commission decides after the end of the formal 
investigation, it usually rejects the aid. This result is particularly robust: if the 
Commission takes a decision beyond the time limit, the likelihood of approval 
significantly decreases in each model presented both in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. 
Looking at the results of Table 4.3, if the Commission has not decided yet before 
the end of the formal investigation, the probability that the aid is approved is about 
thirteen percentage points lower than in case the Commission takes the decisions 
within the time limits. As provided for by the Council regulation 659/1999, this 
means that, most of times that the Commission takes a decision after the formal 
investigation, it is still not able to evaluate the compatibility of the aid and, 
according to the rules, it has to reject the measure.  
The results highlight also that the decision-making is affected by the degree of 
workload. The more applications the Commission has to evaluate, the more likely 
the aid is approved. This correlation is statistically significant, except in the models 
including the fixed effects. Nevertheless, the increase of the number of application 
have a limited impact on the chances of approval: in case the number of measures 
that the Commission has still to take a decision on suddenly increases by one 
hundred unit, the probability that the aid is approved increases by only about one 
percentage point.    
Examining the results both in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the decisions on state aid do not 
seem to rely on the degree of selectivity of national intervention. The Commission 
is less likely to approve ad hoc measures, but this result is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, when member states apply state aid in favour of selective 
targets, the probability of approval decreases, even if, in practise such decrease is 
essentially very tenuous. This result partially agrees with the analysis of Buts, 
Jegers and Joris (2011), which focus just on state aid decisions in 2007. As in the 
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present analysis they find that ad hoc measures are less likely to be approved, but, 
on contrary to the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, they show that this correlation is 
statistically significant.  
Besides, the Commission has been affected by the serious changes in the global 
economy, whereas it does not seem to be influenced by the consequences of the EU 
enlargement. The recent financial crisis has had a significant impact on the 
decisions taken in 2008 and 2009. During this period the probability of approval 
has increased by about two percentage points. On the contrary, the Commission 
does not seem to take into account the relevant differences between old and new 
member states.   
To resume, this section corroborates that member states affect the supranational 
decisions on state aid. The impact varies among member states and over the years, 
but, overall, the results offer corroborating evidences in favour of hypotheses 1, 2, 5 
and 6. So far, I have taken into account all the measures for industry and services, 
including very different types of aid. In the next two sections I investigate 
separately the determinants of regional and horizontal aid, which represented the 
most relevant categories of aid in the dataset. Both present specific features: the 
former is likely to be affected by the bargaining between the most influential 
commissioners on state aid, while the second has constituted a primary 
supranational objective especially in the recent years.  
 
 
4.2 The determinants of regional aid for industry and services 
Table 4.7 shows the determinants of Commission’s decisions on the state aid for 
industry and services that aim to develop a specific region. Since the results focus 
only on regional aid, unlike the previous analysis, they do not include some 
independent variables. First, since regional development has always been a 
supranational priority, the models in Table 4.7 do not include the variable about the 
Commission’s policy preferences. Second, since all the measures concern regional 
development, the models do not include the interactions terms, while hypotheses 5 
and 6 are tested just by means of variables Regional Policy and Regional Policy 
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(government affiliation). In addition, because of collinearity, models do not include 
the variable Crisis.  
The decisions on regional aid are substantially affected by the nationality and the 
government affiliation of the commissioner on regional policy, but this result is not 
statistically significant in most of models. The probability that the Commission 
approves a regional aid is about six percentage points higher when the measure 
under investigation concerns the member state that nominated the commissioner on 
regional policy. This probability tends to double if we consider the results of model 
5, including the fixed effects. When the Commission decides on a regional aid that 
concerns the national government that nominated the commissioner on regional 
policy, the chances that the aid is approved increase by just one percentage point. 
On the contrary, if we take into account the effect of the fixed effect, member state 
do not take any advantage from the commissioners on regional policy according to 
their affiliation with the national governments. 
Member states do not significantly affect the Commission’s decisions through the 
commissioner on competition. Nevertheless, the results considerably changes if we 
assume that the commissioner act according the government affiliation. In fact, 
while member state do not gain any advantage from the nationality of the 
commissioner of competition, they may benefit from his or her government 
affiliation. In particular, when the Commission investigates a regional aid that 
regards the member state that nominated the commissioner on competition, the 
chances of approval decrease by about two percentage points. On the contrary, if 
the regional aid concerns only the government coalition that nominated the 
commissioner, the likelihood that the Commission approves such aid increases on 
average by about three percentage points. 
The results of Table 4.7 provide evidence in favour of the impact of the threats of 
non-compliance. According to hypothesis 1, the Commission seems to be affected 
by the level of monitoring by third interested parties especially if we use as 
indicators the economic sector concerned in the regional aid and the attention 
towards aid implemented illegally. In both cases the correlation between level of 
monitoring and likelihood of approval is negative and significant in each model. 
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Table 4.7 - Determinants of decisions on state aid for regional development 
 (1)  
Logit 
(2)  
Logit 
(3) 
Relogit 
(4) 
Relogit 
(5)  
Logit 
(6)  
Logit 
Sectoral aid -0.916** -0.932** -0.862** -0.877** -0.905* -1.012** 
 (0.439) (0.445) (0.432) (0.438) (0.473) (0.485) 
Transparent aid -0.760 -0.440 -0.696 -0.396 -0.759 -0.610 
 (0.585) (0.502) (0.576) (0.495) (0.793) (0.708) 
Unlawful aid  -3.190*** -3.340*** -3.030*** -3.196*** -4.358*** -4.497*** 
 (0.414) (0.422) (0.408) (0.416) (0.610) (0.664) 
Competition  
 
-0.849 
(0.518) 
- -0.827 
(0.510) 
- 0.532 
(0.901) 
- 
Regional policy 
 
2.453*** 
(1.421) 
- 2.124 
(1.400) 
- 4.393 
(3.152) 
- 
Competition  
(government affiliation) 
- 
 
0.889 
(0.941) 
- 0.789 
(0.927) 
- 1.770 
(1.158) 
Regional policy 
(government affiliation) 
- 0.368 
(0.729) 
- 0.144 
(0.718) 
- -5.381 
(4.446) 
Time limits -2.763*** -2.553*** -2.599*** -2.426*** -3.743*** -4.212*** 
 (0.769) (0.806) (0.757) (0.793) (0.980) (1.453) 
Ad hoc -0.491 -0.434 -0.484 -0.429 -0.595 -0.606 
 (0.521) (0.525) (0.513) (0.517) (0.644) (0.634) 
Workload 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012** 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
New members 0.558 1.421* 0.469 1.287 - - 
 (0.797) (0.813) (0.785) (0.801)   
Constant 1.955*** 2.156*** 1.814*** 2.046*** 1.092 0.662 
 (0.651) (0.628) (0.642) (0.618) (0.925) (1.834) 
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 657 657 657 657 513 513 
Wald chi2 115.25 107.98   125.07 106.55 
Pseudo R2 0.4793 0.4513   0.5833 0.5881 
Loglikelihood -103.333 -108.890   -76.288 -75.406 
Dependent Variable: Commission approves the aid. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p <0.05; * p < 0.1 
 
 
If we assume that third parties monitor especially aid towards specific sectors, we 
notice that the probability that the Commission approves a regional aid towards a 
specific economic sector is about two percentage points lower than the likelihood 
of approval in favour of the measures that are not sectorally targeted. In case the 
Commission evaluates a case of unlawful aid, the likelihood of approval decreases 
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by about eight percentage points. The level of transparency is not significantly 
related with the type of supranational decision, but its substantive impact is higher 
for regional aid than for any other type of measures.  
 
Table 4.8 - Predicted effects of the explanatory factors (regional aid) 
Variables Change in probability 
that the Commission 
approves the aida 
Change in probability 
that the Commission 
approves the aidb 
Sectoral aid -0.021 
(0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.015) 
Transparent aid -0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
Unlawful aid -0.075 
(0.026) 
-0.103 
(0.023) 
Competition  -0.020 
(0.013) 
--- 
Competition (government affiliation) --- 0.027 
(0.029) 
Regional policy  
 
0.057 
(0.024) 
--- 
Regional policy (government affiliation) 
 
--- 0.011 
(0.022) 
Ad hoc -0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
Workload 0.0003 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Time limits -0.065 
(0.024) 
-0.079 
(0.030) 
New members 0.013 
(0.018) 
0.044 
(0.021) 
Note: change in the probability that the Commission approves an aid when a variables increases by 
one unity, all the other values being set at their means. Standard errors in the brackets.  
a The predicted values are estimated from the model 1 in Table 4.7. 
b The predicted values are estimated from the model 2 in Table 4.7. 
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As the level of transparency increases, the chances of approval for a regional aid 
decrease by about two percentage points.  
Looking at the control variables, the decision-making on regional aid is 
significantly affected both by the time limits provided for by the formal procedure 
and the amount of workload. In case the Commission goes beyond the time limits, 
the likelihood of approval considerably decreases. Looking at the substantive 
impact of the procedural constraints, as shown in Table 4.8, when the Commission 
takes a decision after the end of the formal investigation, the likelihood of approval 
is about seven percentage points lower than the cases where the Commission 
decides on time. The amount of workload increases the probability of approval and 
is significantly correlated in each model, but in model 6, which includes fixed 
effects. As the notifications on regional aid increase by one hundred units, the 
likelihood of approval increases by about three percentage points.  
Overall, the Commission seems to prefer schemes rather than ad hoc measures. The 
relation between degree of selectivity and type of final decision on regional 
measures is not significant and as the degree of selectivity increases the likelihood 
of approval by about just one percentage point.  
In addition, the Commission has a positive attitude towards new member states. 
However, aside on model 2, this relation is not significant and member states that 
have recently joined the European Union have a positive but very tenuous impact 
on the supranational decisions about regional aid.  
On the whole, in comparison with the previous analysis concerning all the state aid 
in favour of industry and services, the results on the determinants of the aid towards 
regional development do not present relevant differences. As the previous analysis, 
the results provide a robust or partial corroboration for the impact of threats of non-
compliance (hypothesis 1) and the commissioner on regional policy (hypotheses 5). 
In addition, there are some results showing that member states may benefit from the 
government affiliation with both the commissioner on competition (hypotheses 4) 
and the commissioner on regional policy (hypotheses 6).  
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4.3 The determinants of horizontal aid for industry and services 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the determinants of the general measures for industry and 
services that do not follow specific supranational frameworks and guidelines. As 
the present section does not take into account the aid for regional development, the 
model in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 do not include the variables that test the impact of the 
commissioner on regional policy. 
The result in Table 4.9 and 4.10 highlight that member states do not benefit from 
the commissioner on competition when the Commission investigates a horizontal 
aid. When the Commission evaluates an aid that concerns the member state or just 
the national government that nominated the commissioner on competition, the 
likelihood of approval decreases. This relation is significant, except in the models 
that include also the fixed effects.  
As in the decision-making concerning regional aid, member states may affect the 
decisions by means of threats of non-compliance. As the level of monitoring by 
third interested parties changes, the likelihood of approval by the Commission 
varies considerably. The relation between the likelihood of monitoring and 
approval is significant in two indicators out of three. If the aid is in favour a 
specific economic sector, according to our assumptions, the Commission is more 
likely to approve the horizontal aid. At the same time, the likelihood of approval 
increases when the investigation concerns a measure that member states have 
previously implemented illegally. In the former case, as the monitoring by third 
parties increases, the likelihood of approval is up by about two percentage points. 
In the latter case, the probability may increase by until eleven points. Unlike the 
other indicators, the level of transparency during the implementation is rarely 
significant and the substantive impact of this factor is marginal.  
According to hypothesis 2, we expect that threats of non-compliance affect the 
decision-making depending on the Commission policy orientations. In particular, as 
the level of monitoring by third parties decreases, member states are more likely to 
influence the likelihood of approval when the Commission is liberal than it is 
interventionist.  
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Table 4.9 - Determinants of decisions on aid for horizontal objectives (Part I) 
 (1)  
Logit 
(2)  
Logit 
(3) 
Relogit 
(4) 
Relogit 
(5)  
Logit 
(6)  
Logit 
Sectoral aid -0.815*** -0.923* -0.802*** -0.866 -0.767*** -0.804 
 (0.288) (0.532) (0.2869) (0.529) (0.294) (0.565) 
Transparent aid -0.369 0.467 -0.355 0.474 -0.484* 0.426 
 (0.267) (0.544) (0.266) (0.540) (0.288) (0.580) 
Unlawful aid  -1.917*** -1.241** -1.891*** -1.234** -2.036*** -0.980 
 (0.271) (0.621) (0.269) (0.617) (0.296) (0.683) 
Sectoral aid*Commission - 0.136 - 0.092 - 0.032 
  (0.610)  (0.606)  (0.664) 
Transparent*Commission - -1.099* - -1.083* - -1.189* 
  (0.635)  (0.631)  (0.680) 
Unlawful*Commission - -0.842 - -0.816 - -1.380* 
  (0.664)  (0.660)  (0.752) 
Competition  
 
-0.757** 
(0.323) 
-0.787** 
(0.330) 
-0.767** 
(0.321) 
-0.794** 
(0.327) 
-0.370 
(0.413) 
-0.355 
(0.431) 
Commission -0.591* 0.422 -0.574* 0.480 -0.812 0.608 
 (0.323) (0.765) (0.321) (0.760) (1.021) (1.144) 
Time limits -2.022*** -2.012*** -1.983*** -1.963*** -2.074*** -2.050*** 
 (0.326) (0.325) (0.324) (0.323) (0.332) (0.338) 
Ad hoc -0.769*** -0.824*** -0.760** -0.811*** -0.787** -0.883*** 
 (0.297) (0.304) (0.295) (0.302) (0.329) (0.337) 
Workload 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
New members 0.006 -0.007 -0.029 -0.041 - - 
 (0.509) (0.495) (0.506) (0.491)   
Crisis 1.147** 1.333** 1.066** 1.240** - - 
 (0.540) (0.597) (0.537) (0.593)   
Constant 3.941*** 3.205*** 3.868*** 3.075*** 2.965** 2.345 
 (0.588) (0.862) (0.585) (0.856) (1.442) (1.456) 
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2106 2106 2106 2106 1964 1964 
Wald chi2 271.16 294.27   268.31 308.82 
Pseudo R2 0.3766 0.3821   0.4131 0.4215 
Loglikelihood -302.509 -299.829   -279.320 -275.340 
Dependent Variable: Commission approves the aid. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p <0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 4.10 - Determinants of decisions on aid for horizontal objectives (Part II) 
 (7)  
Logit 
(8)  
Logit 
(9) 
Relogit 
(10) 
Relogit 
(11)  
Logit 
(12)  
Logit 
Sectoral aid -0.844*** -0.927* -0.831*** -0.869 -0.768*** -0.790 
 (0.285) (0.610) (0.283) (0.531) (0.294) (0.567) 
Transparent aid -0.386 0.487 -0.373 0.495 -0.498* 0.404 
 (0.268) (0.548) (0.267) (0.544) (0.286) (0.576) 
Unlawful aid  -1.904*** -1.241** -1.879*** -1.231** -2.039*** -0.966 
 (0.269) (0.622) (0.267) (0.618) (0.295) (0.682) 
Sectoral aid*Commission - 0.099 - 0.054 - 0.009 
  (0.610)  (0.606)  (0.664) 
Transparent*Commission - -1.152* - -1.137* - -1.175* 
  (0.641)  (0.636)  (0.679) 
Unlawful*Commission - -0.825 - -0.803 - -1.405* 
  (0.665)  (0.661)  (0.750) 
Competition  
(government affiliation) 
-1.069** 
(0.478) 
1.127** 
(0.474) 
-1.110** 
(0.475) 
-1.164** 
(0.471) 
-0.323 
(0.560) 
-0.343 
(0.585) 
Commission -0.692** 0.373 -0.674** 0.437 -0.830 0.610 
 (0.329) (0.770 (0.327) (0.765) (1.019) (1.144) 
Time limits -2.026*** -2.016*** -1.990*** -1.970*** -2.072*** -2.050*** 
 (0.325) (0.324) (0.324) (0.322) (0.332) (0.338) 
Ad hoc -0.798*** -0.851*** -0.788*** -0.838*** -0.784** -0.882*** 
 (0.293) (0.300) (0.291) (0.298) (0.328) (0.337) 
Workload 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
New members 0.024 0.009 -0.012 -0.027 - - 
 (0.514) (0.500) (0.5109) (0.497)   
Crisis 1.157** 1.353** 1.075** 1.258** - - 
 (0.539) (0.597) (0.536) (0.594)   
Constant 4.014*** 3.232*** 3.942*** 3.101*** 2.955** 2.332 
 (0.590) (0.862) (0.587) (0.856) (1.444) (1.461) 
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2106 2106 2106 2106 1964 1964 
Wald chi2 263.18 287.31   268.20 312.31 
Pseudo R2 0.3763 0.3821   0.4128 0.4212 
Loglikelihood -302.627 -299.829   -279.485 -275.454 
Dependent Variable: Commission approves the aid. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p <0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 4.11 - Predicted effects of the explanatory factors (horizontal aid) 
Variables Change in probability 
the Commission 
approves the aida 
Change in probability 
the Commission 
approves the aidb 
Sectoral aid -0.019 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.008) 
Transparent aid -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
Unlawful aid -0.090 
(0.025) 
-0.088 
(0.024) 
Commission -0.013 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.007) 
Competition  -0.022 
(0.013) 
--- 
Competition (government affiliation) --- -0.037 
(0.025) 
Ad hoc -0.022 
(0.011) 
-0.022 
(0.010) 
Workload 0.0001 
(0.00004) 
0.0001 
(0.00004) 
Time limits -0.113 
(0.039) 
-0.112 
(0.039) 
New members 0.0001 
(0.011) 
0.0005 
(0.011) 
Crisis 0.019 
(0.007) 
0.019 
(0.007) 
Note: change in the probability that the Commission approves an aid when a variables increases 
by one unity, all the other values being set at their means. Standard errors in the brackets.  
a The predicted values are estimated from the model 1 in Table 4.9. 
b The predicted values are estimated from the model 7 in Table 4.10. 
 
Overall, as shown in Table 4.1246, a liberal Commission suffers effectively more 
from the threats of non-compliance, but the results change considerably according 
to the different variables.                                                         
46 The results of Table 4.12 refer just to the estimation of model 1 in Table 4.9. However, the results 
do no present significant variations in comparison to the estimation of model 7 in Table 4.10.  
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Table 4.12 - The impact of the interaction between threats of non-compliance and 
Commission’s policy preferences on the likelihood of approval (horizontal aid) 
 Commission 
Interventionist Liberal 
 
Sectoral aid 
0 0.978  
(0.008) 
0.877  
(0.022) 
1 0.993  
(0.003) 
0.976  
(0.005) 
  
 
Transparent aid 
0 0.984  
(0.006) 
0.973  
(0.007) 
1 0.989 
 (0.003) 
0.947  
(0.009) 
  
 
Unlawful aid 
0 0.989 
 (0.003) 
0.976  
(0.004) 
1  0.923 
(0.038) 
 0.614 
(0.051) 
    
Note: The likelihood of approval is estimated from model 2 of Table 4.9. The values of all the 
other variables are set to their means. Standard errors in the brackets. 
 
As the monitoring by third interested parties decreases, member states affect more a 
liberal than an interventionist Commission if we assume that the level of 
monitoring depends either on the transparency of the policy instrument or the 
attention paid to the cases of unlawful aid. In the former case, as the level of 
transparency decreases, the likelihood that a liberal Commission approves an aid 
increases by about three percentage points. On the contrary, the degree of 
transparency does not significantly affect the likelihood of approval by an 
interventionist Commission. If the measure under investigation concerns an 
unlawful aid, the likelihood of approval varies both if the Commission is 
interventionist and liberal, but the change is more significant in this last case. This 
result is also more relevant if we consider the estimation of the models including 
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the fixed effects. On the contrary, if we focus the attention on the specificity of the 
economic sector, the results do not corroborate hypothesis 2 at all: as the level of 
control decreases, also the likelihood of approval decreases both when the 
Commission is interventionist and liberal.  
As in the analysis on the cases of regional aid, the Commission’s decisions are 
affected by the statutory constraints and the level of workload. In comparison to the 
decisions on regional aid, the decisions on horizontal aid suffer more from the time 
limits of the formal procedure, while they are less affected by the amount of 
workload. As Table 4.11 shows, the former changes the likelihood of approval by 
about eleven percentage points, whereas the latter has a negligible impact on the 
final decision. 
As in the previous sections, the Commission decides especially in favour of 
schemes than ad hoc measures, but unlike the previous analysis, the correlation 
between selectivity and likelihood of approval is both negative and significant. 
Looking at the substantial impact of the degree of selectivity, the probability that 
the Commission approves an ad hoc measure is about two per cent lower than the 
likelihood of approval in favour of schemes. In addition, the supranational 
decisions on horizontal aid seem to take seriously into account the changes in the 
global economy. The recent financial crisis has increased the likelihood of approval 
by about two points. On the contrary, the Commission has no particular attitude 
towards the horizontal measures notified by new member states. The Commission’s 
policy preferences affect the final decisions, but this result loses statistical 
significance when we include the fixed effects. However, when the Commission is 
liberal, the likelihood of approval for horizontal aid decreases by about two 
percentage points. 
On the whole, this section shows that member states affect the decisions on 
horizontal aid especially by means of threats of non-compliance (hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2), whereas they do not take any advantage from the commissioner on 
competition (hypotheses 3 and 4). 
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4.4 Main findings  
In light of the analysis in the present chapter, the Commission does not appear fully 
independent of national pressures. On the whole, the results highlight that member 
states have some opportunities of influencing the decision-making in their favour. 
In particular, member states may take advantages both from the most influential 
commissioners on state aid policy and the weaknesses of state aid control. Member 
state benefit especially from nominating the commissioner on regional policy. The 
results show that Commission is more likely to approve the regional aid concerning 
the member states and the national governments that nominated the commissioner 
on regional policy. Assuming that member states nominate the commissioner on 
regional policy to represent national or government interests within the 
Commission, this result means that member states may strategically use the 
commissioners to affect the decision-making and the chances of approval of the aid 
under investigation. On the contrary, member states do not derive significant 
benefits from the appointment of the commissioner on competition. I find that 
national government are likely to benefit from the appointment of such 
commissioner only when the procedures regard regional aid. However, this result is 
not statistically significant and we need to investigate further this point.  
In addition, when third interested parties are not likely to monitor the aid, member 
states may affect the decision-making through credible threats not to comply with 
supranational regulation and Commission’s decisions. In particular, when third 
parties either do not or cannot hardly monitor to the aid under investigation, the 
Commission approves the measure in order to regulate it over the years. Even 
though this result varies according to the variables that we use to measure the 
likelihood of monitoring by third interested parties, it is significantly corroborated 
both by the analysis on the determinants of regional and horizontal aid. Besides, 
according to our expectations, the impact of threats of non-compliance is depends 
on the Commission’s policy preferences. Member states influence especially the 
Commission when it is against the implementation on the aid.  
In short, as shown in Table 4.13, the analysis in the present chapter finds substantial 
or preliminary evidences in corroboration of most of the hypotheses I formulate 
about the impact of member states on state aid decisions.  
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Table 4.13 – Hypotheses on the member states’ influence and empirical evidences 
Hypotheses State aid 
(1999-2009) 
Regional aid 
(1999-2009) 
Horizontal aid 
(1999-2009) 
1. The less third interested parties are 
expected to control the aid under 
investigation, the more the Commission 
is likely to approve the aid 
✔✔ ✔✔ ✔✔ 
2. The less third interested parties are 
expected to control the aid under 
investigation, the more a liberal 
Commission is likely to approve the aid 
✔  ✔ 
3. Commission is likely to approve the 
aid concerning the member states 
appointed the commissioner on 
competition 
✖ ✖ ✖ 
4. Commission is likely to approve the 
aid concerning the government coalition 
appointed the commissioner on 
competition 
✖ ✔ ✖ 
5. Commission is likely to approve the 
regional aid concerning the member 
states appointed the commissioner on 
regional policy 
✔✔ ✔  
6. Commission is likely to approve the 
regional aid concerning the government 
coalition appointed the commissioner on 
regional policy 
✔ ✔  
 
Note:  
✔✔ : the empirical analysis significantly corroborates the hypothesis 
✔ : the empirical analysis partially corroborates the hypothesis 
✖ : the empirical analysis does not corroborate the hypothesis 
 
 
Therefore, supranational decisions on state aid do not rely exclusively on the 
features of formal procedure and the Commission’s policy preferences. 
Undoubtedly, both these two factors play a relevant role: the final decisions are 
influenced both by the procedural constraints and the attention paid by the 
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Commission’s policy preferences. Although this factor has a marginal impact on 
the likelihood of approval, overall, the decision-making is strongly affected by how 
the Commission manages the state aid regulation. As a proof that also the 
Commission organization matters, the type of decision is significantly correlated 
with the amount of workload. In addition, especially when the procedure concerns a 
horizontal measure, the final decisions seem to depend also on the attention that the 
Commission pays both to the degree of selectivity of the aid and the changes in the 
global economy.  
In conclusion, the analysis shows that member states are able to influence the 
decision-making on state aid. Nevertheless the results do not show how much 
member states may bias the overall outcome of supranational decisions. In other 
words, as the Commission’s decisions have an impact on the amount of national 
intervention in the domestic economy, the point at issue is the extent to which 
national pressures have serious repercussions on the public expenditure for industry 
and services.  
In order to examine this point more in depth, the next chapter will focus on the 
impact of Commission’s decisions on a specific sector. Since state aid regulation 
may vary from an economic sector to another, I will focus the attention on the 
government measures in favour of car industry. Over the decades, this has been a 
very contested sector, and, for this reason, it looks suitable to investigate the effects 
of EU regulation under national pressures.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The effects of Commission’s decisions under national pressures: 
an analysis of state aid for car industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter has shown that member states may influence the 
supranational decisions on state aid. Since the Commission’s decisions may have 
an important impact on the amount of expenditure that member states grant to 
industries, the present chapter investigates the effects of supranational decisions on 
domestic economies when member states affect the Commission. In particular, in 
the next pages I will examine the consequences of member states’ influence on the 
Commission decisions regarding the measures in favour of car industry. Since car 
manufacturing constitutes a key sector in many European countries, it represents an 
ideal case to evaluate the effects of the EU regulation when member states have an 
incentive to influence the decision-making. 
Several contributions have shown how European rules had significantly affected 
state aid reducing the opportunities for national government to intervene for car 
manufacturing. This chapter shows that, although state aid control on car industry 
has considerably consolidated over the decades, the outcome of Commission’s 
decisions on this sector is likely to be still biased by national pressures.  
The first section briefly summarizes the main features and the development of the 
supranational regulation of car industry. Then, the second section focuses on the 
overall impact of the supranational regulation on the expenditure to car-
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manufacturers between 1992 and 2009. Finally, the third section shows the effects 
of the Commission’s decisions from 2000 to 2009.  
 
 
5.1 The development of state aid control on the car industry  
Over the decades, the government measures in favour of car industry have usually 
underlined the conflicting interests of member states and the European institutions. 
Since the car industry has often constituted a key sector of the domestic economy, 
national governments have been interested to intervene, for instance, to avoid cases 
of company failures and the related bad effects on unemployment and domestic 
production. On the contrary, supranational rules, which aim at preventing that 
member states protect national champions, have strongly constrained the measures 
in favour of such sector.  
Until the end of the Eighties, as the regulation on car industry was still weak, the 
interests of member states prevailed over the supranational provisions. As car 
industries were among the main victims of the first (1973-75) and especially the 
second (1980-84) oil crisis, the most industrialized countries intervened for this 
sector (Dancet and Rosenstock 1997). Given both the strategic importance of car 
manufacturing to domestic economies and the weakness of state aid control, the 
Commission approved most of the aid between 1977 and 1987 and, as a result, 
motor vehicle producers benefited from twenty-six billions of Ecu (Dancet and 
Rosenstock 1997). 
Subsequently, once the recession period was over, the regulation of automobile 
sector completely changed: as member states were more willing to strengthen the 
single market according to supranational rules, the Commission was able both to 
foster competition and change approach to national intervention for car industry. In 
1985 the Commission presented the White Paper on the completion of the internal 
market (Commission 1985), but the main change occurred in 1987 when member 
states signed the Single European Act, committing themselves to remove any trade 
barrier by the end of 1992 (Stephen 2000). As Germano (2007; 2009) points out, 
the fall of trade barriers had a deep effect on the strategies of car industries, which 
were incentivized to gain shares in the global market in order to be competitive. In 
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other words, once trade barriers fell, car industries relied less on the domestic 
market and, therefore, on the state aid provided by national governments. The 
effects of the Single European Act have been particularly evident in the case of Fiat. 
Since 1993, Fiat has significantly changed its strategies in order to increase the sale 
of motor vehicles outside Italy. Therefore, also the special relationship that Fiat had 
with the Italian government has considerably changed (Volpato 2008; Germano 
2009).  
In addition, the Commission strengthen the state aid rules on car industry by means 
of specific frameworks and guidelines. In particular, in 1988 the Commission 
adopted a specific framework to regulate national intervention for automobile 
sector (Cini 2001). 
A direct consequence of the significant change of increased competition and the 
improvements in state aid control was that between the end of eighties and the first 
half of nineties the Commission rejected many government measures in favour of 
car industry. For instance, as shown in Table 5.1, between 1989 and 1995 the 
Commission did not allow member states to implement eleven measures for car 
industry47. In addition to the measures included in Table 5.1, the Commission 
rejected also two aid regimes in Germany (case 90/381/CEE) and Spain (case 
96/313/CEE) and an aid concerning a company producing car components in 
France (case 89/305/CEE). Some negative decisions had a significant impact on 
domestic economy. For instance, this is the case of the decisions on the measures 
granted by the Italian and the British government to Alfa Romeo and Rover 
respectively.  
In 1985 the Italian government, through IRI (the national agency for industrial 
reconstruction) and Finmeccanica (an Italian holding involved in several industrial 
sectors) made a contribution of capital in favour of Alfa Romeo. This contribution 
was about 260.2 billions of lire. Then, in 1986 Finmeccanica made a second 
contribution of 408.9 billions of lire before Alfa Romeo was sold to Fiat in 
November of the same year. These measures were considered illegal from the 
Commission, which ordered Alfa Romeo to pay back the aid, because Italian 
                                                        
47 This is a considerable figure: it constitutes about the seven per cent of all the negative decisions 
reported in the Official Journal of the European Union from 1964 to 1995. 
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government did not notify any restructuring program as provided for in that case by 
the EU law on state aid48.  
 
Table 5.1 – Negative decisions concerning car-industry from 1988 to 1995 
Source: Official Journal of the European Union (1988-1995) 
 
The Commission ordered the recovery also of the measure from British government 
in favour of Rover. Since the British government altered the terms of sale to confer 
selective advantages to British Aerospace, which took over Rover, the Commission 
did not allow the aid. In particular, the Commission requested British Aerospace to 
pay back both the amount of the aid (about 44 millions of pound sterling) and the 
connected interest payment49.  
These decisions created important precedents and contributed further to strengthen 
the authority of European institutions on automobile sector. Nevertheless, as car-                                                        
48 For further information, see the decision of the European Court of Justice included in C-305/89. 
49 As Dancet and Rosenstock (1997) stress, this was the first case of interest payment connected to 
reimbursement. 
Company Member State concerned Document Decision date 
Renault group France 88/454/CEE 29/03/88 
Rover group United Kingdom 89/58/CEE 13/07/88 
Pegeut France 89/305/CEE 21/12/88 
Alfa Romeo Italy 89/661/CEE 31/05/89 
Renault group France 91/C11/03 22/05/90 
Rover group United Kingdom 91/C21/02 27/08/90 
Volkswagen Belgium 91/254/CEE 28/11/90 
Toyota Motor United Kingdom 92/11/CEE 31/07/91 
Daimler-Benz Germany 92/465/CEE 14/04/92 
Rover DAF United Kingdom 93/349/CEE 09/03/93 
Volkswagen Germany 96/313/CEE 20/12/95 
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industry is particularly sensitive to the changes in the international market, the 
Commission has continued to adjust the regulation over the years. In 2001, and then 
2003, the Commission included specific norms for motor-vehicle industry in the 
multi-sectoral frameworks on regional aid (Commission 2001; 2003b). Furthermore, 
recently these frameworks have been temporarily revisited in response to the 
repercussions of the financial crisis on the motor vehicle market.  
At present, according to supranational guidelines (Commission 2004c; 2006a; 
2006b; 2008a) and frameworks (Commission 2006f), Commission is expected to 
authorise member states to support car industry if the primary objective of the aid is 
environmental protection, research and development, regional development, 
promoting risk capital investments and in some cases restructuring and rescuing 
firms in difficulty. However, examining the decisions case by case, these provisions 
seem to have contributed only partially to orient member states towards 
Commission preferences. For instance, in the last decade the Commission has 
rejected also government measures in favour of consolidated priorities, such as 
regional development. In particular, in 2002 the Commission did not authorize nor 
the regional aid granted from the German government to BMW neither the regional 
aid from the Spanish government to Volkswagen50. In addition, focusing the 
attention on some recent cases, car manufacturing seems still to represent a tricky 
sector in state aid regulation. For instance, as shown by the aid granted by Belgian 
and Romanian government to Ford in 2005 and 2008, in the last years Commission 
and member states have strongly disagreed on the government measures having 
training as primary objective51.   
On the whole, although the regulation is still debatable, recent analysis suggest that 
the EU rules have significantly affected the opportunities for member states to 
intervene in favour of car industry. I investigate this point in the next section, where 
I show the trend of aid expenditure for car manufacturing over the years.  
 
                                                         
50  For further information, see the state aid C26/2002 (Commission 2003a) and C38/2002 
(Commission 2004a).  
51  For further information, see the state aid C40/2005 (Commission 2006d) and C39/2008 
(Commission 2010b). 
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5.2 The overall impact of EU regulation on the aid to car industry  
Some recent contributions focusing on car-industry point out the considerable 
impact of the European institutions on state aid. Germano (2007; 2009) points out 
that European rules have significantly reduced the opportunities and the incentives 
for government intervention to support the automobile sector. In particular, 
Germano (2009:208) emphasizes the serious changes that have occurred since 1993, 
when trade barriers within EU fell. After 1993, state expenditure suddenly 
decreased to the point that the overall expenditure for car industry between 1989 
and 1996 was lower than the aid granted to Renault during the eighties 
(McLaughlin and Maloney 1999). Focusing on the period between 1992 and 1999, 
Germano highlights how member states have significantly cut down the grants for 
car industry over the decades. Between 1992 and 1999 all the member states spent 
less than just France and Italy between 1977 and 1987: in this last period, French 
governments granted more than 4.5 billions of Ecu to Renault and Italian 
governments subsidized Fiat with more than 6.5 billions of Ecu (Germano 2007; 
2009).  
As Figure 5.1 shows, the overall expenditure from member states to the car 
industries suddenly lowered after 1992. The value of 1992 is affected by the 
intensity of the aid provided by the Italian government, which granted more about 
three billions of Ecu. Even so, this figure gives further evidence for the overall 
decrease of state aid expenditure: from 1993 to 2009 the overall expenditure has 
never exceeded one billion of euros per year, despite the number of EU countries 
has practically doubled. As Germano (2007; 2009) emphasizes, the overall decrease 
of state aid expenditure for car-industry corresponds to significant reductions in the 
amount of national intervention in France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom, 
that is, the countries that had most granted car industry in the past decades.  
As Table 5.2 shows, over the years the governments in France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and United Kingdom have progressively lowered the amount of state aid. In 
all these member states, the drop in the expenditures is particularly evident: in each 
country, national governments implemented between 2004 and 2009 less than the 
five per cent of the grants of 1992-1997 period. Unlike the other countries, in 
Germany the national support is still important and the aid expenditure has 
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significantly decreased only recently. Nevertheless, no government in these 
countries has spent as much as it usually did during the eighties.  
 
Figure 5.1 – State aid expenditure for car-industry per year (1992-2009) 
 
Sources: Data from 1992 to 1999 (Commission 1997; 1998; 1999); Data from 2000 to 2009: 
personal computations on information available at the official website of the EU Commission. 
 
 
According to the analysis of Germano, both Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2 highlight the 
effects of the changes at European level on the government intervention in the 
domestic economies. Germano (2007: 254-255; 2009: 208) emphasizes especially 
the role played by the Single European Act and the increasing competition after 
1993. However, Figure 5.1 provides some evidences also for the impact of 
supranational rules on state aid. On the whole, it seems plausible that as the 
competition among car manufacturer has increased, the supranational rules on state 
aid have contributed to reduce the the opportunities for government intervention.  
As the trend shows, as soon as the Commission consolidated both the specific 
provisions for aid to the car industry and the procedure of notification, the overall 
aid expenditure further decreases. In particular, since 1999 member states have 
constantly granted less than 0.5 millions of euros, excepting in 2008 and 2009, 
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where governments have slightly increased the amount of aid in response to the 
international period of crisis.  
 
Table 5.2 – Aid expenditure for car-industry in five countries (in millions of euro) 
Member State 1992-1997 1998-2003 2004-2009 
Italy 3285 154.5 75.01 
Germany 980 742.68 362.19 
Spain 626 86.11 62.11 
United Kingdom 224 190.39 44.93 
France 121 52 0 
Sources: Data from 1992 to 1999 (Germano 2009: 180); Data from 2000 to 2009: personal 
computations on information available at the official website of the EU Commission. 
 
The results in this section show that supranational rules have increasingly 
constrained government intervention in the domestic economy. However, they do 
not point out the extent to which the Commission’s decisions and their outcomes 
are affected by national pressures. The next section focuses on this point, looking at 
the overall effects of member states’ influence on the decisions concerning car 
industry that the Commission has taken in the last decade.    
 
 
5.3 The effects of Commission’s decisions on aid to car industry  
From 2000 to 2009 the Commission has evaluated sixty aid concerning fourteen 
member states and thirteen companies 52 . Only nine aid have been notified 
according to the Block Exemption rules, whereas most of the measures have 
followed the standard procedure provided by the Council regulation 659/1999. 
About the half of measures constitutes ad hoc aid, while thirty cases refer to 
                                                        
52 According to the data provided by OICA, I examine only the companies that have a plant at least 
in one EU country. Data are available at http://oica.net/categiry/production-statistics/. Some 
companies operate in Europe but they have not benefited from state aid from 2000 to 2009 (for 
instance, Honda, Lotus, Mitsubishi, Paccar, Porsche and Suzuki).  
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individual applications. Only in three cases national governments have applied a 
scheme.  
The Commission has opened a formal investigation in twenty-four cases and in 
fifteen cases the procedure has ended with either a negative decision or a 
withdrawal. Member states have correctly notified twenty-six aid, while the 
remaining cases have started with an application by third interested parties.  
All the measures concern car industry, but they involve different sectors. Member 
states have granted thirty-four aid to install industrial machinery or equipment and 
twenty-one measures for the manufacturing of vehicles or car components. One aid 
regards the sale of motor vehicles, while in four notifications the national 
governments have not specified the economic sector concerned.  
In most cases, the primary objective of the aid has been regional development 
(thirty four measures) and training (sixteen measures). Furthermore, member states 
have applied two measures for environment protection and one aid each to remedy 
for a serious disturbance in the economy, research and development, sectoral 
development, small and medium enterprises. In five cases, notifications have not 
included specific information about the primary objective of the aid.  
In forty-eight applications, member states have notified to implement the aid 
mainly by direct grant. Apart from eight cases where the notifications do not 
present any information on the policy instrument, the remaining four aid have been 
implemented either by guarantees or tax allowance. 
On the whole, the measures show that Commission has not been independent by 
national pressures. According to the hypotheses presented in chapter 2 and the 
results of chapter 4, member states seem to affect the supranational decisions on car 
industry especially when they can credibly threaten the Commission not to comply. 
In particular, when other member states and firms monitor the aid under 
investigation, that is, when the aid was previously not implemented in agreement 
with supranational rules, the Commission rejects about the half of applications 
(fifteen aid out of thirty-four). On the contrary the Commission approves all the 
twenty-six measures that it evaluates when it cannot rely on the monitoring by third 
interested parties. According to our hypotheses, this result seems to corroborate that 
the Commission is forced to approve in order to avoid that member states 
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implement the measure without following the European rules and take the aid under 
its authority over the years.  
In addition, despite the number of cases is limited, member states seem to influence 
the decision-making also through the commissioner on competition and regional-
policy. In seven cases the member state that applies the aid to car industry is also 
the member state of the most influent commissioners: in five cases out of seven the 
Commission approves the aid. Italian government benefits from the commissioner 
on competition to approve two aid for Fiat, while Poland take advantages of the 
commissioner on regional policy to implement three measures to Volvo and Ford.  
As the data mean that member states have an impact on decisions on car industry, 
we can examine the overall effects of Commission’ authority when it is affected by 
national pressures. On the whole, the Commission’s decisions have marginally 
affected the national spending to the car industry. Although negative decisions have 
contributed to decrease the expenditure, the amount of aid authorised by the 
Commission is very close to amount that member states intended to implement. 
Between 2000 and 2009 member states have applied about 2.8 billions of euro53 
and the Commission has allowed national governments to spend about 2.5 billions 
of euro. In other words, Commission’s decisions have cut about the eleven per cent 
of the overall expenditure notified by member states. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, supranational decisions have affected the national spending 
for car industry especially from 2000 to 2003. In 2000 the Commission allowed 
member states to implement only a quarter of the amount of aid that they intended 
to grant. In particular, the Commission approved about 11 millions of euro, whereas 
member states had applied for granting about 45 millions of euro. In particular, in 
2000 the Commission did not allow the Italian authorities to grant 24 millions of 
euro to the Fiat plant in Rivalta54. Between 2001 and 2003, the impact of 
supranational decisions on government measures decreased, but it was still 
significant. In 2001, supranational decisions contributed to cut a third of the overall 
expenditure, while in 2002 and 2003, the Commission rejected about a fifth of the                                                         
53 This figure may be downwardly biased because the notifications C64/2002, which concerns a 
state aid granted by German government to Daimler-Chrysler, and C75/2002, which concerns a 
granted by Spanish government to Opel, do not include specific information on the amount of 
expenditure applied by member states.  
54 For further information, see state aid C8/1999 (Commission 2000).  
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national spending for the car industry. After 2003, the Commission has just slightly 
affected the amount of state aid. In 2006 and 2007 the Commission allowed 
member states to implement more than ninety per cent of the notified expenditure. 
On the contrary, in 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2009 the Commission’s decisions had no 
impact of the aid expenditure: in these years the Commission approved all the 
national measures for the car industry.  
 
Figure 5.2 – Trend in notified and approved aid expenditure (2000-2009) 
 
Sources: personal computations on data available at the official website of the EU Commission. 
 
Examining the data more in detail, the impact of the supranational decisions on aid 
expenditure between 2000 and 2009 has depended especially on three cases of 
rejections. First, in 2001 the Commission evaluated negatively most of the aid that 
German authorities planned to grant in favour of Daimler-Chrysler, considerably 
reducing the regional aid for a new engine plant in Thüringen. The Commission 
found that only 57 millions of euro for a total eligible costs of around 185 millions 
was compatible with state aid rules for motor vehicle sector55.  
Second, in 2002 the Commission did not allow Germany to implement part of the 
aid for a new Bmw car plant in Leipzig. Although the Commission considered the                                                         
55 For further information, see state aid C61/2001 (Commission 2002b). 
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aid useful and necessary, according to state aid rules, in this case it could authorise 
only the thirty per cent of the eligible investments costs. Therefore, German 
authorities were allowed to grant 363.16 millions of euro instead of 418.6 
millions56.  
Third, in 2003 the Commission approved only a quarter of the measure in favour of 
a Volkswagen plant in Navarra. After the formal investigation, the Commission 
concluded that just a part of the regional aid planned by Spanish government was 
compatible with the common market. As a result, the Commission authorised Spain 
to implement 15 millions of euro out of the 61 millions notified by Spanish 
authorities57.  
Since the impact of the supranational decisions is limited to three cases especially, 
the Commission has significantly constrained a few member states and car 
manufacturers. As shown in Table 5.3 and 5.4, which show the consequences of 
Commission decisions on aid expenditure in each member state and company, 
between 2000 to 2009 state aid regulation had a significant impact especially for 
five countries and four car manufacturers. 
As Table 5.3 shows, the Commission has considerably reduced the amount of 
national intervention in Spain, Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy. 
Spain was the country most affected by the supranational decisions: the 
Commission has allowed around sixty per cent of the state aid and, on the whole, 
rejected about 50 millions of euro. On the contrary, the Commission has cut less 
than twenty per cent of aid expenditure in Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom and 
Italy. In addition, the supranational decisions have slightly affected the measures 
for car industry in Austria, which has implemented around 37 millions of euro 
instead of the 44 millions that the national government had previously planned. 
Finally, the Commission has marginally changed the national expenditure for car 
industry in Portugal and France, while it has approved all the state aid for this 
sector in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden.   
Table 5.4 highlights that the supranational decisions have affected especially the 
state aid in favour of Daimler-Chrysler, Volkswagen, Fiat and Psa. In particular, the                                                         
56 For further information, see state aid C26/2002 (Commission 2003a).  57 For further information, see state aid C38/2002 (Commission 2004a). 
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Commission has cut down around forty-three and twenty-four per cent of the 
national expenditure for Daimler-Chrysler and Volkswagen respectively.  
 
Table 5.3 – Expenditure for car-industry per member state (2000-2009) 
Member State Number of 
aid 
Number of 
negative decisions 
Notified 
Expenditure 
Approved 
Expenditure 
Belgium 11 3 104.17 88.48 
Germany 8 4 1138.5 a 941.87 
Spain 7 2 160.84 b 110.21 
United Kingdom 7 1 145.45 117.32 
Italy 7 2 188.41 161.51 
Poland 4 0 7.95 7.95 
Romania 3 0 600 600 
Slovakia 3 0 99.8 99.8 
Sweden 3 0 74.44 74.44 
Austria 2 1 44.52 37.22 
Portugal  2 1 41.7 38.26 
Hungary 1 0 111.5 111.5 
Czech Republic 1 0 111 111 
France 1 1 5.48 0 
Total 60 15 2833.76 2499.56 
Sources: personal computations on data available at the official website of the EU Commission. 
a This figure does not include the amount notified in the aid C64/2002 (information not available) 
b This figure does not include the amount notified in the aid C75/2002 (information not available). 
 
The aid for Fiat and Psa were reduced only by about fifteen per cent, whereas the 
government measures for Ford, Bmw, Opel have been reduced by less than ten per 
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cent. In addition, the Commission had an impact on the expenditure for General 
Motors, but the substantial effects on the final outcome are negligible.  
 
Table 5.4 – Expenditure for car-industry per car manufacturer (2000-2009) 
Manufacturer Number of 
aid 
Number of 
negative decisions 
Notified 
Expenditure 
Approved 
Expenditure 
Ford 17 3 845.52 800.22 
Volvo 8 0 86.52 86.52 
Fiat 7 2 188.41 161.51 
Bmw 6 2 826.48 763.74 
Volkswagen 4 2 246.83 187.65 
Opel 4 2 62.7 b 59.26 
Nissan 3 0 72.52 72.52 
Daimler-Chrysler 3 2 296.5 a 168.5 
Toyota 2 0 2.72 2.72 
PSA 2 1 35.22 29.74 
Hyundai 1 0 111 111 
General Motors 1 1 5.33 2.18 
Kia 1 0 32 32 
Renault 1 0 22 22 
Total 60 15 2833.76 2499.56 
Sources: personal computations on data available at the official website of the EU Commission. 
a This figure does not include the amount notified in the aid C64/2002 (information not available) 
b This figure does not include the amount notified in the aid C75/2002 (information not available) 
 
 
In conclusion, the above analysis stresses that when the Commission operates under 
national pressures, supranational decisions have a marginal impact on the 
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government measures for the car industry. The Commission’s decisions do not 
contribute to cut significantly the national spending for car manufacturing. In 
particular, the supranational decisions have considerable repercussions only on few 
member states and companies and in most of cases the Commission approves 
exactly what member states planned.  
In light of the analysis in the previous section, European rules have been able to 
reduce the incentives for member states to plan state aid to car industry over the 
decades. However, the results of this section suggest that the overall expenditure to 
car manufacturing is likely to decrease further, if the Commission consolidates it 
autonomy from national pressures.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission’s decisions on state aid do not seem fully independent from 
national pressures. The results presented in chapter 4 show the strong correlation 
between the nature of supranational decisions and the opportunities for member 
states to influence the decision-making.  
First of all, the present analysis emphasizes that the Commission is affected by 
member states when third parties are not likely to monitor the aid under 
investigation. This result is in accordance with the expectations deriving from the 
formal model in chapter 2, which underlines that member states are expected to 
take advantage from the circumstances where the costs on non-compliance are 
likely to be lower than the benefit of the aid. In particular, where member states do 
not feel controlled by third interested parties, such as other members or firms, they 
can credibly threaten the Commission not to comply either with state aid rules and 
eventual negative decisions. Therefore, the Commission should approve the 
measure under investigation in order to keep the aid under its supervision and, 
therefore, to consolidate its authority on state aid policy over the years. According 
to this point, the results show that the likelihood of approval decreases when third 
parties are more likely to monitor the aid under investigation, that is, when they 
compete with the member states concerned in the aid, when they have more 
opportunity to evaluate the distortive impact of the aid or when they have reasons 
not to trust the member state that will implement the aid.  
Furthermore, according to the expectations, the results show that the effects of the 
threats of non-compliance on the final decision depend on the Commission’s policy 
orientations. In fact, they affect the Commission especially when it strongly sides 
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against government intervention in the domestic economy. On the contrary, they 
have lower or negligible influence on the decisions when the Commission is more 
interventionist. As expected by the model in chapter 2, if the Commission is more 
interventionist, it agrees on government intervention independently of other factors. 
On the contrary, when the Commission is more liberal, it approves the aid 
especially to avoid that member state does not implement the measure without 
following the supranational rules.    
Second, the analysis shows that supranational decisions may be influenced from the 
nationality and the government affiliation of the commissioners that are most 
influential on state aid policy. This evidence corroborates the hypotheses that 
member states may benefit from the commissioner to affect the decision-making. 
The results highlight especially the role played by the commissioner on regional 
policy. In particular, the likelihood that the Commission approves an aid increases 
significantly when the regional aid under investigation concerns the member state 
or the government coalition that nominated the commissioner on regional policy, 
who is the commissioner most influential on government measures aiming at 
regional development. On the contrary, the analysis emphasized that, except for the 
procedures on regional aid, member states do not take advantage from the 
nationality and the government affiliation of the commissioner on competition.   
Overall, the analysis emphasizes that member states may influence the 
Commission’s decisions. Nevertheless, such influence varies both among policy 
objectives and member states. The Commission is affected especially when it 
evaluates aid concerning regional development. On the contrary, when the 
decision-making concern horizontal measures, the Commission seems to be 
affected only by the threats of non-compliance. In addition, although in theory all 
the member states are able to influence decision-making, the results show that 
France, Germany and Spain and, to a lesser degree, Italy and Netherlands have 
benefited more than others from the weakness of state aid control. In addition, 
France and Poland appear to influence the decisions also through the commissioner 
on regional policy.   
In light of these results, the Commission is to be considered fully independent of 
member states on two conditions. First, the Commission has always to rely on the 
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control by third interested parties. Second, the commissioners should not favour 
national interests. Therefore, the Commission may increase its independence of 
national preferences in two ways. First of all, it should consolidate further state aid 
control increasing the opportunities to monitor directly the implementation of state, 
relying as little as possible on third parties. Second, although member states may 
choose strategically the commissioners, the Commission should constrain more the 
commissioners to supranational priorities. For instance, the Commission could 
specify further state aid rules on specific sectors and objectives in order to reduce 
the cases where commissioners may use their discretion to favour the respective 
national governments. As a proof of this point, the results stress the impact of 
commissioners on the measures concerning regional development, that are the 
policy objective on which the supranational regulation is often matter of conflict 
among DGs and can still be improve upon.  
Commission should improve its autonomy especially because member states’ 
influence may have repercussions on the domestic economies and the competition 
in the common market. The analysis on the government measures in favour of car 
industry shows that, despite state aid control has consolidated over the years, 
national pressures on supranational decisions may have considerable impact on the 
outcome. In particular, when the decision-making is influenced by member states, 
the Commission tends to approve the expenditure that national government planned 
to grant for domestic firms. On the contrary, if the Commission were more 
independent from member states, it would be likely to cut the public spending to 
industry.  
On the whole, the present analysis contributes to shed new light on the 
independence that the Commission enjoys when it performs its exclusive 
competences. The formal autonomy of Commission does not coincide with the 
independence from national interests that it really enjoys. This study shows that 
even when the Commission performs its exclusive competences on competition 
policy is affected by member states. In particular, according to Pollack (1997), the 
Commission’s independence depends on the control mechanisms that member 
states can execute. Although Commission derives its competence on state aid 
control directly from the Treaty and, therefore, member states have few means to 
  139 
affect its decisions, the results show that under certain circumstances supranational 
decisions may be affected by national preferences. As the independence is 
conditional to the context, the present analysis contribute to explain both why the 
Commission may appear autonomous from national pressures, as highlighted in 
Smith (2001) and Blauberger (2009) and state aid can seem time inconsistent, as 
suggested by many contributions of comparative political economy (e.g. Aydin 
2007; Zahariadis 2010).  
However, we need further analysis to examine more in depth the influence of 
member states on state aid and competition policy. First of all, we need to 
investigate further the relationship between national governments and 
commissioners. The results highlight that often member states benefit from the 
appointment of commissioners, but we do not know the extent to which our 
assumptions are correct. In short, we have a significant relation, but we need to 
know more about the rationale of appointment in order to interpret the results as a 
strong proof of national influence on the decision-making. Second, the present 
analysis does not take into account the conflict between commissioners and the 
head of general directorates. As Cini and McGowan (2008:48) stress, 
commissioners and general directorates may disagree because the former its more 
subject to external political pressures while the latter is likely to ensure legal and 
economic consistency of supranational control. Third, the present analysis ignores 
the relationship within the College of commissioners during the decision-making. It 
implicitly assumes that commissioner on competition and the commissioner on 
regional policy affect the nature of the decision-making. In real facts, although 
these two commissioners are likely to be the agenda setter in the decision-making, 
we should investigate more attentively the coalition formation within the 
Commission in the most controversial cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  140 
References 
 
Alesina A., Mirrlees J., Neumann M.J. (1989), “Politics and Business Cycles in 
Industrial Democracies”, Economic Policy 4(8): 55-98 
 
Alesina A., Roubini N., Cohen G. (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, 
Cambridge: MIT Press 
 
Alvarez M.R., Garrett G., Lange P. (1991), “Government Partisanship, Labor 
Organization and Macroeconomic Performance”, American Political Science 
Review 85(2): 539-556 
 
Aydin U. (2007), “Promoting Industries in the Global Economy: Subsidies in the 
OECD Countries, 1989 to 1995”, Journal of European Public Policy 14(1): 115-
131 
 
Balla S.J. (1998), “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy”, American Political Science Review 92(3): 663-673 
 
Balla S.J., Wright J.R. (2001), “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and 
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy”, American Journal of Political Science 
45(4): 799-812 
 
Ballmann A., Epstein D., O’Halloran S. (2002), “Delegation, Comitology and the 
Separation of Powers in the European Union”, International Organization 56(3): 
551-574 
 
Bawn K. (1995), “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About 
Administrative Procedures”, American Political Science Review 89(1): 62-73  
 
Bawn K. (1997), “Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory 
Constraints, Oversight and the Committee System”, Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization 13: 101-126  
 
Bawn K. (1999), “Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: 
Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending”, American Journal 
of Political Science 43(3): 707-736 
 
Bawn K., Rosenbluth F. (2006), “Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral 
Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector”, American Journal of Political 
Science 50(2): 251-265 
 
Bellucci L. (2010), “National Support for Film Production in the EU: An Analysis 
of the Commission Decision-Making Practises”, European Law Journal 16(2): 
211-232 
 
Blais A., Nadeau R. (1992), “The electoral budget cycle”, Public Choice 74: 389-
403 
  141 
Blais A., Desranleau C., Vanier Y. (1986), A Political Sociology of Public Aid to 
Industry, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
 
Blauberger M. (2009), “Of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Subsidies: European State Aid 
Control through Soft and Hard Law”, West European Politics 32(4): 719-737  
 
Boix C. (2000), “Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and 
Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960-93”, World Politics 53(1): 38-
73 
 
Bovis C.H. (2005), “Financing Services of General Interest in the EU: How do 
Public Procurement and State Aids Interact to Demarcate between Market Forces 
and Protection”, European Law Journal 11(1): 79-109 
 
Brambor T., Clark W.R., Golder M. (2006), “Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses”, Political Analysis 14(1): 63-82 
 
Brouwer E., Ozbugday F.C. (2010), “Measuring the Extent of European State Aid 
Control: An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission Decisions”, 
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-037  
 
Bueno de Mesquita E., Stephenson M.C. (2007), “Regulatory Quality under 
Imperfect Oversight”, American Political Science Review 101(3): 605-620 
 
Buigues P., Sekkat K. (2009), Industrial policy in Europe, Japan and the USA: 
amounts, mechanisms and effectiveness, New York: Plagrave-McMillan 
 
Buigues P., Sekkat K. (2010), “Public Subsidies to Business: An International 
Comparison”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 11(1): 1-24 
 
Buts C., Jeger M., Joris T. (2011), “Determinants of the European Commission’s 
State Aid Decisions”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 11(4): 399-426 
 
Cadot O., Röller L.H., Stephan A. (2006), “Contribution to Productivity or Pork 
Barrel? The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment”, Journal of Public Economics 
90: 1133-1153 
 
Cameron D.R. (1978), “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative 
Analysis”, American Political Science Review 72(4): 1243-1261 
 
Carey J.M., Shugart M.S. (1995), “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank 
ordering of electoral formulas”, Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439 
 
Carrubba C.J., Gabel M., Hankla C. (2008), “Judicial Behavior under Political 
Constraints form the European Court of Justice”, American Political Science 
Review 102(4): 435-452  
 
Chari R.S., Cavatorta F. (2002), “ ’Economic Actors’ Political Activity in ‘Overlap 
  142 
Issues’: Privatisation and EU State Aid Control”, West European Politics 25(4): 
119-142 
 
Christiansen T. (1997), “Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy 
and multiple accountability in the European Commission”, Journal of European 
Public Policy 4(1): 73-90  
 
Cini M. (1996), The European Commission: Leadership, organization and culture 
in the EU administration, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
 
Cini M. (2001), “The soft law approach: Commission rule-making in the EU’s state 
aid regime”, Journal of European Public Policy 8(2): 1350-1763 
 
Cini M., McGowan L. (1998), Competition Policy in the European Union, New 
York: St.Martin’s Press 
 
Cini M., McGowan L. (2008), Competition Policy in the European Union (2nd 
edition), New York: Palgrave  
 
Clark W.R. (2002), Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank 
Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.  
 
Clark W.R., Hallerberg M., (2000), “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and 
Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy”, American Political Science 
Review 94(2): 323-346 
 
Commission (1985), “Completing the internal market: White Paper of the 
Commission to the European Council”, http://europa.eu/documents/comm/ 
white_papers/pdf/ com1985_0310_f_en.pdf 
 
Commission (1993),  “Communication on the Application of Articles 92 and 93 of 
EEC Treaty and Article 5 of the Commission Directive 80/723/EEC to public 
undertakings in the manufacturing sector”, Official Journal C 307 13-11-1993: 3-
14 
 
Commission (1997), “Fifth survey of state aid in the European Community in the 
manufacturing and other certain other sectors”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/studies_reports/archive/rap5_en.pdf 
 
Commission (1998), “Sixth survey of state aid in the European Community in the 
manufacturing and other certain other sectors”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/studies_reports/archive/rap6_en.pdf 
 
Commission (1999), “Seventh survey of state aid in the European Community in 
the manufacturing and other certain other sectors”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/studies_reports/archive/rap7_en.pdf 
 
  143 
Commission (2000), “Decision on the state aid which Italy plans to grant to Fiat 
Auto SpA for its plant in Rivalta (Turin)”, Official Journal L117/26 18.05.2000: 
26-31 
 
Commission (2001), “Communication on Multisectoral framework on regional aid 
for large investments projects, code on aid to the synthetic fibres industry, 
community framework for state aid to the motor vehicle industry”, Official Journal 
C368/10 22.12.2001: 1 
 
Commission (2002a), “Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the 
assessment of unlawful State aid”, Official Journal C119 22.05.2002: 1-22 
 
Commission (2002b), “Decision on the state aid which Germany is planning to 
implement for Daimler-Chrysler AG in Kölleda”, Official Journal L282/23 
19.10.2002: 23-28 
 
Commission (2003a), “Decision on the state aid which Germany is planning to 
implement for BMW AG in Leipzig”, Official Journal L128/12 24.05.2003: 12-19 
 
Commission (2003b), “Communication on the modification of the Multisectoral 
Framework on regional aid for large investments projects concerning the motor 
vehicle sector and the synthetic fibres sector”, Official Journal C 263/3 01.11.2003: 
1-2 
 
Commission (2004a), “Decision on the state aid implemented by Spain for 
Volkswagen Navarra SA”, Official Journal L77/54 13.03.2004: 54-61 
 
Commission (2004b), “Regulation No.794/2004 Implementing Council Regulation 
No.659/1999 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Application of Article 93 of the 
EC Treaty”, Official Journal L140 30.04.2004: 1-134 
 
Commission (2004c), “Guidelines on state aid for rescuing firms in difficulty”, 
Official Journal C244/2 01.10.2004: 2-17 
 
Commission (2005), “State Aid action plan: less and better targeted state aid”, http: 
//ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/reform.html 
 
Commission (2006a), “Guidelines for national regional aid 2007-2013”, Official 
Journal C54/13 04.03.2006: 13-44 
 
Commission (2006b), “Guidelines on state aid to promote risk capital investments 
in SMEs”, Official Journal C194/2 18.08.2006: 2-21 
 
Commission (2006c), “Directive on transparency of financial relations between 
Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within 
certain undertakings”, Official Journal L318 17.11.2006: 17-25 
 
  144 
Commission (2006d), “Decision on state aid C40/2005 (ex N331/2005) which 
Belgium is planning to give Ford Genk”, Official Journal L366/32 21.12.2006: 32-
39 
 
Commission (2006e), “Regulation No.1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis”, Official Journal 
L379 28.12.2006: 1-5 
 
Commission (2006f), “Framework for State aid for Research and Development and 
Innovation”, Official Journal C323/1 30.12.2006: 1-26 
 
Commission (2007), “Notice towards an effective implementation of Commission 
decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid”, 
Official Journal C272/4 15.11.2007: 1-14 
 
Commission (2008a), “Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection”, 
Official Journal C82/1 01.04.2008: 1-33 
 
Commission (2008b), “Regulation No.800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the common market (General block exemption 
Regulation)”, Official Journal L214 09.08.2008: 3-47 
 
Commission (2008c), “Communication: European Economic Recovery Plan”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication13504_en.pdf 
 
Commission (2009a), “Decision on measure C5/2000 implemented by Spain in 
favour of SNIACE SA”, Official Journal L210/4 14.08.2009: 4-15 
 
Commission (2009b), “Communication on the Temporary Community Framework 
for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
economic crisis”, Official Journal C83 07.04.2009: 1-15 
 
Commission (2009c), “Code of Best Practice for the conduct of state aid control 
procedures”, Official Journal C136/13 16.06.2009: 1-8  
 
Commission (2009d), “Amending Regulation No.794/2004 Implementing Council 
Regulation No.659/1999 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Application of 
Article 93 of the EC Treaty”, Official Journal L308/5 24.11.2009: 1-9 
 
Commission (2010a), “EU Competition Law: Rules applicable to state aid”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/compilation/index_en.html   
 
Commission (2010b), “Decision on the state aid C39/08 (ex N148/08) planned by 
Romania for training by Ford Craiova”, Official Journal L167/1 01.07.2010: 1-20 
 
Council (1998), “Regulation No.994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of 
Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain 
categories of horizontal State aid”, Official Journal L142 14.05.1998: 1 
  145 
Council (1999), “Regulation No.659/1999 of 22 March 1999 Laying Down 
Detailed Rules for the Application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty”, Official Journal 
L83/1 27.03.1999: 1-9 
 
Council (2006), “Decision on the approval of exceptional national aid by the 
Republic of Cyprus to Cypriot farmers for the purpose of repaying part of 
agricultural debts created long before accession of Cyprus to the European Union”, 
Official Journal L023/78 27.01.2006: 78-79 
 
Council (2007a), “Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1947/2005 as regards national 
aid granted by Finland for seeds and cereal seed”, Official Journal L282/1 
26.10.2007: 1-2 
 
Council (2007b), “Decision on the granting of an emergency state aid by the 
authorities of Romania to mitigate the consequences of drought in 2006/2007 in the 
agricultural sector”, Official Journal L293/5 10.11.2007: 5-6 
 
Council (2008), “Decision on the granting of an emergency state aid by the 
authorities of Cyprus to mitigate the consequences of drought in 2007/2008 in the 
agricultural sector”, Official Journal L302/7 13.11.2008: 7-8 
 
Council (2009a), “Decision on the granting of state aid by the authorities of the 
Republic of Lithuania for the purchase of State-owned agricultural land”, Official 
Journal L338/93 19.12.2009: 93-94 
 
Council (2009b), “Decision on the granting of state aid by the authorities of the 
Republic of Latvia for the purchase of State-owned agricultural land”, Official 
Journal L339/34 22.12.2009: 34-35 
 
Council (2010), “Decision on the granting of state aid by the authorities of the 
Republic of Poland for the purchase of agricultural land”, Official Journal L4/89 
08.01.2010: 89-90 
 
Cownie F. (1986), “State Aids in the Eighties”, European Law Review 11: 247-267  
 
Crombez C. (1996), “Legislative procedures in the European Community”, British 
Journal of Political Science 26(2): 199-228 
 
Crombez C. (1997), “The co-decision procedure in the European Union”, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(1): 97-119 
 
Crouch C., Streeck W. (eds.) (1997), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: 
Mapping Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage 
 
Dancet G., Rosenstock M. (1997), “State aid control by the European Commission: 
the case of the automobile sector” in Stuyck J., Abraham F., Goemans C. (eds.), 
Subsidies and competition in the European Union, Leuven: Leuven University 
Press  
  146 
Dahlberg M., Johansson E. (2002), “On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of 
Incumbent Governments”, American Political Science Review 96(1): 27-40 
 
Dogan R. (1997), “Comitology: Little Procedures with Big Implications”, West 
European Politics 20: 31-60 
 
Doleys T.J. (2000), “Member States and the European Commission: Theoretical 
Insights from the New Economics of Organization”, Journal of European Public 
Policy 7(4): 532-553 
 
Doleys T.J. (2009), “Incomplete Contracting, Commission Discretion and the 
Origins of EU Merger Control”, Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3): 483-
506 
 
Donnelly M., Ritchie E. (1994), “The College of Commissioners and their cabinets” 
in Spence D., Edwards G. (eds.), The European Commission, Harlow: Longman 
 
Döring H., (2007), “The Composition of the College of Commissioners: Patterns of 
Delegation”, European Union Politics 8(2): 207-228 
 
Drazen A. (2000), “The Political Business Cycle after 25 year”, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 15: 75-117 
 
Egan, M. (1998), “Regulatory strategies, delegation and European market 
integration”, Journal of European Public Policy 5(3): 485-506 
 
Egan M. (2001), Constructing a European Market: standards, regulation, and 
governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Egeberg M. (1996), “Organization and Nationality in the European Commission 
Services”, Public Administration 74(4): 721-735 
 
Egeberg M. (2006), “Executive politics as usual: Role behaviour and conflict 
dimensions in the College of European Commissioners”, Journal of European 
Public Policy 13(1): 1-15 
 
Egeberg M., Heskestad A. (2010), “The Denationalization of Cabinets in the 
European Commission”, Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4): 775-786 
 
Elgie R., McMenamin I. (2005), “Credible commitment, political uncertainty or 
Policy complexity? Explaining variations in independence of non-majoritarian 
institutions in France”, British Journal of Political Science 35(3): 531-548 
 
Epstein D., O’Halloran S. (1994), “Administrative Procedures, Information, and 
Agency Discretion”, American Journal of Political Science 38(3): 697-722 
 
  147 
Epstein D., O’Halloran S. (1999), Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics 
Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Featherstone K., Papadimitriou D. (2007), “Manipulating Rules, Contesting 
Solutions: Europeanization and the Politics of Restructuring Olympic Airways”, 
Government and Opposition 42(1): 46-72 
 
Ferejohn J., Shipan C. (1990), “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy”, Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization 6(1): 1-20 
 
Franchino F. (2000), “Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions”, 
European Union Politics 1: 63-92 
 
Franchino F. (2002), “Efficiency of Credibility? Testing the two logics of 
delegation to the European Commission”, Journal of European Public Policy 9(5): 
677-694 
 
Franchino F. (2004), “Delegating Powers in the European Community”, British 
Journal of Political Science 34(2): 269-292 
 
Franchino F. (2007), The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Franchino F., Mainenti M. (2011), “Distributive Policies in Parliamentary Systems: 
the Interplay between Electoral and Fiscal Institutions”, Paper presented at the 
EPSA annual conference, Dublin, June 16-18 2011 
 
Franzese R.J. (1999), “Partially Independent Central banks, Politically Responsive 
Governments, and Inflation”, American Journal of Political Science 43(3): 681-706 
 
Franzese R.J. (2002), Macroeconomic Policies in Developed Democracies, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Franzese R.J., Jusko K.L. (2006), “Political-Economic Cycles” in Wittman D., 
Weingast B. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Cambridge: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Frazer T. (1995), “The New Structural Funds, State Aids and Interventions on the 
Single Market”, European Law Review 20(1): 3-19 
 
Garrett G. (1998a), “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or 
Virtuous Circle?”, International Organization 52(4): 787-824 
 
Garrett G. (1998b), Partisan Politics in the Global Economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
  148 
Garrett G., Kelemen R.D., Schultz H. (1998), “The European Court of Justice, 
National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union”, International 
Organization 52(1): 149-176 
 
Garrett G., Mitchell D. (2001), “Globalization, government spending and taxation 
in the OECD”, European Journal of Political Research 39(2): 145-177 
 
Garrett G., Tsebelis G. (1996), An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism, 
International Organization 50(2): 269-299 
 
Germano L. (2007), “Grande impresa e decisioni pubbliche. La Fiat da Campione 
nazionale atipico a global player”, Stato e Mercato 80(2): 245-278 
 
Germano L. (2009), Governo e grandi imprese, Bologna: Il Mulino  
 
Gilardi F. (2002), “Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory 
agencies: a comparative empirical analysis”, Journal of European Public Policy 
9(6): 873-893 
 
Gilardi F. (2007), “The same, but different: central banks, regulatory agencies, and 
the politics of delegation to independent authorities”, Comparative European 
Politics 5: 303-327  
 
Golden M., Picci L. (2008), “Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994”, 
American Journal of Political Science 52(2): 268-289 
 
Gourevitch P. (1986), Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to 
International Economic Crisis, New York: Cornell University Press 
 
Goyder D.G. (1988), EEC Competition Law, Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Grossman E. (2006), “Europeanization as an Interactive Process: German Public 
Banks Meet State Aid Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies 44(2): 325-348 
 
Gualini E. (2003), “Challenges to Multi-level Governance: Contradictions and 
Conflicts in the Europeanization of Italian Regional Policy”, Journal of European 
Public Policy 10(4): 616-631 
 
Gwiazda A. (2007), “Europeanization of Polish Competition Policy”, European 
Integration 29(1): 109-131 
 
Haas E.B. (1958), The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 
1950-1957, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
 
Haas E.B. (1964), “Technocracy, pluralism and the new Europe”, in Graubard S.R. 
(eds.), A New Europe?, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
 
  149 
Häge F.M. (2007), “Committee Decision-making in the Council of the European 
Union”, European Union Politics 8(3): 299-328 
 
Hall P. (1986), Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in 
Britain and France, New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Hall P., Soskice D.W. (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hammond T., Knott J.H. (1996), “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential 
Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints and Bureaucratic Autonomy 
in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making”, Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 12(1):119-166 
 
Hancké B., Rhodes M., Thatcher M. (eds.) (2007), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: 
Conflict, Contradictions and Complementarities in the European Economy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hansen W.L. (1990), “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of 
Protectionism”, American Political Science Review 84(1): 21-46 
 
Hibbs D.A. (1977), “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy”, American 
Political Science Review 71(4): 1467-1487 
 
Hibbs D.A. (1992), “Partisan Theory After Fifteen Years”, European Journal of 
Political Economy 8: 361-373 
 
Hofmann H.C.H. (2006), “Administrative governance in state aid policy” in 
Hofmann H.C.H., Türk A.H. (eds.) EU Administrative governance, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar 
 
Hoffmann S. (1966), “Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state in the case 
of Western Europe”, Daedalus 95(3): 862-915 
 
Hoffmann S. (1982), “Reflections on the nation-state in Western Europe today”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 21(1): 21-38 
 
Hooghe L. (1999), “Images of Europe: Orientations to European integration among 
senior officials of the commission”, British Journal of Political Science 29(2): 345-
367 
 
Hooghe L. (2001), The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. 
Images of Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Hooghe L. (2005), “Several roads lead to international norms, but few via 
international socialization: a case study of the European Commission”, 
International Organization 59(4): 861-898 
 
  150 
Hopenhayn H., Lohmann S. (1996), “Fire-Alarms Signals and the Political 
Oversight of Regulatory Agencies”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
12(1): 196:213 
 
Huber J., Shipan C. (2002), Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations 
of Bureaucratic Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Huber J., Shipan C., Pfhaler M. (2001), “Legislatures and Statutory Control of the 
Bureaucracy”, American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 330-345 
 
Hug S. (2003), “Endogenous Preferences and Delegation in the European Union, 
Comparative Political Studies 36(1/2): 41-74 
 
Jensen C. (2004), “Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in 
Parliamentary Democracies”, Governance 17(3): 335-359 
 
John P., Ward H. (2001), “Political Manipulation in a Majoritarian Democracy: 
Central Government Targeting of Public Funds To English Subnational 
Government, in Space and across Time”, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 3: 308-339 
 
Kam C., Franzese R.J. (2007), Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in 
Regression Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press  
 
Keefer P., Stasavage D. (2002), “Checks and balances, private information, and the 
credibility of monetary commitments”, International Organization 56(4): 751-774 
 
Keefer P., Stasavage D. (2003), “The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central 
Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy”, American Political 
Science Review 97(3): 407-423 
 
Kelemen R.D. (2001), “The Limits of Judicial Power: Trade-Environment Disputes 
in the GATT/WTO ant the EU”, Comparative Political Studies 34(6): 622-650 
 
King G., Tomz M., Wittenberg J. (2000), “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: 
Improving Interpretation and Presentation”, American Journal of Political Science 
44(2): 347-361 
 
King G., Zeng L. (2001), “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data”, Political 
Analysis 9(2): 137-163 
 
Kohno M., Nishizawa Y., (1990), “A Study of the Electoral Business Cycle in 
Japan: Elections and Government Spending on Public Construction”, Comparative 
Politics 22(2): 151-166 
 
Kydland F.E., Prescott E.C. (1977), “Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency 
of optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy 85(1): 473-91 
 
  151 
Lavdas K.A., Mendrinou M.M. (1999), Politics, Subsidies and Competition: The 
New Politics of State Intervention in the European Union, Chelenham: Edward 
Elgar 
 
Lawton T.C. (1999), “Governing the Skies: Conditions for the Europeanisation of 
Airline Policy”, Journal of Public Policy 19(1): 91-112 
 
Leucht B. (2009), “Transatlantic policy networks in the creation of the first 
European anti-trust law: Mediating between American anti-trust and German ordo-
liberalism” in Kaiser W., Leucht B., Rasmussen M. (eds.) The History of the 
European Union: Origins of a trans- and supranational polity 1950-72, New York: 
Routledge 
 
Lohmann S. (1998), “Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of 
German Monetary Policy, 1957-92”, World Politics 50(3): 401-446 
 
Lupia A., McCubbins M., (1994), “Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and 
Police Patrols Reconstructed”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10(1): 
96-125 
 
Majone G. (1996), Regulating Europe, London: Routledge 
 
Majone G. (1997), “Independent agencies and the delegation problem: theoretical 
and normative dimensions” in Steunenberg B., van Vught F. (eds.), Political 
Institutions and Public Policy, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers  
 
Majone G. (2001), “Two logics of delegation: agency and fiduciary relations in EU 
governance”, European Union Politics 2(1): 103-122 
 
McCubbins M.D., Noll R.G., Weingast B.R. (1987), “Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3: 
243-277 
 
McCubbins M.D., Noll R.G., Weingast B.R. (1989), “Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies”, Virginia Law Review 75: 431-482 
 
McCubbins M.D., Schwartz T. (1984), “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms”, American Journal of Political Science 28(1): 
165-179 
 
McGillivray C. (2004), Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade 
and Industrial Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
McGowan L. (2000), “At the Commission’s Discretion: Cartelbusting and Fining 
Infringements Under the EU’s Restrictive Practises Policy”, Public Administration 
78(3): 639-656 
 
  152 
McGowan L. (2007), “Theorising European Integration: revisiting neo-
functionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC 
competition policy?”, European Integration Online Papers 11(3): 1-17 
 
McGowan L., Cini M. (1999), “Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition 
Policy: The Case of Merger Control”, Governance 12(2): 175-2000 
 
McGowan L., Wilks S. (1995), “The First Supranational Policy in the European 
Union: Competition Policy”, European Journal of Political Research 28(2): 141-
169 
 
McLaughlin A., Maloney W. (eds.) (1999), The European Automobile Industry. 
Multi Level Governance, Policy and Politics, London-New York: Routledge 
 
Merkin R., Williams K. (1984), Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and 
the EEC, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
 
Milward A. (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley: University 
of California Press 
 
Moe T. (1984), “The New Economics of Organization”, American Journal of 
Political Science 28(4): 739-777 
 
Moe T. (1989), “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure” in Chubb J., Peterson P. 
(eds.), Can the Government Govern?, Washington: Brookings Institutions 
 
Moe T. (1990), “Political Institution: The Neglected Side of the Story”, Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 6: 213-253 
 
Moravcsik A. (1993), “Preferences and power in the European Community: a 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies 31(4): 
473-524 
 
Moravcsik A. (1995), “Liberal intergovernmentalism and integration: A rejoinder”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 33(4): 611-628 
 
Moravcsik A. (1998), The Choice for Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
 
Nicolaides P, Kekelekis M., Buyskes P. (2005), State aid policy in the European 
Community, Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
Nordhaus W.D. (1975), “The Political Business Cycle”, The Review of Economic 
Studies 42(2): 161-190 
 
Olson M.K. (1995), “Regulatory Agencies Discretion Among Competing 
Industries: Inside the FDA”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11(2): 
379-405 
 
  153 
Olson M.K. (1996), “Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement 
Alternatives”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12(2): 376-407 
 
Olson M.K. (1999), “Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation and 
Industry Compliance”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15(3): 573-
601 
 
Pech G. (2004), “Coalition governments versus minority governments: Bargaining 
power cohesion and budgeting outcomes”, Public Choice 121(1): 1-24 
 
Persson T., Tabellini G. (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge: 
MIT Press 
 
Persson T., Tabellini G. (2004), “Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes”, 
American Economic Review 94(1): 25-45 
 
Persson T., Roland G., Tabellini G. (2007), “Electoral Rules and Government 
Spending in Parliamentary Democracies”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 
2(2): 155-188 
 
Plender R. (2003), “Definition of Aid” in Biondi A., Eeckhout P., Flynn, J. (eds.) 
The Law of State Aid in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press   
 
Pollack M.A. (1997), “Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European 
Community”, International Organization 51(1): 99-134 
 
Pollack M.A. (2003), “Control Mechanism Or Deliberative Democracies?: Two 
Images of Comitology”, Comparative Political Studies 36: 125-155 
 
Pollack M.A. (2010), “Theorizing EU Policy-Making”, in Wallace H., Pollack 
M.A., Young A., Policy-Making in the European Union, New York: Oxford 
University Press  
 
Quigley C., Collins A.M. (2002), EC State aid and state aid regulation law, 
Oxford: Hart 
 
Rhinard M. (2002), “Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union Committee 
System”, Governance 15(2): 185-210 
 
Rogoff K., Sibert A. (1988), “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles”, 
Review of Economic Studies 55(1): 1-16 
 
Rosamund B. (2005), “The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU studies: 
revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B.Haas”, Journal of European Public 
Policy 12(2): 237-254 
 
Roubini N., Sachs J.D. (1989a), “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the 
Industrial Countries”, Economic Policy 8(4): 99-132 
  154 
Roubini N., Sachs J.D. (1989b), “Political and economic determinants of budget 
deficits in the industrial democracies”, European Economic Review 33(5): 903-933 
 
Rubini L. (2010), The Definition of State aid and Subsidy: WTO and EC Law in 
Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Salamon L.M. (2002), “The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction” in Salamon L.M. (eds.) The Tools of Government: A Guide to the 
New Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Sandholtz W., Stone-Sweet A. (1998), European Integration and Supranational 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Schimmelfennig F., Rittberger B. (2006), “Theories of European Integration” in 
Richardson J.J.(eds.) European Union: power and policy-making, New York: 
Routledge 
 
Schmidt V.A. (2002), The Futures of European Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Schmitter P.C. (1996), “Examining the present Euro-policy with the help of past 
theories”, in Marks G., Scharpf F., Schmitter P., Streeck W. (eds.), Governance in 
the European Union, Thousand Oaks: Sage 
 
Schmitter P.C. (2004), “Neo-Neofunctionalism”, in Wiener A., Diez T. (eds.), 
European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Scholz J.T., Twombly J., Headrick B. (1991), “Stree-Level Political Controls Over 
Federal Bureaucracy”, American Political Science Review 85(3): 829-850 
 
Schultz K.A. (1995), “The Politics of the Political Business Cycle”, British Journal 
of Political Science 25(1): 79-99 
 
Schwartz G., Clements B. (1999), “Government subsidies”, Journal of Economic 
Surveys 13(2): 119-147 
  
Seidel K. (2009), “DG IV and the origins of a supranational competition policy: 
Establishing an economic constitution for Europe” in Kaiser W., Leucht B., 
Rasmussen M. (eds.) The History of the European Union: Origins of a trans- and 
supranational polity 1950-72, New York: Routledge 
 
Shipan C. (2004), “Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional 
Nature of Congressional Influence”, American Political Science Review 98(3): 467-
480 
 
Smith M.P. (1998), “Autonomy by the Rules: The European Commission and the 
Development of the State Aid policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies 36(1): 
55-77 
  155 
Smith M.P. (2001), “How Adaptable is the European Commission? The Case of 
State Aid Regulation”, Journal of Public Policy 21(3): 219-238  
 
Snyder S.K., Weingast B.R. (2000), “The American System of Shared Powers: The 
President, Congress, and the NLRB”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
16(2): 269-305 
 
Stephen R. (2000), Vehicle of influence. Building a European car market, Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press  
 
Steunenberg B., Koboldt C., Schmidtchen D. (1996), “Policymaking, Comitology, 
and the Balance of Power in the European Union”, International Review of Law 
and Economics 16(3): 329-44 
 
Stone-Sweet A., Fligestein N., Sandholtz W. (2001), The Institutionalization of 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Szyszczak E. (2011) (eds.), Research handbook on European state aid law, 
University of Leicester: Littleton chambers 
 
Swank D.H. (1988), “The Political Economy of Government Domestic Expenditure 
in the Affluent Democracies, 1960-80”, American Journal of Political Science 
32(4): 1120-1150 
 
Taylor P. (1983), The Limits of European Integration, New York: Columbia 
University Press 
 
Thatcher M. (2002), “Analysing regulatory reform in Europe”, Journal of 
European Public Policy 9(6): 859-872 
 
Thielemann E. (2000), “Institutional Limits of a “Europe with Regions”: EC State-
aid Control Meets German Federalism”, Journal of European Public Policy 6(39): 
399-418 
 
Thies M.F. (2001), “Keeping Tabs on Partners: the Logic of Delegation in 
Coalition Governments”, American Journal of Political Science 45(3): 580-598 
 
Thomson R., Boerefijn J., Stokman F. (2004), “Actors alignments in European 
Union decision making”, European Journal of Political Research 43(2): 237-261 
 
Thomson R. (2008), “National Actors in International Organizations: the case of 
the European Commission”, Comparative Political Studies 41(2): 169-192 
 
Thomson R. (2009), “Actor alignment in the European Union before and after 
enlargement”, European Journal of Political Research 48(6): 756-781 
 
  156 
Tomz M., Wittenberg J., King G. (2003), “Clarify: Software for interpreting and 
presenting statistical results. Version 2.1”, Stanford University, University of 
Wisconsin and Harvard University 
 
Trondal J. (2006), “Governing at the frontier of the European Commission: the case 
of seconded national officials”, West European Politics 29(1): 147-160 
 
Trondal J. (2008), “The anatomy of the autonomy: Reassessing the Autonomy of 
the European Commission”, European Journal of Political Research 47(4): 467-
488 
 
Tsebelis G. (1995), “Decision making in political systems: veto players in 
presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism”, British 
Journal of Political Science 25(3): 289-325 
 
Tsebelis G. (2002), Veto Player: how political institutions work, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Tsebelis G., Garrett G. (2001), “The Institutional Foundations of 
Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union”, International 
Organization 55(2): 357-390 
 
Volden C. (2002), “Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States”, 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 18(1): 187-220 
 
Volpato G. (2008), Fiat Group Automobiles. Un’araba fenice nell’industria 
internazionale, Bologna: Il Mulino 
 
Weingast B.R., Moran J.M. (1983), “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional 
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission”, Journal of 
Political Economy 91: 765-800 
 
Weingast B.R. (1984), “The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-
Agent Perspective with Applications to the SEC”, Public Choice 44(1): 147-192 
 
Wiener A., Diez T. (eds.) (2004), European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press  
 
Wilks S., McGowan L. (1996), “Competition Policy in the European Union: 
Creating a Federal Agency?” in Doern G.B., Wilks S. (eds.) Comparative 
Competition Policy: National Institutions in a Global Market, Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Wilks S. (2005), “Competition Policy: Challenge and Reform” in Wallace H., 
Wallace M.A., Pollack M.A. (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
  157 
Wishlade F. (1993), “Competition Policy, Cohesion and the Coordination of 
Regional Aids in the European Community”, European Competition Law Review 
14(4): 143-150 
 
Wishlade F. (1998), “Competition Policy or Cohesion Policy by the Back Door? 
The Commission Guidelines on National Regional Aid”, European Competition 
Law Review 6: 343-357 
 
Wishlade F. (2008), “Competition and Cohesion – Coherence or Conflict? 
European Union Regional State Aid Reform Post-2008”, Regional Studies 42(5): 
753-765 
 
Wonka A. (2007), “Technocratic and independent? The appointment of European 
Commissioners and its policy implications”, Journal of European Public Policy 
14(2): 169-189 
 
Wonka A. (2008), “Decision-Making Dynamics in the European Commission: 
Partisan, National or Sectoral?”, Journal of European Public Policy 15(8): 1145-
1163 
 
Wood B.D., Waterman R.W. (1991), “The Dynamics of the Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy”, American Political Science Review 85(3): 801-828 
 
Wood B.D., Waterman R.W. (1993), “The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic 
Adaptation”, American Journal of Political Science 37(2): 497-528 
 
Zahariadis N. (1997), “Why state subsidies? Evidence from European Community 
countries, 1981-1986”, International Studies Quarterly 41(2): 341-54 
 
Zahariadis N. (2005), “Policy, Networks, Elections and State Subsidies”, Review of 
Policy Research 22(2): 115-131 
 
Zahariadis N. (2010), “State Aid and Partisan Government in the European Union”, 
Social Science Quarterly 91(2): 436-454 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
